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This dissertation examines how Governor General Jean Decoux mixed 
ideology and pragmatism to design policies elevating the colonial oeuvre 
in Indochina to fulfill his only mission: ensure French sovereignty in the 
region in the post-World War II era. This study begins by establishing 
that Vichy France had neither the will nor the capacity to export 
Pétainism abroad. It examines Pétain’s regime in the metropole and 
exposes the vacuity of the National Revolution as a coherent force. It 
looks at the opposing forces within the metropolitan government and the 
constraints imposed by the occupying German authorities to determine 
that there was no one version of the National Revolution, much less one 
that could be exported twelve thousand kilometers away to a Southeast 
Asian colony that had drastically different socioeconomic characteristics. 
The dissertation then explains that the Decoux regime is best understood 
in light of the ideological influence of ultraconservative Charles Maurras 
on the officers of the French Navy, including Decoux, whose writings 
and actions reflected the views of Action française. This study shows how 
Decoux used Vichy’s National Revolution as a vehicle to design policy 
geared toward winning the hearts and minds of the peoples of Indochina 
and overcoming the colony’s slide into autarky, objectives that were 
essential for the survival of French authority in the colony. Chapter 4 
examines how Decoux perfected the administration’s propaganda 
machine—which utilized coercion, censorship, rituals, and festivals—to 
draw parallels between French and Indochinese cultures to glorify the 
colonial oeuvre in the region. Chapter 5 looks at the regime’s 
v
administrative reforms, orchestration of sporting events, and use of the 
Légion française des combattants as desperate endeavors to create the illusion 
of a nascent federalist spirit guided by a united French community. 
Chapter 6 focuses on Decoux’s reorganization of the economy, designed 
to prove that the colonial authorities could still provide for the 
Indochinese peoples in spite of the region’s increasingly autarkical 
situation. Throughout this dissertation, I stress Decoux’s relative 
autonomy from the Pétainist agenda that existed (in rhetoric if not in 
practice) in the metropole, maintaining that his primordial objective was 
the salvation of any pretense of colonial legitimacy in the region, in spite 









Chapter I: Introduction and Overview
How did the unique strategic and political situation in French 
Indochina allow Governor General Jean Decoux to implement his own 
brand of authoritarianism in the colony during the Second World War in 
an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the European and Indochinese 
peoples? This dissertation seeks to answer this question by exploring how 
the French colonial administration sought to fulfill its mission of 
maintaining French sovereignty in the region by balancing its policy-
making between the ideological prevalence of a Maurrassian worldview 
and the endogenous and exogenous factors that required a more 
pragmatic approach given Indochina’s unique geopolitical situation. 
Moving away from the idea that Hanoi indiscriminately followed a 
Pétainist agenda and that Vichy “actually cloned itself overseas,”1  this 
study will show that the Decoux regime acted with significant autonomy 
to face its challenges, though its politics had the same ultraconservative 
and anti-republican ideological roots as those that inspired the National 
Revolution in the metropole. The marked cultural, socio-political, and 
economic differences that characterized France (as the metropole) and 
the five pays that constituted the colony rendered it impossible to import a 
carbon copy of the Pétainist program in Indochina, particularly given the 
colonists’ precarious hold on the region.2  Moreover, Decoux’s 
proconsulship outlasted the Vichy government by more than six months 
1
1. Eric Jennings, Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain's National Revolution in Madagascar, 
Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 2.
2. The term pays refers to the five regions of  Indochina: Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, 
Laos, and Cambodia. 
and Pierre Laval’s return to power in April 1942 arguably ended the 
prominence of the National Revolution in France itself, providing Hanoi 
with the opportunity to implement policies aligned with Decoux’s own 
worldview. The first goal of this project is to examine how the Decoux 
administration used the National Revolution as a vehicle to promote its 
own agenda, inspired by Maurrassism, with policies aiming to justify the 
five pays’ relationships with France, through the nurturing of a federalist 
spirit and concrete administrative and economic changes designed to 
promote the idea of France as Indochina’s natural protector and 
intellectual guide, in spite of its status as a weakened global power. The 
third goal is to contribute to a literature that has received little attention 
from scholars, including French historians, thereby increasing awareness 
for the legacy of the regime and its effects on post-Second World War 
Indochina.
Overview and Existing Literature
Much of the scholarly consideration devoted to the Vichy 
government has either focused on state collaboration and the persecution 
of Jews in France or the role of the leaders and the mass following they 
fostered and lost. Other contemporary works have examined how the 
French extreme Right seized power and the social foundations it tried to 
lay through the National Revolution. Even more profuse are the efforts to 
build theoretical models and case studies accounting for the emergence of 
nationalism in Western and non-Western regions and the struggles for 
independence that sometimes ensued. Indochina, and Vietnam in 
particular, has generated a considerable amount of interest due to its 
2
violent experience with decolonization and its role in Cold War 
containment history. Meanwhile the French empire during the Second 
World War has mostly been examined for its diplomatic or strategic 
value. With few exceptions, the contexts within which the imperial 
administration in Indochina implemented policies bore of anti-republican 
ideologies, the point where these bodies of literature intersect, have been 
overlooked. 
Traditionally, historians have designated this time in Indochinese 
history as the “Japanese period,” implicitly bypassing or downplaying the 
importance of the internal administrative and political machine that the 
occupying forces allowed the French to run. When not looking at 
Indochina as a mere piece in the United States’ quest for a decolonized 
post-war Asia (a vision that disappeared at Yalta in February 1945), 
scholars have most often focused on Franco-Japanese relations and the 
unfolding of events that took place ahead of the coup de force of 9 March 
1945. Brocheux and Isoart present a well documented account of how 
the Japanese stationnement presented diplomatic and strategic dilemmas 
for France and opportunities seized by Vietnamese nationalists.3  In a 
book rich on archival research but often short on analysis, Jaques Valette 
shows the often conflicting opinions and directions of French decision-
making vis-à-vis the Japanese and the mixed results that ensued.4 
Meanwhile Philippe Grandjean puts Japan at the center of colonial 
decision-making, with international relations as the main driver behind 
3
2. Pierre Brocheux and Paul Isoart, L'Indochine française, 1940-1945 (Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France, 1982).
3. Jacques Valette, Indochine 1940-1945: Français contre Japonais (Paris: SEDES, 1993).
Decoux’s policies, and Smith is particularly attentive to how the French 
and the Japanese competed for the realization of their visions of post-war 
Indochina.5 
Christopher Goscha’s work principally tries to answer the question of 
why an Indochinese state structure did not come into being after the war 
given various colonial administrations’ desires and plans to create one 
unified body.6  When looking at French imperial policies, Goscha 
examines how the imperial power constantly had to manage tensions 
between the Vietnamese on one side and the Lao and Cambodians on the 
other, particularly given the historical and socioeconomic domination—
as well as the self-perceived racial superiority—of the former. His brief 
section on Vichy Indochina focuses mostly on Decoux’s efforts to create 
an Indochinese “cultural ensemble” in parallel with the re-rooting of local 
identities and nationalisms.7 Goscha treats both of these policy directions 
as reactions to Japanese propaganda and Thai irredentism. However, 
while much attention is spent on the spillover effects for the Indochinese 
Communist Party (ICP), little is said about the ideological underpinnings 
that guided Decoux’s regime. The intellectual framework that processed 
events and subsequently decided upon which course to take is largely 
neglected and yet recognizing the lenses through which the world is 
perceived is a critical component in understanding policy-making (as 
opposed to policy-implementation). In fact, Goscha treats Decoux’s 
4
4. Philippe Grandjean, L'Indochine face au Japon: 1940-1945 (Paris: Harmattan, 2004). and 
Ralph B Smith, "The Japanese Period in Indochina and the Coup of 9 March 1945," 
Journal of  Southeast Asian Studies 9, No.2 (1978).
5. Christopher Goscha, Vietnam or Indochina?: Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese 
Nationalism, 1887-1954 (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of  Asian Studies, 1995).
6. Ibid., p. 83.
endeavors as continuations of the politics of Republican Governor 
Generals Alexandre Varenne and Pierre Pasquier to redefine local 
identities based on traditionalism and construct an Indochinese federal 
system with France as the keystone.8 If this is accurate, then the National 
Revolution in Indochina was not the complete break with the Republic 
that Vichy intended at home. Perhaps this says more about the 
Republican colonial authorities than it does about Vichy Indochina, but 
nonetheless examining the ideological sources underpinning Decoux’s 
ultraconservatism and contextualizing his mission to maintain French 
sovereignty in the region are essential to understanding the colonial 
vision of Indochina that Decoux sought to reinforce: one founded on 
hierarchies, supported by local sovereigns and elites, where France was 
seen as the protector of an Indochinese union. How Decoux sought to 
win the hearts and minds of the European and Indochinese peoples 
through policies based on his worldview is the subject of  this study.
A large portion of the historiography of the region examines the 
effects of Vichyite Indochina’s promotion of local identities as a factor in 
the development of nationalisms. The literature is rich with conclusions 
that Decoux’s initiatives were the impetus behind the emergence of 
independence movements.9  Decoux’s policies have to be understood as 
part of overall changes brought about by colonialism to the relationship 
between identity and the nation, particularly in Laos and Cambodia. 
Until the arrival of the French in the nineteenth century, state structures 
5
7. Ibid., 54.
8. Jennings and Raffin are the most obvious, but Goscha and Ivarsson also allude to this.
in what would be these two countries existed outside Western notions of 
judicial recognition.10  In these kingdoms, historically held together by 
fluid borders within mandala systems,11  the colons altered concepts of 
geography and spatial delimitations to meet their geo-strategic needs to 
counter Thai, British, and Chinese threats as well as to organize the 
colony administratively. Most of the literature on the region sees a 
continuity between the Third Republic and Vichy in promoting Lao and 
Cambodian identities to minimize Thai influences and this pays little 
attention to policies specific to Decoux.
Using Thongchai Winichakul’s Siam Mapped as his theoretical 
foundation, Søren Ivarsson skillfully investigates how Laos was formed 
by the larger and competing layouts of Indochina and Siam.12  He 
examines how the French colonial administrations used maps, print, and 
infrastructural improvements to promote a discourse linking Laos to 
Vietnam and away from Thailand. Ivarsson presents the Decoux 
administration as the paroxysm of identity politics that already existed 
during the Third Republic. Clearly the advent of the Lao Renovation 
Movement and Director of Public Education in Laos Charles Rochet’s 
efforts to cultivate a local identity were outgrowths of Decoux’s 
convictions, but they remained largely directed against the influence of 
the Thai, particularly after the cessation of territories following the 
6
9. At the risk of  generating debate, I loosely distinguish nation from state insofar as the 
former relates to identity while the latter is more structural and judicial.
10. Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 75; O.W. Wolters, History, Culture,  and 
Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives (Ithaca: SEAP, 1999), 27.
11. Søren Ivarsson, Creating Laos: The Making of a Lao Space Between Indochina and Siam, 
1860-1945 (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2008).
Franco-Thai war of 1940-41, efforts to which the republican 
administrators were also sensitive. In contrast, Martin Stuart-Fox, 
perhaps the most renowned scholar on Laos, and Geoffrey Gunn focus 
almost exclusively on Lao nationalism as a political movement, devoting 
very little space to the National Revolution.13
John Tully briefly evokes how Decoux was eager to foster Khmer 
national pride, but his longer term history of Cambodia never treats the 
National Revolution as much more than a tool to suppress Gaullists, 
Jews, and Communists.14  Penny Edwards’s work propounds that 
Cambodia was defined as a cultural space within colonial offices, she 
mistakenly downplays France’s geo-strategic objectives in formulating 
policy.15  That is to say that while she treats certain ideological facets of 
Decoux’s politics of promoting local identity, she pays too little attention 
to the pragmatism involved in his decision-making, particularly when 
pulled by different and competing forces. Furthermore, Edwards is 
interested in the revival of Cambodia’s Angkorian past, not the thrust of 
the French national recovery that was so central to the National 
Revolution.
Unlike in Cambodia and Laos, Vietnam’s notion of nationhood dates 
back at least two thousand years, and the colonial administration’s 
principal objectives there were to prevent local identification with 
7
12. Martin Stuart-Fox, Buddhist Kingdom, Marxist State: The Making of Modern Laos 
(Bangkok: White Lotus, 1996); Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997); andGeoffrey C. Gunn, Political Struggles in Laos, 
1930-1954 (Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1988).
13. John A. Tully, France on the Mekong: A History of the Protectorate in Cambodia, 
1863-1953 (Lanham, MD: University Press of  America, 2002).
14. Penny Edwards, Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation, 1860-1945 (Honolulu: 
University of  Hawai'i Press, 2007).
Japanese pan-Asian propaganda and re-direct emerging nationalism away 
from the ICP. However the policy outcomes were not always those that 
Hanoi intended. Brocheux and Hémery treat the Decoux regime as part 
of an incoherent whole of French policy vis-à-vis its colony and relate 
how the Viet Minh tapped discontent about colonial policies that had 
very old roots.16  David Marr’s seminal work 1945 provides multifaceted 
perspectives on the events leading to the Vietnamese Revolution, through 
French, Japanese, Allied, and Vietnamese lenses.17  However as its title 
indicates, the book does not provide more than background information 
on the politics that preceded the final year of the war. Marr’s Vietnamese 
Tradition on Trial18  focuses mainly on Vietnam and while it includes 
Decoux’s efforts to restore the family, reform education, and alter the 
functions of the mandarinate as part of the forces of cultural change that 
seized the country since the 1920s, it is never Marr’s ambition—nor in his 
expertise—to understand the dynamics of Hanoi’s policy-making, much 
less as they relate to the metropole.
The literature on colonialism examining the Decoux regime is 
particularly sparse, with only a handful of books and scholarly articles 
looking beyond Franco-Japanese relations and concentrating on the 
relatively free rein of the French administration. In his book Vichy in the 
Tropics—of which Indochina is but one of three parts, the other two 
focusing on Vichyite Madagascar and Guadeloupe—Eric Jennings argues 
8
151. Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery, Indochine: La Colonisation ambiguë, 1858-1954 
(Paris: Découverte, 2001).
16. David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995).
17. David G. Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1981).
that Vichy France “projected its ideology throughout the French empire 
between 1940 and 1944” and “delivered to its empire not only an 
authoritarianism that was bound to elicit opposition but also the seeds of 
nationalist resurgence.” He provides a thoughtful analysis of how the 
National Revolution was adapted to the Indochinese context and how its 
ultraconservative agenda aimed to keep the indigenous peoples loyal to 
the empire. Jennings focuses on what he believes were the three principal 
tendencies of Vichyite politics in Indochina: dependence on and use of 
mandarins and sovereigns, the impetus given to local nationalisms, and 
the formulation of a federalist discourse. He shows how Hanoi sought 
similarities between Pétainism and Confucianism around values of 
authority, family, work, and hierarchy.19  In addition, the colonial 
authorities drew parallels between French and Vietnamese folk heroes 
such as Joan of Arc and the Trung Sisters. Jennings examines thoroughly 
the Vichyite regime’s promotion of local identities, its use of sports and 
organizations to reach the youth, and its cultural push toward a return to 
tradition, three vectors which he argues were critical in the emergence of 
independent Indochinese nationalisms. Lastly, Jennings looks at the 
importation of Vichy’s exclusionary politics and Decoux’s administrative 
visions of federalism. Unfortunately, in his analysis, Jennings never pays 
enough attention to the changes occurring in the metropole, specifically 
Vichy’s changing political directions, its dissonant internal voices, and its 
diminishing power to project itself in the metropole or overseas. If Vichy 
cloned itself, then which Vichy was it and when? Furthermore, he never 
9
18. Jennings, 2, 38, 151-153
explains what it was about the Indochina of the Third Republic that 
Decoux wanted to “revolutionize.” The colony was already non-
democratic, exclusionary, and rural.  These fundamental but unanswered 
questions weaken his argument and leave the door open for a new 
interpretation of  the Decoux regime.
Of the essays contained in the edited volume L’Empire colonial sous 
Vichy, Jennings’s contributions are the most relevant to this project. In 
them he evokes many of the same themes found in Vichy in the Tropics, 
notably the role of youth organization, sports, and identity politics. He 
repeats his assertion that Vichy reproduced itself abroad and that it 
introduced all of Pétain’s favorite themes throughout the empire 
including the betrayal by “anti-France” elements, fears of an Anglo-
Saxon plot to seize its empire, and the National Revolution as a powerful 
elixir for the recovery of all of France, metropole and colonies alike.20 As 
in Vichy in the Tropics, Jennings completely ignores the economic 
initiatives of the Decoux regime designed to address the colony’s 
increasingly autarkical situation. The Decoux he paints in these essays is 
slightly more autonomous than the one of Vichy in the Tropics and 
Jennings affirms that in “Southeast Asia, the Vichy team, dynamic, 
competent, and even zealous, tried by every means to instill in the 
Indochinese notions of local patriotism, ancestors, authenticity, even 
irredentism.” As in his previous book, Jennings concludes that the 
“formula was no doubt fatal for French colonialism.”21
10
19. Eric Jennings, "La Politique coloniale de Vichy," in L'Empire colonial sous Vichy, eds. 
Jacques Cantier and Eric Jennings (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2004), 18.
20. Eric Jennings, "L'Indochine de L'Amiral Decoux," in Cantier and Jennings, eds., 49.
Anne Raffin focuses primarily on the manners in which Decoux 
utilized youth organizations for ideological purposes, specifically to 
counter Japanese propaganda and develop local patriotisms to fall within 
the colonial context.22  Like Jennings, she argues that the promotion of 
sports and scouting created the structures and discipline from which 
nationalists successfully drew in the aftermath of war. Moreover, the 
cultivation of regional identities, either as part of an ideological agenda 
or as a pragmatic approach to counteracting Japanese influence, backfired 
on the French as the infusion of  youth organizations
with specific and powerful cultural meanings was viewed by the French 
colonial authority as a means to reinforce the rapid construction of an 
imperial political identity of members of each country [but these] 
preexisting imperial organizations would later help social group 
formation after the fall of French colonialism in 1945 by reducing the 
costs of  mobilization.23
Raffin shows that the transposition of the National Revolution to 
Indochina needed to be customized and localized enough to develop a 
form of its own if it was to resonate in Confucian and Buddhist cultures. 
Like Jennings she explicates how the colonial administration drew 
parallels between French and Indochinese folklores, but she is less rigid in 
her analysis and her approach to the coexisting efforts to “Westernize” 
local mentalities and “Easternize” the National Revolution highlights 
how pragmatic the colonial state could be. She makes an important 
contribution by investigating how initiatives to create common political 
11
21. Anne Raffin, Youth Mobilization in Vichy Indochina and its Legacies, 1940 to 1970 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005).
22. Ibid., 143.
identities were developed to counteract Japanese pan-Asian propaganda. 
According to Raffin, the National Revolution drew its strength from five 
factors in Indochina: 1) Decoux’s personality and political orientation 
(influenced heavily by his habitus and the Navy culture);24  2) Decoux’s 
discretionary powers; 3) Platon’s ideology as Vichy’s Minister of 
Colonies; 4) the drive to counter Japanese propaganda; and 5) the 
relatively low level of  interference by the Free French.
Sébastien Verney’s recently published L’Indochine sous Vichy provides 
a panoply of detail, demonstrating a thorough research of the measures 
taken by the Decoux regime. Like much of French colonial literature, 
however, it is rich with information but light on analysis. It emphasizes 
the administration’s actions rather than its overall strategy or the origins
—that is the reasons behind—these actions. Echoing Jennings (though 
providing more room for customization for the local context) in the few 
places where he dives into analysis, Verney insists that the Decoux 
administration “tried to elaborate a National Revolution as faithful as 
possible to Vichy” to “create a new Frenchman.”25  This dissertation 
distinguishes itself from Verney’s work by arguing that Decoux used the 
National Revolution as a vehicle to achieve his objectives, which were 
dominated not by the need to create a “new man” (which as Chapter 2 
will discuss was more in line with ultras than Pétainist ultraconservatives) 
but simply to assure the sovereignty of France over Indochina in the 
postwar. This project contends that Decoux formulated policy based on 
12
23. Anne Raffin, "Tours of Duty, Cross-Identification and Introjection: The Colonial 
Administrative Mind in Wartime Indochina," Journal of Historical Sociology 21, No.2/3 
(2008), 183-212.
24. Sébastien Verney, L’Indochine sous Vichy (Paris: Riveneuve Editions, 2012), 161, 475.
his own Maurrassian-influenced worldview, pragmatically adapting to 
how he saw the Indochinese context through his ideological lenses. As 
such, this dissertation places a greater emphasis than does Verney on the 
intellectual underpinnings of Decoux’s decision-making and objective-
setting.
This overview of the works specifically examining the politics of the 
Decoux regime and its relationship to the ultraconservative agenda of the 
National Revolution highlights the literature’s quantitative paucity. 
Moreover, it shows important gaps in the historiography. While Raffin 
allows Hanoi more independence in its policy-making than Jennings, her 
extensive focus on sports and youth organizations leaves her less room to 
examine thoroughly the dynamics and ideological underpinnings of the 
colonial administration’s politics, particularly those based in anti-
republican pre-war France. Jennings provides a broader thematic 
coverage but presents an often incomplete picture of the National 
Revolution itself, as he neglects its lack of political and ideological 
cohesion at home—particularly as the conflict dragged on—and Vichy’s 
declining influence; a significant problem since his argument is based on 
the notion that Vichy cloned itself  abroad.
This thesis dissociates Vichy and the ideology behind the National 
Revolution when examining the dynamics of Decoux’s policy-making, 
looking at three fundamental events in the metropole that have largely 
been ignored in the colonial literature, though they are critical to 
evaluating the Vichy’s influence on Hanoi and therefore understanding 
the latter’s autonomy (which in turn provides information about the 
13
drivers behind its decisions). These events are: 1) the ideological evolution 
of the National Revolution; 2) Pétainism’s emasculation under the 
Darlan government and to an even greater extent under Laval’s second 
administration; and 3) Vichy’s diminishing power, particularly after the 
German occupation of the Free Zone. Historian Julian Jackson 
underscores the problem by claiming that there was “an official version of 
the National Revolution it was contained in Pétain’s speeches—although 
Pétain himself disliked the term Revolution and only used it four times, 
preferring to talk of redressement [recovery] or rénovation [renewal].”26 One 
highly influential Vichy scholar, Robert Paxton, affirms quite clearly that 
Vichy was not a bloc and that there were competing “tendencies around 
several sets of alternatives: integral Catholic moral order—the pagan 
nationalist moral order of some pre-war protofascist leagues; federal state
—centralized state; persuasive means—coercive means.”27  Moreover, 
when Paxton calls the history of the National Revolution “the gradual 
gathering around one set of poles: integral Catholicism, Napoleonic 
centralism, more concentrated capitalism, and coercion”28  he is 
describing the dialectical evolution of a political agenda faced with 
internal and external struggles in the context of war, ones that did not 
necessarily resonate in Indochina. 
It is difficult to accept Jennings’s main thesis, that Vichy officials 
could have extended an “undiluted form of their ultraconservative 
14
25. Julian Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 148.
26. Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001), 140.
27. Ibid., 142.
ideology” to Indochina, since Vichy’s own politics were never 
ideologically homogenous; existed in relation to (if not dependent on) its 
relationship with Germany and the policies of the Reich; and varied 
consequentially based on the particular Head of government in power at 
the time, not to mention the incessant machinations of its officials.29 This 
study departs from Jennings by positing that Vichy never had the power 
to project one coherent ideological agenda throughout the war as the 
doctrines it proposed were never unified. Furthermore, its internal drive 
for fundamental change weakened as Pétain’s own influence declined, 
particularly after Vichy turned increasingly collaborationist following 
Laval’s return to power (18 April 1942) and the German occupation of 
the Free Zone (11 November 1942). Apart from the promulgation of 
exclusionary laws and its evermore coercive use of power, the period was 
short during which Vichy applied the ultraconservative doctrines for 
which it is remembered. 
Nevertheless, when the National Revolution’s momentum and the 
traditionalists’ power were at their zenith, during the first eight months 
that followed the armistice, the ease and rapidity with which Pétainist 
programs were enacted in the metropole suggest that they were the 
products of already existing ultraconservative discourse, and much of this 
can be traced to Action française, the royalist, ultraconservative movement 
headed by Charles Maurras. This dissertation looks at how this discourse 
penetrated the upper echelons of the French Navy, influencing Decoux 
profoundly so that his politics as Governor General were born of the 
15
28. Jennings, Vichy in the Tropics, 2.
same Maurrassian tradition that gained force at the turn of the century in 
France and inspired Vichy’s recovery. As such, it is more useful to 
understand the dynamics of policy-making of the Decoux administration 
as the confrontation between a worldview significantly influenced by pre-
war ultraconservatism and the specific Indochinese context of the war, 
including the region’s isolation and the administration’s primordial 
mission to maintain French sovereignty in Indochina, which, given 
France’s military impotence and the constant threat posed by the 
Japanese presence, could only be achieved through policies designed to 
win hearts and minds.
Vichy’s own inability to come up with a pure version of Pétainism 
makes it impossible to accept Hanoi’s implementation of the National 
Revolution as the pursuit of an undiluted ideology originating from Vichy 
itself. That is not to say that directives from the metropole weren’t sent to 
and followed by the colonial administration, but Decoux had to exercise 
some discretion in their implementation since most of Vichy’s laws were 
designed to address specifically metropolitan issues. Hanoi may have 
supported the Légion Française des Combattants (the veterans’ organization 
whose goal it was to diffuse Pétainist principles in France and in the 
empire), the push for traditional values, and (at times) the application of 
exclusionary laws, but the ideas behind these initiatives date from long 
before the war, present in the discourses of Action française or La Croix de 
feu founder Colonel de la Roque, as Chapter 3 will show. This study 
refutes the predominance of the Vichy-Hanoi axis and in its stead 
proposes that while the politics of Vichy and Hanoi shared similar 
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ideological roots, their respective situations during the war made it 
impossible for the former to replicate itself abroad, allowing Decoux a 
certain freedom to enact his own worldview to accomplish his objectives, 
the most important being keeping France’s imperial hold over Indochina.
To understand Indochina’s relationship with the metropole one must 
make the distinction between Vichy the administrative entity and Vichy 
the nominative encapsulation of Pétainism, collaboration, and every 
other image burned into popular consciousness. Within the context of the 
Second World War, Vichy was a government body, with domestic 
policies, political relationships with the conflict’s powers (including the 
occupying forces), and ties to the territories of its empire. It is largely in 
the post-war era of the Allied victory that Vichy as a name has morphed 
into the more subjective—nebulous—anti-republican and Axis-aiding 
policies of some of the members of its government (see Chapter 2). 
Decoux’s loyalty to the metropole was first and foremost an 
administrative one, that is, a refusal to enter into dissent vis-à-vis what he 
saw as the only legitimate French government. That his worldview 
coincided with the tenets of Pétainism only reinforced this perception. 
Moreover, Japan’s declarations to French Ambassador in Tokyo Arsène 
Henry in 1940 that it would only recognize legal representatives of the 
metropolitan government was a clear threat, and dissent on the part of 
officials serving in Indochina was unthinkable.30  François Darlan, Head 
of the French Navy, suggested Decoux replace out of favor Governor 
General Georges Catroux when those within the French government in 
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favor of an armistice with Germany were desperate to avoid the 
disintegration of the empire that would have resulted from continuing the 
struggle from abroad. Darlan trusted Decoux to accept the metropolitan 
administration as the only legal entity and not to break the chain of 
command. 
Indochina officially promulgated laws originating from the metropole 
but, as will be discussed, these were enacted with various levels of 
customization  based on regional contexts, and sometimes were kept on 
the books but not observed. One should not assume, however, that the 
laws coming out of Vichy were automatically or inherently Pétainist, in 
the doctrinal sense of the word. As will be explored in chapter 2, Vichy 
the political entity was often not aligned with Vichy the nominal ideology 
(which arguably did not exist in itself but has come to designate that for 
which the National Revolution stood). As such, Decoux’s loyalty to 
Vichy should be understood within a geopolitical framework more than 
an ideological one, though critically—and this is what this dissertation 
argues—Decoux and Pétainism shared the same ultraconservative 
ideological roots. This work will provide evidence of Decoux’s autonomy 
by stressing the logistical impossibilities of having the metropole dictate 
policies in Indochina and highlighting when and how Decoux chose to 
act in accordance to his own appreciation of the situation based on 
political expedient or the customized application of law in the colony. 
The crux of the argument remains that Decoux’s openness to the rhetoric 
of the National Revolution was a matter of sharing in its pre-war 
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Maurrassian roots and believing that it was the most appropriate vehicle 
to ensure the maintenance of  French sovereignty in Indochina.
This dissertation will not, it should be noted, provide the Indochinese 
peoples‘ responses to Vichy policies. Although these are critical linkages 
to understanding how wartime events prepared the terrain for the August 
Revolution of 1945 and the First Indochinese War, local reactions to 
colonial policies would take this work beyond its intended scope. Beyond 
the considerable research that is required to draw parallel paths between 
colonial policies and locals’ reactions, this dissertation seeks to divulge 
how and why policies were made in the colony based on decisions that 
had to be taken with the limited information the authorities had on 
specific topics. French intelligence was remarkably out of touch with the 
locals and their sentiments vis-à-vis the administration, the war, and daily 
life.31  Shawn McHale investigates how the Viet Minh over the course of 
the war moved from reacting to the colonial rhetoric to crafting a message 
of their own. He also explores the manner in which, in Vietnam, the rural 
population was more susceptible to Viet Minh propaganda because they 
were historically less touched by French culture and influence.32  Locals’ 
reactions is a complex, broad topic and this work will hopefully open the 
doors for future research that will complete the picture of Indochina 
during the Second World War.                                                                         
Background and Project Construct
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Decoux’s ascendence was the result of the parallel aggressive 
expansions of the German and Japanese empires, both of which France 
was unable to resist militarily. In the metropole, the ultraconservative 
regime of Marshal Philippe Pétain pursued erratic and sometimes 
contradictory agendas involving ideologically-driven efforts to destroy the 
institutions of the Third Republic, which it replaced, and pragmatic 
approaches, including collaboration with the German occupying forces, 
to ensure the prominence of France as a power in the postwar. The 
capitulation of France in Europe, coupled with the disarray that ensued 
the change of regime, encouraged the Japanese to pressure the French 
into allowing the stationing of its troops in Indochina, knowing that the 
colonial authorities were incapable of resisting militarily given their 
insufficient combat forces. 
On 19 June 1940, days before the signing of the armistice in Europe, 
Japan demanded that French Indochina close its border with China to 
ensure that no supplies reached Chiang Kai Shek’s army. The Japanese 
had sought the shutdown of the Indochinese-Yunnan railway since 1937, 
which it suspected served to transport arms to Chinese Nationalist forces. 
Severed from a French government in the midst of collapse, faced with 
the threat of a Japanese invasion that would have toppled the French 
authorities, and receiving no sign of military support from the British or 
American governments, Governor General Georges Catroux (Decoux’s 
predecessor) decided to appease Tokyo. He prohibited the transport of 
fuel across the border and allowed the presence of Japanese 
representatives to control its closure. One week later, republican Minister 
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of Colonies Rivière dismissed Catroux on grounds that he should never 
have given in to the Japanese ultimatum and allowed the presence of 
foreign troops in the colony. The Republican government immediately 
appointed Admiral Jean Decoux, then commander of the French naval 
forces in Pacific, as Governor General of  Indochina.
Initially in favor of continuing the fight against Germany from the 
colonies and refusing to give into Japanese pressures even at the risk of a 
hopeless military conflict, Decoux reluctantly fell in line with Vichy’s 
positions on cessation of hostilities with the Wehrmacht and the 
preservation of Indochina above noble sentiments of resistance to the 
invader. In August, Japan demanded that the French allow its troops 
passage in Indochina as well as use local airfields. As Vichy and Tokyo 
negotiated accords, Decoux continued to oppose compliance, warning 
the Ministry of Colonies of the nefarious consequences of succumbing to 
Japanese threats. Again he was reminded of his need for discipline and 
again the Admiral, with his preternatural sense of duty, complied. The 
result was the signing of two agreements, one in August and another in 
September, which ultimately allowed for the presence of 6,000 Japanese 
troops in Tonkin. Though other agreements would follow, both economic 
and military (including one that extended Japanese presence across the 
colony), these first two were the watershed in Franco-Japanese relations 
that would preserve France’s sovereignty in Indochina (until the coup de 
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force on 9 March 1945) in exchange for its subservience to the Japanese 
war effort.33
This supposed sovereignty marked the contradiction in Decoux’s 
General Governorship and Indochina’s place within the larger global 
conflict. The French were in no position to resist the Japanese in 1940: 
90,000 troops, of which only 14,500 were European (and ostensibly better 
trained and motivated for combat), six months of munitions for the 
infantry, three for the artillery, no mechanized units, rifles dating from the 
Great War, and 98 airplanes, only 15 of which were considered modern 
fighters.34 Once the Japanese forces arrived in the region, the French hold 
became even more precarious. The colonial authorities were entirely 
dependent on Japanese willingness to let them continue to exist, a 
willingness that ended on 9 March 1945 when Tokyo deemed it in its 
interests to take control of the region to better assure its defense. French 
Indochina was, moreover, technically tied to Japan by the Common 
Defense Agreement (the Darlan-Kato Accord of July 1941), which 
committed it to fight alongside the Empire of the Sun in case of foreign 
aggression in Indochina. While Japan used the stationing of its troops in 
Indochina for its war effort, it needed the region to supplement the rice 
and resources it was lacking. It could not rely on China to provide it with 
foodstuffs; Kwangtung especially was deficient in rice. Rice production in 
the French colony, coupled with Japan’s needs for rubber and petrol, 
incited the Japanese to move southward into Indochina and the Dutch 
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Indies.35 When Vichy Prime Minister Pierre Laval accepted a system of 
reciprocal exchanges in special yen on 30 December 1942, the Bank of 
Indochina became the ultimate guarantor of trade payments with Japan, 
effectively forcing Indochina into Japan’s financial orbit and absorbing it 
in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.36 France was technically 
sovereign and maintained its administration in the region, but only under 
the sword of Damocles. In spite of this reality, Decoux had no choice but 
to keep his administration operating and implementing policies in hopes 
that the war would end with his government still intact.
From the Allies’ standpoint, Indochina played little to no part 
strategically during the conflict other than to reduce the number of 
Japanese troops which could be stationed in the Philippines to oppose an 
eventual American return. As early as November 1943, the United States 
War Department contended that military operations in China would 
come too late to support an attack on mainland Japan, thereby making an 
assault on Indochina an unnecessary diversion, though, as Chapter 6 
examines, the Allies heavily targeted Indochinese ports and infrastructure 
to disrupt the region’s external and internal trade, which in turn hindered 
the movement of foodstuffs within the territory and contributed 
significantly to the 1944-1945 famine in Tonkin and northern Annam. 
While de Gaulle had designated the liberation of Indochina as the 
highest priority outside the metropole and the United States was willing 
to placate him while tapping the French resistance network in Indochina 
23
34. Valette, 32.
35. Martin Thomas, The French Empire at War (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1998), 202.
to provide it with information on Japanese troop movements, 
Washington had no intention to land its troops in the French colony. The 
War Department, however, found it useful to keep the Japanese guessing 
as to where the Allies would strike and planted stories suggesting an 
imminent invasion of Indochina.37  This policy ultimately had disastrous 
effects on French Indochina as the resistance believed the Allies would 
“liberate” the region. Its members often lacked the necessary discretion, 
overzealous in voicing their support for de Gaulle, in what Jacques 
Vallette calls the “raison d’être of a resistance of the eleventh hour, in a last 
hope of absolving [those] who, almost to the man, had compromised 
themselves with an inopportune ardor in favor of Vichy and the National 
Revolution.” The Japanese overthrew the colonial administration largely 
in order to address the risks posed by this resistance in case of an 
amphibious Allied landing in Indochina, as well as to block efforts of 
Gaullist elements who were beginning to infiltrate back into the colony.38
For four and a half years, the colonial administration would exist and 
make policies based on its interactions with the two forces that exerted 
some form of influence over it: the politics of the French and Japanese 
governments. Though the influence of both of these forces strengthened 
and waned over the course of the Second World War, the story of 
Decoux’s administration is primordially one of the struggle of the 
colonial authorities to ensure a maximal degreeFrench sovereignty over 
Indochina during the war and in its aftermath. To do so, Decoux had to 
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demonstrate to the local people as well as the Japanese forces (and to 
some extent the Americans, of whose distant gaze he was very conscious) 
that France—in spite of its defeat in Europe, its capitulation to Tokyo’s 
demands in Asia, and the potential loss of face that ensued both events—
was capable and willing to continue to build its oeuvre in the colony, 
which, according to its own narrative, brought the benefits of Western 
culture and science to the region to elevate the peoples there and develop 
the societies into modern ones. This was nothing more than the 
continuation of a republican discourse dating back over sixty years, but 
the ultraconservative doctrine of Pétain’s National Revolution in Vichy 
provided an alternative vehicle for Hanoi to reach its goals. Decoux, 
himself influenced by Action française, used the National Revolution to 
implement policies in Indochina that derived from Maurrassism, itself 
the ideological source of Pétainism, to win the hearts and minds of the 
Indochinese and French populations. Indochina’s isolation from the 
metropole and the unique context that it presented allowed him 
unprecedented autonomy to govern, thereby resulting in a brand of 
authoritarianism that crushed dissenting voices while elevating and 
fetishizing its own ideological tenets. Moreover, the ultraconservative 
discourse provided justifications for certain administrative and economic 
reorganizations that were necessary given the autarkical state of 
Indochina during the war. How Decoux created his own brand of 
authoritarianism, based on his worldview, to win the hearts and minds of 
the inhabitants of  Indochina is the subject of  this study.
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To understand Decoux’s regime and in particular its connections 
with the National Revolution that it supposedly embraced, it is critical to 
examine the history of Pétainism in the metropole to gauge the power it 
did or did not exert in France and abroad. The following two chapters 
look at Vichy’s political evolution, particularly in terms of the gap 
between the rhetoric and the actions of the government, as well as the 
ideological frameworks of the Maurrassian ideology that permeated the 
pre-war France, influencing not only the architects of the National 
Revolution, but also the navy, and aspiring officers such as Jean Decoux. 
Doing so will demonstrate that Vichy was incapable of projecting itself 
overseas (or as Jennings puts it “cloning”) because it had neither the 
ideological homogeneity nor the political will to do so. With this 
established, this project will examine how Decoux’s regime formulated 
policies that re-organized Indochina to face the challenges of its geo-
strategic position based on the Admiral’s worldview and personal 
character.
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Chapter II: Neither National nor Revolution
The idea that the Vichy government cloned itself overseas 
presupposes that it consisted of a homogenous body of interests with a 
coherent political agenda that could be implemented throughout the 
empire. It suggests that, in the midst of a global conflict and while 
occupied by a foreign power, the metropolitan administration successfully 
exported a set of policies that were unabashedly French solutions to 
French problems. Moreover, the notion assumes that the imperial 
governor generals had the capacity to adapt the programs to their regions’ 
socioeconomic specificities without losing the spirit of Vichy’s original 
intents. This reproduction would have been all the more impressive in 
Indochina, a land of variegated cultures located 12,000 kilometers from 
Vichy, officially absorbed into the Japanese Sphere of Co-Prosperity and 
cut off from all maritime traffic with Europe by 1941.1  Indochina 
represents a unique case in Vichy imperial policy because it is the only 
colony to have remained loyal to Pétain until the liberation of Paris, as 
North Africa and Madagascar fell to the Allies in 1942.2  This chapter 
looks at the historical and political contexts that surrounded Pétainism’s 
effort to remold France after its defeat. It examines the reasons behind the 
failure of the National Revolution as a doctrine, highlighting the 
unwillingness of many top officials within Vichy to implement its 
programs and the obstacles posed by the occupying forces. By exposing 
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the ultimate emptiness of the National Revolution in the metropole, this 
chapter shows that Vichy had neither the ability nor the willingness to 
export a homogenous doctrine to Indochina.
The Third Republic was never able—or truly wanted—to replicate its 
ideology in the colonies in spite of its self-proclaimed mission civilisatrice. 
For almost fifty years, a debate raged between proponents of assimilation 
(those who believed in the acculturation of local peoples to the values and 
rights of the French republic) and associationism (those who favored 
indirect rule, with limitations of political inclusion of colonial subjects). 
Neither policy was ever consistently applied in any part of the empire, 
though in the years preceding the Second World War, associationists were 
on the ascent. While it held a universalist republican discourse, French 
imperial practice during the Third Republic limited the political 
participation of its indigenous peoples, relied on local chiefs to maintain 
order, allowed religious bodies (both missionaries and monks) to educate 
the youth, and enforced different legal codes for colonials and subjects.3 
Even under the Leftist Popular Front (1936-1937) very little was 
achieved. Since the Socialists had been continually critical of colonial 
policy, many expected the administration to enact deep reforms within 
the empire, but these hopes were soon dashed. In 1927 Léon Blum, who 
would later be Prime Minister under the Popular Front, had called for 
colonial legislation that would begin processes of decolonization after a 
period of “provisional tutelage,” a position somewhat aligned with 
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British policy.4 Yet unlike in the Philippines, Burma, or India, the French 
never held conversations with local leaders about the future of the 
colonies and no long-term plans were ever designed.5  Minister of 
Colonies Marius Moutet under the Popular Front declared from the 
outset that the primary goal of colonialism was to improve the social and 
economic conditions of local populations. This “altruistic colonialism” 
nonetheless remained subject to economic laws, and with concerns not to 
increase unemployment in the metropole or create a potentially 
revolutionary proletariat in the colonies, no policy of extensive 
industrialization was ever seriously considered.6  Particularly in 
Indochina, the colonial economic model resembled that in Java: the 
export of raw materials or semi-finished goods. Furthermore, Indochina’s 
imports from France were higher than its exports to the metropole 
because the colony was able to sell more to Asia than it bought. This 
created a positive commercial balance for Paris, masking a deep malaise 
in the French economy.7  It is difficult to export economic, social, and 
political development with such pressing needs to sustain under-
industrialization.
While Hanoi undeniably drew from Pétainist rhetoric of national 
rebirth and glorification of the Marshal, to understand how the colonial 
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administration in Indochina made policy and to determine Decoux’s 
capacity to implement his own brand of authoritarianism to win hearts 
and minds, it is essential to comprehend the situation in the metropole 
and measure Vichy’s power to replicate its ideology abroad. It is not 
enough to assert that Vichy cloned itself; one should become familiar 
with the men who composed the government—in Hans Morgenthau’s 
words, the “individuals who, when they appear as representatives of their 
nation. . .wield the power and pursue the policies of their nation.”8 One 
must understand Vichy’s internal mechanics and its driving forces before 
we can assess its relationship with Hanoi. Only then can one speak in 
empirical terms of Vichy’s power and measure its ability to disseminate 
its programs abroad and subsequently gain insights into Decoux’s 
administration.
The most striking paradox of the National Revolution—the new 
order that Pétainism sought to create in France following the debacle—
was that it was neither “national” nor a “revolution.” From its inception, 
the rebirth that Pétainism promised could not extend to the entirety of 
the country. When Parliament voted on 10 July 1940 to give 
plenipotentiary powers to Pétain, three-fifths of France was under the 
yoke of occupation and Article 3 of the armistice made it clear that “the 
German Reich exercise[d] all rights of an occupying power” in the North. 
While the government in Vichy was theoretically sovereign over the 
entirety of France, for almost two and a half years German authorities 
systematically refused to allow Vichy to implement its programs or 
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disseminate its propaganda in the Occupied Zone. The Journal Officiel, 
where all French laws and decrees issued in Vichy were printed weekly, 
needed the approval of the German military before it could be published 
in Paris and the General Delegation of the Government in the Occupied 
Territories was established to minimize the isolation of local French 
authorities faced with the occupying power.9 This reality never weakened 
Pétain’s conviction that he embodied the nation. In a phrase that 
Baudouin described as in the pure style of Louis XIV, Pétain told his 
Minister “I know I can have full confidence in you, because you identify 
my person with the nation.”10 Yet Vichy’s capacity to govern was further 
diminished when on 11 November 1942 the Wehrmacht crossed the 
demarcation line, completing the country’s subjugation. German control 
stretched now to the Mediterranean and the Reich installed a Gauleiter 
who had final say on all Vichy legislation, reducing Vichy to an organ of 
internal repression and organization of migrant French labor to German 
factories. 
The new order was anything but revolutionary and its 
ultraconservative, reactionary agenda drew the scorn of the quasi-fascist 
pro-collaboration circles in Paris (who considered themselves 
revolutionaries), within which Marcel Déat and Jacques Doriot were 
integral. The Nazi organs shared this contempt. On 22 December 1940, 
the Kölnische Zeitung accused Vichy, the “decree machine,” of calling for 
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revolution without taking necessary the steps to make one, describing it a 
place where 
one doesn’t dare call fundamentally conservative policies conservative 
but where one is continually forced to seek new, often superfluous 
qualifiers that nonetheless fail to hide that the content consists, from an 
ideological point of view, of a return to a past anterior to the 
Revolution...[as the regime is] spiritually entrenched in the principles of 
a disappeared epoch.11
Going beyond empty government propaganda, we must answer a few 
questions to assess the relationship between Vichy and Hanoi. Did 
Pétain’s government implement a coherent program in the metropole that 
could be used as a model in the colonies? How did internal and external 
forces mold Vichy’s politics? Lastly, how much power did the regime have 
to project itself and play a direct role in the direction of policies in its 
colonies? If the answers to these questions suggest that Vichy did not 
have the capacity to export a coherent program to the colonies, then we 
must conclude that Decoux acted with certain levels of ideological and 
administrative autonomy in the region during the war.12
From Debacle to Rebirth
The spectacular defeat of the Allied forces during the Battle of 
France left a country shellshocked. On 15 May 1940, only five days after 
the launch of operation Fall Gelb (the Wehrmacht’s code name for the 
invasion of the Low Countries and the subsequent penetration of the 
Ardennes), Prime Minister Paul Reynaud telegraphed his British 
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counterpart informing him that the counterattack against the Germans in 
Sedan had failed and the battle was lost. Including Belgian and 
Luxembourger citizens, conservative estimates count eight million évacués 
(the term used at the time) flooding the roads to escape the invading 
forces, and ten to twelve million Frenchmen who came in contact with 
them during their flight and were thus emotionally and psychologically 
impacted by the scenes.13  This direct experience with defeat contrasted 
with the static and distant—and therefore only imagined in the minds of 
most citizens—battle lines of the Great War. Though several journalists 
and politicians had warned in the years preceding the war of the certain 
defeat to which France’s lack of preparation would lead, when 
catastrophe struck many sought scapegoats to justify the annihilation of 
what they had believed to be the most powerful army in the world: a fifth 
column of communists, a pro-German defeatist camp, or the British who 
fled all too quickly out of inherent selfishness. The Third Republic 
remained the most obvious target of blame, even though not one 
parliamentary deputy from 1936 to 1940 had voted against annual 
appropriations bills for the military.
As government members faced the decision whether to stay in the 
metropole or continue the struggle from North Africa, Pétain announced 
he would not “abandon French soil and [and would] accept the suffering 
that shall be imposed on the patrie and its sons. The French rebirth will be 
the fruit of this suffering.”14  Pétain saw an opportunity for the elite to 
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push for a political, intellectual, and moral renovation following the 
country’s defeat and occupation by foreign armies, as it had been for 
Prussia after its loss to Napoleon at Iéna in 1806.15 Foreign Minister Paul 
Baudouin declared in May that the “horrible misfortunes that appear to 
be falling upon [France] may perhaps finally be salutary,” echoing 
Pétain’s declaration that all must “be started over in this country.”16 Only 
a program of rebirth could prevent France from falling into anarchy. 
When parliament voted to accord Pétain with the authority to promulgate 
a new constitution for the Etat français, it permitted the concretization of 
this program. As with Thiers in 1871, Clemenceau in 1917, Poincaré in 
1926, and Doumergue in 1934, the French called on an old man to save 
France.
Though completely overrun militarily, the French posed two 
conditions as the sine qua non for armistice: the preservation of its navy 
and the neutrality of its empire, non-aligned with either Allied or Axis 
powers in the war effort. The navy was deemed necessary to protect the 
colonies, which in turn ensured France would remain a great, albeit 
weakened, power after the war. Neutrality was key to prevent the British 
from invading and later appropriating France’s imperial possessions while 
equally it served as leverage against what Weygand called the “abuses 
which the Reich impose[d] upon all European people.”17  Neutrality 
would also shield indigenous peoples from seeing French officers take 
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and risking local uprisings upon a hoped-for liberation.18  Germany was 
happy to oblige as it too wanted to avoid French colonies and the fleet 
from falling into British hands. This position of neutrality extended to the 
colonies, including Decoux’s Indochina.
Unlike their counterparts in the metropole, the military leaders 
present in the colonies had not experienced the rout of the French army 
first hand, and debates raged all over the empire whether to pledge loyalty 
to Pétain or continue to fight. For many, the Marshal’s influence and 
prestige weighed heavily on the decision to accept the cessation of 
combat, certainly more than that of the largely unknown de Gaulle, who 
had been promoted from colonel only a few months before. As Admiral 
Platon’s biographer Jean-Marc van Hille highlights, it is surprising how 
often the term “veneration” was employed in the political discourse of 
the time when referring to the victor of Verdun.19  Most of the imperial 
proconsuls, including Decoux, were career officers trained to serve and 
obey and believed the military to be above politics. To them any 
dissidence was a crime against the patrie, and every significant colony 
rallied to the government, except French Equatorial Africa, which rallied 
to the Free French on 26 August 1940 (though Gabon remained an island 
loyal to Vichy). Defections were individual, not as groups, and French 
promises not to continue the war from abroad were critical for the 
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maintenance of the armistice, to which Germany tied the fates of two 
million prisoners of  war, hence keeping most officers in line.20
The National Revolution
In a speech delivered on 8 October 1940, after the government had 
already enacted substantial pieces of legislation (including the First 
Jewish Statute), Pétain called for a Revolution to correct seventy years of 
republican mistakes that had led to defeat. Never defining exactly what 
he meant by the value-laden term revolution, he outlined the essential 
traits of the new regime: “national in foreign policy, hierarchical in 
interior policy, coordinated and controlled in its economy and above all 
social in its spirit and its institutions.”21 The National Revolution, whose 
principal architects had been members or sympathizers of Action 
Française, was a response to the disorder, secularism, and class struggle in 
the name of equality and urbanization that emerged from the the 1789 
Revolution’s abolition of moral values and the rejection of social 
consensus.22 It sought to end the weakness of the government in the face 
of private interests and the excess concentration of capital.23 The difficult 
times ahead required a paternal order “to give the country the strength to 
live. . .by ridding it of  the selfishness that divided and weakened it.”24
A confusing catchall term that meant everything and yet nothing, 
“National Revolution” had been part of the vocabulary of the 
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Bonapartist deputy Pierre Taitinger’s Jeunesses Patriotes during the 
Interwar period and was also the title of French fascist Georges Valois’ 
book in 1924. It had the advantage of presenting facets of almost every 
Right-wing ideologue of the previous seventy-five years and therefore 
represented diverse, though often opposing, ideals (a contradiction that 
would pose problems for the regime as none of these visions came to 
fruition). Pétain uttered the words “National Revolution” only four more 
times afterward. His ultraconservative background precluded him from 
any reference to 1789 and he preferred the terms redressement (recovery) or 
rénovation (renewal). This reluctance underscores certain divisions within 
Vichy: the use of dynamic slogans to rally conservatives quickly 
weakened the latters’ resolve while simultaneously alienating the regime’s 
more radical elements, disgusted with the regimes’ inaction.25  Jacques 
Benoist-Méchin, Secretary of State to the Council in charge of Franco-
German Relations (who also participated in the negotiations of the 1941 
Franco-Japanese Agreements) and one of Vichy’s most ardent 
proponents of collaboration, did not believe that the “new French 
revolution” could succeed under existing conditions, either in the North, 
subjugated by the victor, or in the Free Zone, where there lived a weak 
and opportunistic population. Like other ultras (social nationalist 
revolutionaries as opposed to ultraconservatives) who embraced the 
values of Fascist Italy and admired the energy of Nazism, he believed 
that all revolutions, in order to succeed, required both violent struggle—
37
25. In the expression “National Revolution,” Henri du Moulin de Labarthète, Director 
of Pétain’s Civil Cabinet, saw the combined political heritage of Renan, de Maistre, Le 
Play, Taine, Maurras, Salazar, and Barrès. Cointet adds Péguy, Proudhon, and Lyautey. 
Cointet, Histoire de Vichy, 135.
with its heroes and its martyrs—and a will to spiritually annex national 
space and time to construct common ideals. Nothing but insipidity would 
result from policy made in the comfort of government offices under the 
watchful eye of  the occupier.26
Given the cleavages within Vichy, historians have debated whether 
one can speak of its “essence.” John Sweets refuses to accept that there 
was such a thing as a “Vichy of Pétain” or a “Vichy of Laval”: Vichy 
should always be taken as a whole. He believes that since Pétain was the 
only figure present in the regime from beginning to end we should accept 
Pétainism’s goals and policies (in terms of the programs of the National 
Revolution) as the essence of Vichy.27 This view isn’t entirely satisfactory 
as it fails to measure the regime’s willingness to adopt a common 
program incorporating different factions and ideological elements as well 
as Vichy’s capacity to implement such a program, taking them from 
theory (and rhetoric) to action, were it even to exist. Vichy only had 
sufficient power and leverage to carry out the programs outlined by 
Pétain during its first year, while the French population was still under 
the shock of defeat, the material hardships were only beginning, and the 
Wehrmacht looked unstoppable. With this in mind, we can nevertheless 
identify the principal thrusts of the National Revolution (strongest in the 
regime’s first year but existing at least rhetorically throughout its life): 1) 
an emphasis on traditionalism, including a reforging of corporatist 
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economic and social relations; 2) the prevalence of the local community; 
3) the hierarchization of society through administrative changes; 4) the 
redirection of youth and education policies; and 5) politics of national 
identity and exclusion. 
Traditionalism. Pétain’s ultraconservative agenda rested on the belief 
that processes of industrialization and urbanization were socially 
unstable and had destroyed the nation’s moral fibre. For the Marshal, 
himself of peasant origins, modernity imperiled the family and atomized 
humans by eroding the communal bonds that once united them. It had 
been a still largely rural France that defeated Germany during the 
previous war and urbanization threatened to weaken France by stripping 
it of its essence. In 1918, it was argued, French soldiers were stronger, 
healthier, and more adaptable to changing conditions than their German 
counterparts, who had been corrupted by industrialization.28 Inspired by 
the turn of the century monarchist La Tour du Pin, Vichy traditionalists 
saw the peasantry as the incarnation of the “natural order,” one of 
morality, family, and communalism, in opposition to an urban society 
that favored individualism, divorce, and chaos. From this point, Vichy 
espoused a corporatist agenda, where production was directed by the 
state but with the input of labor and owners, thereby overcoming class 
tensions and regrouping Frenchmen around natural economic groupings. 
Furthermore, in order to resurrect traditional rural values, the 
government undertook a “return to the soil campaign” that provided 
subsidies to families willing to leave the city to pursue agricultural 
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activities and pushed the youth to engage in farm work, either through 
volunteer corps or labor requisition. It asked teachers to promote the 
nobility of careers in farming, created elite schools of agriculture, and 
elevated Jeanne d’Arc as a symbol of the peasant hard at work.29  To 
remind the country that the rural world fed the city, the authorities 
printed the portrait of the Duke de Sully, Henri IV’s Superintendent of 
Finance, on the new one hundred franc bill along with his motto 
“Plowing and sowing are the two udders of  France.”30 
The Prevalence of the Local Community (Regionalism). Closely 
related to traditionalism, the push for regionalism (referring to the 
nurturing of local cultures based on traditional pre-Revolutionary 
provincial identities rather than the prevalence of defined administrative 
areas) was a means to reverse the loss of identity—often associated with 
the land—that resulted from the centralization of power in Paris since 
1789. On 11 November 1789, the National Constituent Assembly agreed 
to divide France into administrative départements based on geographical 
and hydrographical—not cultural or traditional—criteria. For Vichy 
ultraconservatives, the “province,” with its history and folklore, 
represented an extension of the natural community. Beyond the 
ideological discourse of traditionalism that touched the everyday life of 
the French, regionalist policies intended to redirect the collective 
imagination. According to cultural historian Christian Faure, the 
“province”—the term was used more often than “region” due to its 
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ideological dimension—created a process of social and individual 
identity that fused region with community and was a necessary step 
toward the conceptualization of the hierarchy of communities which was 
the basis of the National Revolution. Furthermore, by replacing the 
defeated patrie with a return to communities (or smaller patries), Vichy 
hoped that a psychological shift would draw away from the frustrations of 
occupation.31 More than an attack on the revolutionary reorganization of 
the administration, this was an attempt to reverse the atomization of the 
citizen in favor of an elevation of the community, a re-ordering of values 
placing the group in front of the individual. These ideas were not new; 
they were a central piece of Maurras’s L’Enquête sur la Monarchie, first 
published in 1909. There was, however, also a pragmatic reason to push 
for regionalism as it provided the government with greater control over 
distribution processes by overcoming departmental chauvinism and 
hoarding, making food supply and the transportation of goods easier 
through a re-tooled administrative machine.32
Social hierarchization. On 11 October 1940, the Marshal declared 
that the 
new regime will be a social hierarchy. It will no longer rest upon the 
false idea of the natural equality of men but on the necessary idea of the 
natural equality of opportunity, given to all Frenchmen to prove their 
aptitude to serve. Work and talent alone will be the foundation of the 
French hierarchy. . .From this will arise the true elite whom the past 
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regime has tried for years to destroy and who will constitute the 
necessary corps for the development and well-being of  all.33
Three months earlier, Pétain announced that “governors [would] be 
placed at the head of large French provinces. Thus, the administration 
[would] be both concentrated and decentralized.”34 The changing role of 
prefects (Heads of départements) was to play a central part in the 
hierarchization of society and the further destruction of revolutionary 
values. The prefectoral corps was originally created on 28 Pluviôse Year 
VIII (17 February 1800) to provide the government with nonpartisan, 
impartial representatives to implement Paris’s decisions at local levels and 
facilitate consensus between the capital and the regions, which in turn 
oversaw several départements. In order to have some sort of stability 
during the numerous governmental changes of the Third Republic, the 
prefectural corps was professionalized, its members chosen for their 
administrative, not their political skills. This led to a culture of prudence, 
conservatism, and skepticism, where administrative constraints 
influenced decisions (or lack thereof) more than official texts. 
Questioning the techno-administrative cultural pusillanimity, Vichy 
passed several laws to reinforce the power of the prefects, restore the 
authority of the state, and combat the pluralistic influences of the 
parliamentary regime.35  Civil servants were forbidden from striking; 
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promotions were based on merit, not seniority; and as a final sweetener, 
remuneration was largely increased.36  While Vichy’s prefectural corps 
was part of the provincial reorganization necessary to ensure the proper 
distribution of food and goods, it also served to strengthen the role of the 
elite as a link between the government and the people, as both tools of 
propaganda and coercion. 
Youth and Education. The proponents of the National Revolution 
believed that France had lost the war long before 1940 through years of 
republican indolence and hedonism. Pétain blamed a society that 
corrupted youth, where the “unhealthy atmosphere in which many of 
[the youth’s elders] grew up [had] slackened their [the youth’s] energy, 
softened their courage and led them along paths of pleasure toward the 
worst catastrophe of [France’s] history.” One of the National 
Revolution’s principal objectives was to re-inculcate the values of work, 
family, discipline, and strength that the Republic had eroded over the 
previous seventy years. Pétain predicted that France’s young men and 
women would soon “learn to prefer the joys of difficulties overcome to 
the easy pleasures.”37 In spite of the numerous programs aimed at youth, 
no homogenous philosophical current ever emerged out of Vichy, often 
leading to contradictory actions. Encapsulating the schism between 
revolutionaries (such as the Paris ultras and the staunchest advocates of 
collaboration) and ultraconservatives (those traditionalists more closely 
aligned with Maurrassism) within the regime, camps formed around the 
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question of how to organize youth: based on the new European order 
(secular and fascist) as embodied in Germany or maintained within a 
French model, non-unified but Catholic.38
Vichy promoted organizations to inspire youth with courage, 
discipline, and patriotism. As with education reform, Vichy was never 
able to resolve the internal disputes between those who sought to provide 
the Catholic Church (which had been marginalized during the Third 
Republic) with a central role and those desiring to construct a single 
youth movement based on fascist models. Originally conceived as a 
means to fight unemployment, the Chantiers de Jeunesse, made it 
obligatory for all twenty year old men to serve eight months engaging in 
physical exercise, camping, and hard work—especially in forestry and 
agriculture—in the open air to build community spirit and fight what was 
believed to be urban corruption. The Chantiers were created to circumvent 
the limitations of the armistice and inculcate military values in a country 
limited to a hundred-thousand man standing army. The voluntary 
Compagnons de France, largely designed to save French youth from 
unemployment through work on farms or artisan workshops, generated 
more enthusiasm than its counterpart, but the movement’s autonomous 
structures and push for regionalist awakening made it more difficult for 
the government to control.39  Only the Jeune Légion, created in 1943 to 
develop politically 15-25 year old boys, aimed to identify and cultivate 




hierarchization. Disappointingly, only twenty percent of France’s youth 
participated in these organizations.40 None of these organizations existed 
in Indochina under Decoux.
Exclusion. To most people Vichy is synonymous with collaboration 
with Nazi Germany—a simplification given the friction that often marred 
Franco-German relations—particularly in its hunt for ethnic and political 
undesirables. Vichy’s participation, albeit indirect, in the Holocaust 
perhaps essentializes this perception. Even before rounding up and 
handing over Jews to the Reich, Vichy had been active in passing 
legislation to marginalize Jews, measures that found their impetus not in 
German pressure, but in the nationalist and xenophobic ideologies 
predating the war. During its first year, Vichy issued 26 laws and 24 
decrees directed against Jews, and unlike German ordinances in France 
that defined Jews by religious practice (until at least April 1941), Vichy 
statutes referred to race.41  Though Pétain did protect veteran Jews—
spilled blood washes away all suspicions—and opposed the wearing of 
the yellow star, he was relentless in his hostility to foreign-born Jews 
(estimated to represent two-thirds of France’s Jewish population) deemed 
pariahs to the nation.42  Influenced by Maurice Barrès, writer and 
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forefather of Right-wing French nationalism, the Marshal believed that 
national identity was found in the land. Like many others, he saw the 
Jew, eternal nomad, as the antithesis of the rural values that would lead 
to France’s rebirth.43Vichy also outlawed secret societies—which meant 
Freemasons—and within the first week of its existence decided it could 
sack public servants in all impunity. As one would expect, Communists 
were also hunted down and interned, with almost five thousand arrested 
even before Germany’s invasion of  the Soviet Union.44
Vichy presented few excuses in its hunt for secret societies as Pétain 
seems to have thought Freemasons morally more culpable in the 
corruption of France than the Jews, stating that “a Jew cannot help his 
origins, but a Freemason has chosen to become one.”45  On 13 August 
1940, all secret societies were abolished, its members were banned from 
public office, and teachers had to swear they did not belong to such 
organizations. By 1941 endless lists of suspected Freemasons were 
published; a file of approximately 170,000 names was constituted.46 
Curiously, the hunt for Freemasons was most fierce under the 
government of Admiral Darlan, whose father had been a member of the 
Grand Orient Masonic Lodge. Yet Laval’s return marked the de facto end 
of the measures that affected secret societies. By taking control of the 
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and extend his clientelist mode of governing, relying on elites, many of 
whom had belonged to secret societies and once set aside by Vichy.
Factionalism and the Myth of  the National Revolution
The foundering of the National Revolution owed much to a 
factionalism driven by political ambition, a desperation to keep power, 
and France’s economic hardships under the occupation. On 12 August 
1941 Pétain spoke of the “ill winds” that compromised national rebirth, a 
clear sign that he was already aware that the doctrine he outlined in his 
speeches was faltering. The struggle between those who promoted a 
traditionalist agenda and those who believed in the German-led New 
European Order sabotaged both sides’ efforts at effecting social and 
economic change, particularly as the Reich’s demands took a heavier toll 
on France’s resources. The interruption of trade and the burden of the 
occupation costs forced the country into penury, unable to meet the target 
of seventy percent of 1938 production upon which many policies were 
based. The government imposed forced savings that were immediately 
channeled toward the state; at one point forty percent of public spending 
was covered by these loans. It was impossible to lead a revolution when 
the state could not even feed its people. 
In the wake of the armistice, when the shock of defeat created an 
environment in which most Frenchmen were open (or at least non-
resistant) to Pétainism, three camps formed around the direction of 
France’s internal and external affairs. Weygand and Baudouin believed in 
adhering to the terms of the armistice and nothing more; Pétain, more 
nuanced, wanted to follow the Prussian example following its defeat at 
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Iéna in 1806 (which had led to an intellectual and political rebirth while 
maintaining ties with Napoleon) and lead France’s resurgence while 
keeping up appearances of alliance; and Laval pushed a Franco-German 
rapprochement out of opportunism rather than ideological reasons.47 Out 
of these stances emerged the confrontation between Vichy traditionalists 
(close to Action Française) and revolutionaries (inspired by Fascism). 
While traditionalists like Baudouin believed that France’s conception of 
humanity was antithetical to that of the Nazis,48 fascist sympathizers like 
Benoist-Méchin claimed that in order for France to regain its rank as a 
world power, it needed to follow an audacious political course and 
“extend a hand to the revolutionary in Hitler. . .[as France’s] politics 
shouldn’t be a simple adaptation to events, but a total resurrection of the 
flesh and the soul of  [its] people.”49
Further complicating Vichy policy-making, by 1943 no one in France 
could make a decision without German consent. That year, Hitler’s 
representative Cecil von Renthe-Fink—the Gauleiter Pétain called his 
gaoler—became a fundamental part of Vichy. Renthe-Fink’s presence 
rendered Pétain incapable of physically leaving Vichy without German 
approval, and the octogenarian lost all independent control over his 
government. Forbidding another 13 December (when Laval was 
dismissed from government), Germany blocked Pétain’s attempt to sack 
Laval and replace him with former Minister of Colonies Charles Platon, 
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a man about whom the Reich knew very little.50 In March 1944, Renthe-
Fink demanded that Marcel Déat enter the government. Déat was one of 
the key figures of the Paris ultras who incessantly criticized Vichy’s 
reluctance to align itself with Germany and discredited the National 
Revolution as an ultraconservative sham. By this time Vichy had long 
since lost its drive to implement the National Revolution, which existed 
in no substantial form outside propaganda. The regime had become no 
more than a vassal of the Reich, capable of little more than coercive 
policing.
Given these evolutions, one cannot talk of a homogenous Vichy 
ideology—though broad intellectual sources, mostly stemming from anti-
Dreyfussard movements, influenced all members of government—and it 
was exceptional that one member belonged to a unique school of 
thought.51  Though the antagonism between Pétain and Laval is the best-
documented case of personal antipathy, factionalism and shifting centers 
of power created many Vichys (ultraconservative, revolutionary, 
collaborationist/pragmatic) and thus destroyed any possibility of 
constructing the National Revolution as a uniform force. Eventually, both 
traditionalists and revolutionaries were sidelined by Laval, whose desire 
for an authoritarian government was entirely pragmatic. The 
counterrevolutionary discourse so central in the first two years 
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disappeared as Vichy evolved into a mere police state. Moreover, real 
power wasn’t centered in Vichy but in Paris, where most of the 
administration remained, and in Wiesbaden, where the manner in which 
to carry out the terms of the armistice was negotiated daily.52 The symbol 
of Pétain was the only constant, yet as the conditions of daily life 
harshened and the Wehrmacht became bogged down on the Eastern front, 
it too lost the potency of its initial years. The Marshal’s speeches were the 
only incarnation of the National Revolution: words existing largely 
outside of government action. As World War II historian Yves Durand 
encapsulated: “Vichy, one might say, or much talk and little action.”53 
The failure of the National Revolution is most striking when 
examining the masquerade behind Pétainism’s two most culturally 
significant enterprises: traditionalism and regionalism. The gap between 
rhetoric and reality concerning peasant and artisan policies illustrated the 
government’s real lack of support for the programs—particularly after 
1942—and its pragmatic need to push them officially. By emphasizing the 
eternality of the peasantry and the land, Vichy sought to obfuscate the 
authoritarian and centralizing measures it adopted concerning agriculture 
and the artisanat. In empirical terms, the “return to the soil” campaign 
was an early failure—only 1,561 families drew subsidies, of which 409 
never even attempted a return—and with Laval’s return and France’s 
complete occupation, the push toward the countryside was abandoned 
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altogether and order, not to say survival, became the new priority.54  The 
Corporation Paysanne’s ambitious goals of promoting and managing “the 
common interests of the peasant families in moral, social, and economic 
questions” and regulating “all the conditions of life of the peasant” ceded 
to state management of agriculture and to an economy geared toward 
efficiency of production. Juxtaposed with the increased dominance of 
industrial cartels, the Artisans’ Statute of 1943 that integrated the many 
autonomous professional groups into the state bureaucracy placed the 
artisanat in a weaker position than it had been under the Third Republic 
when it had an important parliamentary lobby.55
Similarly, enthusiasm for regionalism died down after the 
government’s first year, though the propaganda promoting the issue 
persisted. Pétain carried on with his tours, speaking in front of ebullient 
crowds about provincial renovation, while in the background ministries 
centralized power through the establishment of local prefects. Christian 
Faure highlights how these practices, while contradictory, were also 
complementary as the first policy obfuscated the second. This strategy 
was symbolic of Vichy’s dualism: an ideological power, incarnated in the 
image of the Marshal, and a technocratic and centralizing force pushed 
by Darlan and Laval. Given the media focus on provincial rebirth, local 
notables were happy to play the game as their prestige increased 
accordingly. The regional sleight of hand turned the rural population’s 
attention away from the realities of economic planning and production 
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appropriation.56  The pressing issues of order and food supply rendered 
any real diffusion of power toward the provinces impossible as the central 
government, beginning under Darlan, needed to overcome hoarding at 
the département level. Vichy placed such an importance on these matters 
that each regional prefect had one assistant for police and one for food 
distribution issues.57
Yet through each change in cabinet, the government perpetuated the 
myth of the National Revolution—an empty shell given the lack of 
concrete achievements—to reassure the people and divert attention from 
the quotidian difficulties. With no homogenous driving force, Vichy 
advanced hesitantly and arbitrarily, its rhetoric disconnected from its 
actions. With no political cohesion, Vichy tried to exercise many political 
courses at the same time, a strategy that was “unjustifiable” to many.58 
Partly explaining Germany’s lack of willingness to engage in 
collaboration, Hitler recognized this tendency in 1942 when he claimed 
that “wanting to sit on all seats, [the French] are sat on none. This is 
explained by the fact that the soul of this country is torn. Just within the 
government of Vichy, several tendencies are represented: antisemitic 
nationalism, clerical philosemitism, royalism, the revolutionary spirit, etc. 
What is missing is an energetic man.”59 Pétain, a half-deaf octogenarian, 
could never be this energetic man and neither Laval nor Darlan was much 
interested in the National Revolution. On 1 January 1942, Pétain 
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declared “the National Revolution hasn’t yet gone from theory to 
practice.”60  With the entry of the United States into the war making an 
ultimate German victory more questionable—leading to tighter German 
controls over French affairs and increased socioeconomic hardships—
there was neither hope nor momentum for the National Revolution to 
complete this transformation.
However many divisions and intrigues existed under the Darlan 
government, they multiplied exponentially under Laval. It was not 
Pétain’s decision to bring him back in April 1942 but Berlin’s. In 1940 the 
Marshal had already accused Laval of sabotaging the National 
Revolution. Pétain despised Laval, who had been a pacifist in his youth 
and had escaped military service, and saw him as a vestige of the culture 
of affaires of the Third Republic. Laval had the support of the Paris ultras, 
who also sought a rapprochement with the Reich, yet Laval was no 
revolutionary. Benoist-Méchin described him as “totally incapable of 
reforging the country’s soul and instilling within it a new vision of its 
destiny [and] he wanted to erase everything that invoked, from close or 
afar, the National Revolution” and “the most powerful agent of 
disaggregation [France] had even known.”61 
Laval declared at his trial: “There was always talk of the National 
Revolution; I never knew what the National Revolution was, no one ever 
defined it and it’s an expression that I myself never used.”62  While 
Darlan’s staunch anticlericalism ended the influence of the Catholic 
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contingent, Laval’s return concluded the purge of the traditionalist camp. 
He de facto ended the persecution of secret societies by eliminating the 
anti-Masonic police headed by Platon and secretly authorizing the 
reopening of lodges in the Free Zone. He reinstated prefects who had 
been sacked in 1940 and replaced ministers with men loyal to him. 
Laval’s government emphasized collaboration, sidelining all policies—
many of which involved Pétainist ideals—that did not serve Franco-
German interests. Perhaps already disillusioned, the Marshal admitted on 
17 June 1942 that the National Revolution had been a series of “setbacks, 
uncertainties, and disappointments.”63
By signing the constitutional act of 18 April 1942 that accorded Laval 
all governmental powers, Pétain completed the process of his own 
marginalization. Now Head of Government, Laval insisted that Pétain 
step down as President of the Council and content himself with the 
honorific title of Head of State. The former deputy who had no time for 
the National Revolution and had now quasi-dictatorial powers: he simply 
presented Pétain with the list of ministers he wanted named, passed 
decrees with only his signature, gained control of the ministries of foreign 
affairs, interior, and information, and served as chief of police, 
ambassadors, prefects, and consuls. Perhaps more important, he had the 
Reich’s trust and Otto Abetz, the German ambassador to France, 
declared that Laval was “the only guarantor of a policy of 
collaboration.”64  By November 1942, Laval refused to provide the 
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Marshal with any details of his policy-making and even ceased to invite 
him to the council of ministers, turning it into a ceremonial reading of 
his own decrees.65  Pétain confessed that year: “Laval is hated and I am 
tired of assuming responsibility for an authority I don’t have. He only 
does what he wants, I can’t get anything out of him.”66 Pétain became no 
more than a figurehead, relegated to a public role in order to sustain the 
illusion of unity. His attempt to get rid of Laval in November 1943 failed 
as it encountered German resistance (Hitler had already written Pétain on 
23 April forbidding Laval’s dismissal, pointing to the Head of 
Government’s efforts to build new relations between France and the Axis 
powers), proving that France had no power outside of  the Reich’s will.67
Conclusion
With the collapse of the French forces and the subsequent shock to 
the civilian population, no government since 1789 had enjoyed more 
power and so few juridical obstacles to its policies than Vichy in its initial 
months. Never over the course of the nineteenth century—with the 
possible exception of the Paris Commune—had a French administration 
attempted to change simultaneously the political and social order.68  The 
National Revolution as envisaged by Pétain was supposed to rectify 
seventy years of errors by returning to values eroded by the Republic. In 
his vision, modernity had corrupted morality and weakened France by 
atomizing society and creating a hedonistic culture of leisure. The New 
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Order intended to reconcile the individual with society by reintegrating 
him into his natural community: his family, his region, and his 
profession. By returning to the intemporal land, compatriots would 
reforge the bonds that once united them, eradicating “un-French” 
elements such as Jews and Freemasons and ending class conflict. The 
National Revolution tried to establish frameworks within which to create 
a new generation of Frenchmen, one that valued discipline, work, and 
respect for authority. Perhaps more important, Pétainism sought a return 
to social hierarchies, ending what it believed to be the false notions of 
egalitarianism born of  1789.
The “divine surprise” to which Charles Maurras referred in 1941 was 
not the defeat of France or the fall of the Republic, but Pétain’s ability to 
lead the country politically. Maurras stated “We expected so much of 
him, we could and must expect everything. To this natural expectation, 
he was able to add something. Now nothing is missing.”69 Action Française 
never ceased to support Pétain and the monarchical power in which he 
wrapped his person, even as the traditionalist camp that embraced the 
Marshal’s program for national rebirth was marginalized and debilitated 
within less than a year after the Republic voted to accord Pétain quasi-
plenipotentiary powers. 
Ironically, Admiral Darlan was designated as successor to Pétain one 
day after the publication of Maurras’ article and from this point began 
the decline of the National Revolution as the traditionalists envisaged it. 
Darlan, whom Socialist Prime Minister Léon Blum of the 1936 Leftist 
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Popular Front had named Admiral Chief of Staff of the Navy, was 
neither a Maurrassian nor a believer in the National Revolution. He was 
driven by ambition rather than ideology, engaging France in a politics of 
collaboration when convinced Germany would win the war, and 
cultivating ties with the Allies once his certainty waned. While Darlan’s 
entry into government began a process of technocratization, Laval’s 
return in April 1942 completed the marginalization of the traditionalist 
camp as he surrounded himself with cronies in his determination to avoid 
another 13 December, when Laval was ousted from givernment. Under 
Laval, prefects were reinstated and Freemasons no longer persecuted, 
while peasant politics disappeared entirely. Even the Légion Française des 
Combattants lost its identity as it opened up to non-veterans and, absorbed 
by the government, turned into a tool of  coercion and internal repression. 
 Even if factionalism had not destroyed the National Revolution, the 
exigencies of occupation and German opposition to French rebirth 
certainly would have. Hitler never intended to treat France as a partner 
and used the French hopes of extracting concessions through 
collaboration to his advantage. Split into two zones, Vichy never exercised 
its authority over the Occupied Zone. Moreover, German economic and 
financial demands forced the French government to centralize its 
authority to ensure distribution and security while emphasizing efficient 
industrial production. The Wehrmacht’s total occupation of the metropole 
in 1942 completed France’s subjugation, with any semblance of 
legitimacy disappearing as it became necessary for Vichy to gain German 
approval before it could adopt any measure. By 1943, Germany 
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controlled Pétain’s speeches and movements. A Gauleiter ensured that no 
independent action could take place. Laval, whose return was imposed by 
Hitler, reduced Pétain to figurehead status, a powerless old man whose 
reluctance to collaborate no longer impeded the former republican’s 
alignment with the Reich.
Understanding the mechanics behind Vichy’s National Revolution—
and the gap between rhetoric and action—is critical for assessing the 
policy-making processes of Decoux’s administration in Indochina. Vichy 
was incapable of imposing a coherent policy on its metropolitan territory, 
over which it was supposedly legitimate. Therefore, its ability to project 
itself 12,000 kilometers away, in an exotic land under the watchful eyes of 
the Japanese, is highly questionable. Vichy could not have cloned itself 
overseas because there was no uniform model to replicate. Yet Decoux 
did invoke the National Revolution—at least in name—and many of his 
administration’s policies were aligned with those espoused by the 
traditionalist camp in the metropole, albeit adapted to the Indochinese 
environment. How can we explain Hanoi’s embrace of a Pétainist 
program that never materialized in the metropole? Given Darlan and 
Laval’s lack of enthusiasm for the National Revolution—keeping in mind 
that they were heads of government from February 1941 onward, not 
counting Laval’s first stint as Prime Minister in 1940— it is unlikely that 
Decoux’s lack of Pétainist zeal would have warranted his dismissal 
provided he remain loyal and useful to Vichy as an administrative entity. 
Even if we suggest that Decoux’s regime was more Vichyite than Vichy it 
follows that it necessarily acted independently of the metropole since the 
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French government abandoned the ultraconservative doctrine in favor of 
collaborationist policies that ran counter to French rebirth. Decoux was 
not faced with a push to collaborate with the Germans and thus enjoyed 
the autonomy to pursue his own ultraconservative policies irrespective of 
what was happening in France. The omnipresent Japanese threat forced 
him to avow loyalty to Vichy as a state (though given his ideology and his 
preternatural inclinations toward order, hierarchy, and discipline he most 
likely would have done so any case), but there is little evidence that the 
Japanese cared about the National Revolution’s program itself. The point 
of entry into the politics of the colonial administration in Indochina 
should therefore not be how Vichy cloned itself in the region, but rather 
how Decoux adopted the discourse of the National Revolution to 
legitimize his own agenda, one based on his own ideology. The next 
chapter looks at the common worldviews of Vichy’s traditionalist camp 
and Admiral Decoux. It examines their shared Maurrassian ideological 
sources by turning to the pre-war discourse of the extreme right in France 
and the influence of Action française, and tries to determine where Decoux 
sat in relation to it. 
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Chapter III: Decoux and the Legacy of  Action française
Though the Vichy government lacked the will and the capacity to 
project Pétain’s vision of national rebirth onto its overseas colonies, the 
National Revolution, in the form advocated by traditionalist elements 
during the regime’s first year, existed in its own right as a reactionary 
doctrine prior to the war. The speed with which the government drafted 
and enacted laws for the metropole during its first three months reveals a 
pre-existing and well thought out program to destroy the values and 
institutions of the Third Republic on which policy-makers blamed 
France’s moral decline. The National Revolution’s ideological origins can 
be traced to the extreme Right’s appropriation of the nationalist cause 
(see below) and its criticisms of parliamentary democracy, two tendencies 
that took form during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. A 
fervent Catholic, Pétain had sympathized with monarchist movements 
since his youth at Saint-Cyr.1  Throughout his career Pétain based his 
sociopolitical beliefs on the idea that the army ensured the preservation of 
the national community and he found his moral inspiration in the 
editorials of Maurras and Daudet; the literary works of Chateaubriand 
and Barrès; the political ideas of Tardieu, editor until 1939 of the extreme 
Right wing newspaper Gringoire and whose book La Révolution à refaire 
criticized the French parliamentary system; and Salazar, the Portuguese 
Head of Government who carried out his own ultraconservative National 
Revolution during the 1930s.2  Vichy’s National Revolution drew from a 
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tradition of French political thought that for many years sought to 
eradicate the values of republicanism. This chapter investigates the 
ideological roots of the French ultraconservative—and anti-republican—
thought that existed until the outbreak of the war and in particular how 
the ideas of Charles Maurras permeated the French Navy, or Marine. It 
looks at the culture of conformity within the navy, one that served as an 
intellectual conduit for officers to espouse the philosophy of Action 
française, Maurras’ royalist movement. This chapter shows how close the 
majority of officers in the Marine were to Action française and how Decoux 
had to have been influenced by its ideas, as reflected in his actions and 
writings. By examining the building blocks of Decoux’s worldview 
through the ultraconservatism that influenced him culturally and 
intellectually, this chapter seeks to uncover to the roots of his policy-
making in Indochina.
In 1932, writer Jean Paulhan wrote that the only veritable choice for 
a young man seeking to engage himself politically was between Charles 
Maurras and Karl Marx.3 According to the director of the Nouvelle Revue 
Française, Maurras’ Action Française and Marxism were the only two 
doctrines complete enough to contest seriously with the discredited 
French system.4  In Vichy, Pétain’s entourage consisted of men who 
shared many of the ultraconservative ideas of Charles Maurras, though 
many weren’t necessarily royalists; Maurras’ thoughts had guided the 
Right for so long that many within Vichy were Maurrassian without even 
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realizing it.5  AF provided conservatives—even the non-extremists—with 
the logical and coherent arguments necessary to confront the theories of 
the Left, and inspired the more active groups to take its ideas to their 
natural conclusion; putting an end to the Republic.6  Maurras’ 
recalibration of the ideas of counterrevolutionary thinkers such as 
Bonald and Maistre was forcibly at the center of any alternative to 
republicanism that Vichy sought to establish.7  The debacle of 1940 
unexpectedly presented the opportunity for AF’s doctrines to be 
implemented, not by Maurras, who remained more a thinker than a 
politician, but by the second and third generation of  his disciples.8
Was Admiral Jean Decoux one of these disciples? While the answer 
would contribute significantly to understanding Decoux’s worldview, and 
hence his policy-making as Governor General of Indochina, no 
incontrovertible evidence has been uncovered to prove an affiliation to 
AF. Nevertheless, through Decoux’s writings, his social relations, and the 
professional milieu in which he existed, one can build a picture of his 
political influences and orientations and infer with confidence that he was 
one of the many arch-conservatives imbued with a Maurrassian spirit 
without officially belonging to AF. If the Vichy regime was unable to 
clone itself in Indochina, then Decoux’s Pétainist zeal can only be 
explained through an ideological congruity with the doctrinal origins of 
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the National Revolution. Certainly the spirit of discipline that permeated 
the military played a significant role in ensuring loyalty to the 
government of Vichy, but this by itself would not have been enough to 
prevent dissidence, as demonstrated by the defection to the Free French 
of Decoux’s predecessor, General Catroux.9 In this chapter, I will look at 
how the Right appropriated nationalism into its political program at the 
end of the nineteenth century, and specifically how one of the French 
Right’s most influential movements, Action Française, became the 
dominant ideology in the navy at the time of Decoux’s professional 
ascendency during the 1930s. Given the Marine’s culture of conformity 
and hierarchy, AF inevitably played a significant influence on the 
evolution of the future Governor General of Indochina’s worldview, a 
proposition supported by Decoux’s affiliations and actions during his 
time at the Ministry of the Navy as well as in the views expressed in his 
postwar memoirs. Coming to grips with Decoux’s worldview is critical to 
understanding the mechanism behind his regime’s policy-making.
Nationalism, Action Française, and the roots of  the National 
Revolution
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The wars between 1791 and 1797 were nationalist conflicts, but also 
due to Jacobin principles of egalitarianism, centralization, and 
universalism. Fighting invading armies to defend not just France but a 
revolutionary ideal, both peasants and urban workers (the sans-culottes) 
experienced what the historian François Furet calls the “democratization 
of glory” by taking roles previously reserved for the nobility. Nationalism 
meant the synthesis of ideological ideals, and love of the nation 
integrated the masses into the state, provided its members shared the 
values of the emerging notion of citizenship.10 The Boulangist movement 
(a heterogenous movement mixing socialism, nationalism, and 
authoritarianism, which threatened the Third Republic) and its particular 
form of populism sparked the transfer from Left to Right of nationalist 
ideals and sentiments, a shift that was completely unpredictable within 
the context of nineteenth-century politics. This mutation began in 
1887and was largely completed by 1899 when the Dreyfus Affair reached 
its climax, so that by the turn of the century, nationalism was an intrinsic 
part of the programs of the Right.11  The nation was now defined not 
merely in terms of its citizens, but by the more subjective notions of 
identifying with and belonging to a specific territory and the culture, 
mentality, and traditions that had existed within it for centuries. 
Concurrently, Right wing literature began to elevate the army as the only 
entity capable of national salvation, rising above the affaires—those 
scandals that uncover politicians’ acts of corruption, nepotism, and self-
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enrichment—and parliamentary musical chairs that characterized the 
Third Republic.
Writing during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Paul 
Déroulède’s ideas presented a synthesis of the principal ideological 
currents from the Right during this time. The head of the Ligue des 
Patriotes called for the reformation of the education system to inculcate a 
love of the patrie in all children, one that would permeate all social 
classes, integrating and mobilizing the masses to ensure the survival of 
the nation against foreign enemies. He believed the army to be the symbol 
of national unity and the model of dignity, strength, and independence.12 
This militarism bred contempt for the oratory debates of democracy, 
refusing to give parliamentarians responsibility for safeguarding national 
interests. Obsessed with regeneration following the Franco-Prussian War 
(1870-1871), Déroulède called for the protection of the country from 
internationalist doctrines—that is, any ideology that sought to address 
issues other than domestic ones, including universalism of human rights, 
freedom, or class struggle—that were nothing more than “the 
exploitation of France by the foreigner.”13  Déroulède directed 
nationalism on a course from which it would seldom deviate: the 
individual subordinated to the collective, the exclusion of the liberal 
order, and a xenophobic patriotism.14
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Maurrice Barrès, successor to the head of the Ligue des Patriotes 
following his friend’s death, also believed that nationalism alone could 
reverse France’s decadence. For the author of Les Déracinés, published in 
1897, “in order to allow the conscience of a country such as France to 
free itself, one needs to root the individuals in the land and in the dead, in 
the land of our dead.” He exclaimed, “Let the influence of the ancestors 
be permanent, and the sons energetic and righteous, the nation united.”15 
The cult of the land and the dead necessitated the defense of familial and 
regional solidarity, the soil, and the national spirit against foreign 
elements.16  Barrès’ vision of communities endured for decades, as he 
declared, “families of individuals, those are the communes, families of 
communes, there is the region, families of regions, there is the nation.”17 
For Barrès, only the development of a national consciousness could 
reposition the general interest over the individual will and lead to the 
“harmony of people that are united for generations in the same social 
institutions to affirm common moral interests.”18
Barrès was one of the first politicians to exploit the nascent anti-
Semitism of the 1880s. For him, the essence of nationalism was the 
transcendence of internal divisions—including those of class—which 
necessarily implied the rejection of foreign elements that could threaten 
the consensus. He called anti-Semitism the “popular formula,” the only 
sentiment capable of rallying all social classes. Barrès drew from Edouard 
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Drumont, whose La France juive, first published in 1886, was one of the 
biggest successes of its century. According to Drumont, the struggle 
between Aryan and Jew has perpetuated throughout the ages as the 
“dream of the Semite, in effect his fixed thought, has constantly been to 
reduce the Aryan to servitude, to confine him to the glebe.”19  Barrès 
claimed that Jews were responsible for France's socioeconomic turmoil as 
they were the embodiment of finance and refractory to labor, effort, and 
honest work.20  Exploiting the misery of the working class and playing on 
the petite bourgeoisie's fears of its own proletarianization, Barrès used 
anti-Semitism as a form of revolt against economic liberalism and 
bourgeois society, masking realities through myth, but overcoming social 
cleavages and ideological oppositions.21 He saw anti-Semitism as capable 
of gathering the “ardent and suffering masses. . .[and] the petite 
bourgeoisie, eager for the preservation of private property, but jealous of 
the great fortunes.”22
The victory of the Republican bloc in the 1902 legislative elections 
spelled the death of nationalist movements accepting the Revolution and 
seeking to operate within the republican context (a strategy advocated by 
Barrès), paving the way for the rise of AF and Charles Maurras. AF 
called for the violent and complete destruction of the system, freeing 
France of a “necessarily corrupt and “Jewified” [enjuivé]” 
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parliamentarism.23  With the publication of Enquête sur la monarchie, the 
intellectual center of nationalism moved away from Barrès toward the 
counter-systemic doctrines of AF.  Maurras pushed the concept of 
nationalisme intégral, calling for the predominance of the national interest 
above all other values and motives, before class and business: he called for 
la seule France, réaction d’abord (France alone, reaction first).24  This 
program was based on a particular vision: France needed to develop ways 
of thinking which were natural to France, emphasizing the importance of 
the soil; France needed to reverse Jacobin centralization and encourage 
regional traditions; France was military, the glory of its army was 
necessary for its well-being; France was Catholic and should therefore rid 
itself of foreign elements (including Protestants, Jews, and Freemasons) 
and limit naturalizations; and France was not democratic.25 
For Maurras as for other thinkers on the Right, the “nation” no 
longer designated an abstract concept, a spiritual principle as it had 
during the Revolution, but rather the ethnically homogenous community 
that existed within juridically defined boundaries, constituting a state that 
corresponded to “an enormous mass of desires, passions, needs, 
aspirations, customs, rituals, ways of being, thinking, [and] speaking.”26 
France was comprised of French citizens, who increasingly participated 
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in the political process and conglomerated into socioeconomic groups.27 
Maurras was concerned—as Pétain would be—with minimizing 
factionalism and reintegrating all Frenchmen around corporatist 
structures, altering the political process so that “instead of directing the 
nation, suffrage should represent it.”28  According to the leader of AF, 
since a society can survive only if it is capable of unity and discipline, a 
strong state needs to arbitrate amongst factions, toward the greater 
national good, ending the predominance of the “barbarian chiefs left to 
the impulses of  passion or of  interest.”29
Rejecting Rousseau, Maurras was inspired by La Tour du Pin, 
literary historian Hippolyte Taine, and syndicalist Georges Sorel. He 
believed humans could only really exist as such within their families, their 
communities, and their professional environments.30  Liberalism had led 
to individualism, ridding humans of their substance and their historical 
form. Inspiring ultraconservatives for decades to follow and preparing the 
terrain for the ideas of social groupings and corporatism, Maurras wrote 
that “families can be considered the natural vehicles of tradition” and the 
strength of France is “the incorporation of the individual in the soil.” By 
replacing “the artificial, the fictitious” departments with “regions much 
more vast,” humans would be reattached to the “natural and the eternal” 
community. Corporatism would end “the state of isolation to which 
revolutionary individualism has reduced [man, where] he feels too lost 
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amongst other men and too weak to take on serious responsibilities,”31 
and reunite society by reintegrating the proletariat and ending the 
insecurity engendered by big industry.32  AF wanted to replace the 
individual, that product of the Revolution, with the family, the 
profession, and the region, for France “[would] only prosper in a 
sustainable way when it [was] be possible to reorganize the corporations” 
to reverse the trend where “it seem[ed] the majority of [Frenchmen were] 
more sensitive to private interests than to the general interest.”33
AF based its antidemocratic and corporatist philosophy on the 
concept of social hierarchy and the negation of the false equality that 
came out of the Enlightenment thinkers. Building on the ideas of social 
psychologist Gustave Le Bon, for whom “the final dissolution [of all 
great empires] was carried out by these irrational and brutal masses,”34 
Maurras rejected democracy, denouncing the “republican fiction wanting 
all rational acts, all clear visions, to be necessarily understood and 
adopted by the enlightened minds and noble hearts of all voters.”35 
According to AF, the Republic would always be a war of factions and run 
counter to the spirit of nationalism, whose intrinsic purpose was to unite. 
The Republic was pusillanimous and incapable of decisive action, its 
institutions corrupted humans and limited their power over reality 
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through the electoral process.36 This “revolutionary disorder” encouraged 
the prominence of the “mediocre, the envious, the stupid, and the 
rogue.”37   Only a “regime of non-equality, limited by the actions of an 
authority that restrains it would safeguard the duties of justice and 
charity that watch over the life and the development of those less 
gifted.”38  For Maurras, only a society based on a hierarchy of ability, 
where each would have “the most rights possible. . .based on naturally 
unequal situations,”39  could ensure the glory and progress of France 
while paternalistically caring for each citizen through his reintegration 
within the community.
Maurras was convinced that the interests of French citizens were 
always threatened by the métèques—a pejorative term for any foreigner on 
French soil, which in Maurrassian discourse included Jews, Protestants, 
and Freemasons, pointing to the cultural distinctions between these 
groups and what was imagined as the authentic Frenchmen—who could 
not relate to French problems given that they did not share the common 
patrimonial heritage. Like Barrès, Maurras recognized the political 
usefulness of anti-Semitism: “All seems impossible or horribly difficult 
without this providence of anti-Semitism. With it all falls into place, 
smooths and simplifies itself. If one was not antisemitic by patriotic will, 
one would become it by simple sentiment of opportunism.”40  For him, 
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nationalism was the will to survive, and he believed that decadence began 
with the infiltration of elements that threatened the French order.41 
Nationalism “defends the nation against the Foreigner from within.”42 
The “foreign oligarchy” would be destroyed only if it was “replaced by 
another nobility, truly born from the guts of the nation.”43 The vision of 
AF held that as long as foreigners were free to “colonize” France, to 
increase their influence in all national sectors, the country would be 
occupied and exploited from within: the solution was either to subjugate 
the métèque or expel him.44  A reformed state, assuming its role as 
socioeconomic regulator, would see to it that foreigners “prosper freely in 
France, serving it loyally with their talents. . .becoming with time, by 
alliance or by marriage, very good Frenchmen.”45 Integration through the 
development of a national consciousness and an adherence to the 
community could overcome foreignness: “neither linguisticism nor 
racism: politics first! A national politic sees peoples as peoples, not as 
languages or blood. . . Amongst all, the biological element is the most 
weakly considered and the least seriously determined.”46
While Maurrassism was never able to move from theory to action, it 
inspired the programs of Salazar. The Portuguese Head of Government 
(1932-1968) admitted his intellectual debt to Maurras, influenced by his 
“politics first,” his notions of the strong state, and his condemnation of 
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democracy as a means of guiding power.47  Salazar’s volume of collected 
speeches could be seen on Pétain’s table and Portugal represented an 
experience to which Pétain could refer.48  Salazar’s discourse in 1936 
could have been repeated word for word by the Marshal four years later:
[We] don’t ask for much: a notion and a sense of pátria and national 
solidarity; family—social cell par excellence; authority and hierarchy; 
spiritual value of life and of respect owed to human beings; obligation to 
work; superiority of virtue; sacred character and religious sentiments—
here are the essentials for the mental and moral formation of the citizen 
in the Estado novo.49
Salazar’s view of family as the basis of society, his fear of hedonism and 
the erosion of traditional values, his desire to organize the nation based 
on natural groupings and corporations, his push for schools to inculcate 
morality and the love of the nation, his belief that authority was 
necessary and a just reward for the elite constituted the bridge between 
AF and the proponents of Pétainism.50  Portugal’s own National 
Revolution was a contemporary model on which traditional Vichy had to 
draw since, after all, Maurras, whom Pétain respected and consulted, “in 
the end, [had] built nothing.”51
The French Navy: Conformity in Thought and Action
This discourse, with its emphasis on love of the nation, hierarchy, 
and authority, had all the ingredients to resound well within certain 
circles, not least in the military. Defeat in the Franco-Prussian War led to 
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cataclysmic changes in the French civil and military landscapes, with 
repercussions affecting the officer corps for generations.  It is not 
surprising that the appropriation of nationalist sentiments by the Right in 
its discourse attracted many within military circles. Déroulède, so 
obsessed with revenge on the Germans, wrote that to belong to the army 
meant “belonging to duty, to danger, to death, no longer to oneself, 
almost no longer be oneself.”52  In 1891, La Revue des deux mondes 
published an unsigned articled entitled “The Social Role of the Officer in 
the Universal Service,” written, it was soon revealed, by future Marshal 
Hubert Lyautey. This piece significantly affected how the military 
perceived itself and its relationship with French society. Lyautey, whose 
bourgeois family had numerous ties with members of the legitimist (that 
is, believing in the return of the Bourbon dynasty) nobility, saw universal 
conscription as a unique opportunity for officers—who he believed 
constituted France’s elite—to influence the minds of the country’s youth, 
as military service exposed every one of the nation’s young men to the 
army’s values and teachings. The officer had the social duty of inspiring 
“these twenty year old souls ready for profound impressions, that a spark 
could light up for life” and, as the educator of the nation, he must teach 
them that “on the ruins of the lost hierarchies, the social necessities of 
discipline, respect, and abnegation [would] not cease, and that the army 
[would] always be the best, if not the only school, where these virtues 
would be learned.”53  Lyautey’s ideas and the myth surrounding his 
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persona marked the spirits of many officers whose careers began at the 
turn of the century, and both Catroux and Decoux, whose fortunes took 
such radically different directions, wrote of their admiration for 
Lyautey.54
 The socioeconomic makeup of the corps and its particular cultural 
characteristics provided a fecund ground for the monarchist ideas of AF. 
According to Chalmers Hood, during the decades preceding the Second 
World War the Royale, nickname of the French Navy, had become a 
refuge for those with contempt for the egalitarian forces flourishing 
elsewhere in French society. Ten years before the war, approximately one 
in six open supporters of AF was in the military. The navy’s code of 
behavior forbade the questioning of authority and its strong sense of 
hierarchy, coupled with a profound cult of the nation, engendered a 
mistrust toward a system deemed too unstable and weak, and 
predisposed minds to royalist arguments.55 
Even before embarking on their careers, future naval officers 
understood that they would not succeed if they strayed from the 
ideological norm. Applicants to the École Navale sat for an entrance exam 
whose questions were structured in such a way as to reveal personal views 
on political and religious issues.56  George Debat recalls how the huge 
bust of Admiral de Rigny, the last Minister of the Navy under a legitimist 
government, was deliberately placed at the end of the main walkway at 
the École Navale. According to Debat, AF was the only major political 
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movement to promote a theory of the state and the nation whose 
principles resembled those of the Navy, and students, isolated from much 
of society, often adopted ultraconservative values to fit in with the 
predominant culture. Even those who called themselves republicans were 
impregnated with Maurrassian ideas, coming to see how naval hierarchy 
could be transposed to the rest of society. Debat explains that “taken by 
the game of the sea and the arms, isolated by its mode of life from the 
existence of a working class city, proud of its organized power, hateful of 
a regime incapable of preserving a grandeur rebuilt on blood, the Navy 
distanced itself more every year from the French people.” He recounts 
how every day during the interwar period every officers’ quarters received 
the daily publication L’Action Française, which delivered “its blows on the 
foundations of the Republic and proposed, beautiful and hard like a 
Doric column, Maurrassian reasoning.”57  Its vituperations revived a 
latent anti-Semitism to which staunch Catholics, like Decoux, were 
particularly receptive. Debat clarifies that naval anti-Semitism was not so 
much racial as the xenophobic outcome of a staunchly nationalist 
milieu.58
Many considered it a “law of nature” that French naval officers 
turned to AF. They had been kept out of the political process by the Law 
of 29 July 1872, which denied all military personnel the right to vote in 
the hopes of keeping the armed forces above partisan politics. Without 
this means of expression, officers sought alternatives to the ballot box, 
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and AF’s incendiary discourse appealed to the snobbish and resentful 
members of the corps.59  From February 1928 L’Action française devoted 
two pages, twice a month, to military affairs. Officers read about how 
“the Republic, the reign of the mediocre, is the enemy of all elites. The 
officer corps has always been an elite, and as such, it is inevitable that it 
be the victim of the republicans.”60 By the early 1930s, when it came time 
for the men who entered the navy during the 1890s (the first generation 
born under the Third republic) to reach the upper echelons of hierarchy, 
the centrist parliamentary influence over the Ministry of Navy—
appropriately located on the Rue Royale—faded completely, and a single 
voice, incarnated by AF, came to dominate the naval corps.61
 For years following the Great War, AF sought to exploit the 
military’s self-perception as the sole guardian of discipline, respect, and 
abnegation and it tried to drive further the wedge between officers and the 
Republic. The publication wrote of how the government’s defense policy 
was rife with “ignorance, distraction, confused hatred, spew of radical 
socialist bile against the military professional only good to get himself killed 
to make up for the politicians’ mistakes.”62 AF pushed the myth that the 
military was the only guarantor of national unity, threatened by internal 
corruption and foreign influences. The soldier, true representative of the 
country’s valor, twice saved France: during the Dreyfus Affair and during 
the Great War. By the 1930s, the military increasingly accepted the idea 
77
59. Hood, "The French Navy and Parliament Between the Wars," 402. Xenophobia 
having more to do with nationality than race.
60. L’Action française, 25 February 1928.
61. Hood, Royal Republicans, 125-126; 146.
62. L’Action française, 25 July 1929 [emphasis in original].
of national recovery pushed by AF and other extreme Right circles, 
particularly after the failed 6 February 1934 putsch and the subsequent 
formation of the Popular Front.63  More than fifty years after it was 
written, Déroulède’s sophism that “a powerful army is the only safeguard 
of the prosperity of a nation [and] it is a corresponding truth to affirm 
that the prosperity of a nation is foremost the support of a powerful 
army”64  resounded within a corps feeling betrayed by an ungrateful 
government.
After Pétain’s ascension to power, many within the armed forces to 
think they would save France for a third time. Debat recalls how for most 
officers of the Royale the preservation of France required that the fleet 
submit to the Armistice. Darlan maintained that the Navy was the one 
French military branch that had not been humiliated and most admirals 
staunchly defended the Pétainist conception of national interest. Tying 
the colonies to the prestige of the Navy itself, the grand corps saw itself as 
the sole protector of the empire.65  For these officers, including Decoux, 
swearing allegiance to Pétain was a matter of discipline, honor, and 
nationalism.66 For the Navy
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the common good of the French consist[ed]. . .in the safeguard of the 
soul of the patrie, that is the will to consider as only temporary the 
defeat of [the] armies, to stay rooted in the hopes of national liberty, and 
to maintain the presence of France on the field of honor. [Naval 
personnel] defended this part of the common good essential for personal 
human dignity that is honor.67
In addition to this sense of honor, the absolute discipline that 
attached the naval officer to the local chief (that is, the squadron 
commander) as well as to the summit of the national hierarchy (the Head 
of State) made it nearly impossible to follow one’s personal convictions 
even if  they ran counter to Pétain. Otherwise, this would betray the 
values of abnegation and primacy of the common interest over the 
individual will.68 
In the hierarchical culture of the Royale, a handful of spokesmen set 
the ideological agenda and their subordinates followed suit. Leaders 
sought intellectual conformity to a greater extent than in other military 
organizations. During the summer of 1940, de Gaulle had only recently 
been promoted General and his name was largely unknown to those in 
the Navy. Moreover, Admiral Muselier, the only naval officer who called 
for dissidence, suffered from a dubious reputation further fueled by his 
recent retirement.69 The Royale was a tightly knit and homogenous group 
in which everyone served and obeyed unquestioningly the orders of their 
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superiors70 and when Darlan told the admirals to obey the clauses of the 
armistice lest the country be ruined, officers followed suit.71
Decoux: Spokesman for the Conservative Cause
Born in 1884, Jean Decoux entered the École Navale in Brest in 1901, 
two years after the Dreyfus Affair had reached its paroxysm, revealing the 
deep cleavages within the Third Republic; one year after the first 
publication of Maurras’ Enquête; and one year before the legislative 
elections that would mark the victory of secular republicanism over the 
coalition of the traditional right.72  Decoux recalled the visit in 1903 of 
Minister of Marine Camille Pelletan—Dreyfussard and socialist 
sympathizer, whose “ephemeral reign took. . .for the French fleet the 
semblance of a new Trafalgar”—and the sentiments shared among the 
students that this “hotheaded member of parliament” had stripped the 
Royale of one of its “oldest and most emotive traditions” when he put an 
end to all religious displays in the Navy, leaving the devout to pursue their 
activities in clandestinity, “like in  the epoch of the first Christians and 
the time of the catacombs.”73  The end of these long-standing customs 
polarized the officer corps, leading many to fear an unprecedented and 
dangerous Masonic and Jewish influence on government.74  Given the 
treatment of these events in his memoirs, these experiences indubitably 
shaped Decoux’s worldview creating in his mind an opposition between 
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the grandeur of the Navy and the Republic, which plunged France “into 
the depths of  demagogy and anarchy.”75
One of Decoux’s ideological influences was Admiral Antoine 
Schwerer, one of the navy’s staunchest conservatives and most vocal anti-
Semites. Schwerer left active duty in 1924 to become a prominent leader 
in AF, believing it to be the only movement able to “lead the assault” 
against the weak and the “men of bad faith” seeking to perpetuate the 
“very somber” situation of France.76  He called the Republic a “Judeo-
Masonic regime that wants to destroy the family, the patrie, and religion 
at the same time. . .that will lead [France] to a new war. . .to the 
parcelling of the patrie. . .and to the dechristianization of France. . .The 
decline of our country is accelerating [and] Judeo-Masonry is 
triumphing.”77  Schwerer, who after the Great War had become a 
spokesman for the conservative cause within the Navy,78  for whom 
“democracy only survived through the ignorance in which it kept the 
French people,” accused parliament of weakening France by refusing to 
reinforce the fleet, diverting the greater part of naval appropriation funds 
to the arsenals—“parasitic vegetation, of purely electoral order,” and 
bastion of Bolshevik activity—and weakening the nation by submitting to 
the Washington Naval Congress.79  His voice epitomized the arch-
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conservative sentiments putting the military and parliamentarianism in 
opposition to each other.
Decoux openly lamented the Republic, with its “infernal cycles of 
ministers without duration and without authority” and its values of 
popular sovereignty that led to “the collective hysteria of the masses.” He 
reviled the “cowardly and amorphous politicians” who “grazed at the 
trough” of the League of Nations, itself of Anglo-American, “sometimes 
Hebraic and Masonic influence.” He deplored the 1932 victory of the 
“bolshevizing” Cartels des Gauches and the 1936 Popular Front, which he 
accused of accelerating the Republic’s declining influence. Decoux 
regretted Colonel de la Roque’s lack of preparation in his attempt at 
seizing power during the riots of 6 February 1934, preventing him from 
ending the “ephemeral and inconsistent governments.” He admired 
Francisco Franco, one of the leaders of the anti-republican forces during 
the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), many of whose methods of order and 
discipline derived from fascism, as Decoux understood it.80 
Decoux tried to convert his political ideas into policy during his five 
years at the rue Royale. Admiral Georges Durand-Veil, head of the Navy’s 
general staff and Decoux’s former commander-in-chief, whose views 
exemplified naval conservatism and elitism,81  must have been aware of 
his subordinate’s political opinions when he personally asked Decoux in 
1931 to join him as Head of the Section d’Etudes des Armements Navals. 
Decoux certainly did little to hide his political leanings afterward, and to 
82
80. Decoux, Adieu Marine, 274; 285; 292; 295; 306; 333; 352; 356.
81. Vice Amiral Georges Durand-Veil, "L'Esprit de la marine," La Revue des deux mondes, 
No.1 (1939).
influence his colleagues he often enclosed with his letters clippings of 
L’Action française, and other extreme Right newspapers such as Gringoire, 
or Candide.82  Participating in several international disarmament 
conferences, Decoux fought to preserve French naval interests against 
what he perceived to be Anglo-American plots.   
That an officer of the French navy should be anglophobic is not in 
itself surprising, but Decoux was convinced Great Britain was hostile to 
any rapprochement between France and Italy, its Latin “sister nation.” 
This view mirrored that of AF. Maurrassians never stopped asserting that 
London could not be trusted, since Englishmen were “raised, educated in 
the tradition that the adversary of England. . .is France,” and their 
interests lay in pulling France away from her Latin neighbors in order to 
“enslave” her. England had systematically undercut France following the 
Versailles Treaty and masked her weakness by cozying up to Germany.83 
Debat recalls how Trafalgar was a name that “still sounded awful to our 
ears”84 and Decoux recounts how in the days immediately preceding the 
Entente Cordiale (1904), naval officers still saw England as France’s 
principal threat. Echoing AF, he believed Great Britain had allowed 
Germany to rearm in order to rival France’s military, a continuation of 
London’s historical ambitions for a continental balance of power. He saw 
the 1935 Anglo-German agreement to increase the size of the Reich’s 
fleet as a direct affront to the Conference of Stresa (also 1935), where the 
signatories agreed against unilateral or bilateral decisions that would 
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compromise peace. Decoux took Great Britain’s opposition to the 1935 
Rome Accords (where France promised to allow Italy a free hand in 
Ethiopia in exchange for its support against Germany aggression) as 
proof that Whitehall “never saw positively any slight desire of France to 
flirt” with Italy.85  
During his time at the Rue Royale, Decoux promoted a formal 
alliance of Latin powers (namely with Italy), an action that would have 
met with Maurras’ approval. With Germany’s departure in 1933 from 
both the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, many 
within French military and political circles deemed war inevitable. By 
1935 French industrial production was a third lower than in 1928, placing 
serious doubts on France’s ability to defend itself, particularly as it could 
no longer count on its former ally Russia. According to Laval and the 
French General Staff, the key to offsetting the German threat was Italy. 
Decoux praised Laval’s efforts in 1934 to end long-standing Franco-
Italian disputes, and Mussolini’s support of an independent Austria 
(when he sent four divisions to the Brenner following the assassination of 
Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss to avoid a German Anschluss) was 
proof of the worthiness of an alliance. Decoux blamed the communists, 
the Masonic lodges, and international Jewry for the failure of the Hoare-
Laval Pact (in 1935, which sought to end the war in Abyssinia by giving 
Italy control over significant portions of the region) and the Franco-
Italian friendship that would have ensued. When Italy invaded Ethiopia, 
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Decoux supported Italy’s defense of the “cause of Civilization,”86  and 
pushed the French government to help the “fascist revolution and its 
grandiose projects” with logistical support in Abyssinia.87  AF, which 
attributed Italy’s resurgence to its “method, its spirit of discipline, of 
perseverance,”88  supported a Latin union with Mussolini’s Italy to fight 
its internal enemy, the Popular Front, and its external enemy, Germany.89 
Maurras described the League of Nations as “a coalition of Masonry, 
Jewry, and England,” and castigated it for its “hypocrisy” in opposing the 
war in Abyssinia.90 Both Decoux and AF were eager to open their arms 
to Mussolini to preserve their ultraconservative vision of  France.
Admiral Decoux, Product of  his Environment
It is certain that Darlan suggested Decoux to replace General 
Catroux as Governor General of Indochina on 25 June 1940 (two weeks 
before Pétain was given plenipotentiary powers and therefore during the 
last days of the Third Republic) because he knew his character and 
convictions, and was confident Decoux, who was heading the French 
naval forces in the Pacific at the time, would obey the Marshal. The 
Royale—which had seen very little combat during the Battle of France 
and had not experienced the multi-pronged attacks of the Wehrmacht, the 
pathetic flow of refugees clogging the roads, or the capture of hundreds 
of thousands of its soldiers—was disproportionately represented in the 
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governments of colonial Vichy.91  Its culture of tradition and hierarchy 
ensured the loyalty of its officers to the government of Vichy, and 
Decoux was cut from the most conservative cloth the Navy offered. In 
1940, his personal political views were well known as was his 
uncompromising faith in the chain of command. At a time when France 
needed its empire as a bargaining chip in its armistice negotiations with 
Germany, Darlan was convinced Decoux would not break with the 
administrative entity that was Vichy. While the Vichy government was 
still reeling from the debacle and the asphyxiating demands of 
occupation when it decided to dismiss Catroux during the summer of 
1940, it still had the logistical capability to send someone from the 
metropole to take on the duties of Governor General of Indochina. That 
Decoux was already on site was fortuitous, but his disposition and 
worldview made him an ideal appointment to follow the Vichy line.
It is not necessary for Decoux to have been a member of AF to 
embrace its theses. Maurrassism had seeped through France’s political 
Right in the years preceding the war, its ideas symbolizing the emerging 
nationalism that no longer embodied a spirit, but rather a culture, a race, 
and a historical tradition. The Navy, where conformity reigned, was 
particularly sensitive to Maurras’ notions of réaction d’abord and the 
publication L’Action française was found in all quarters of this branch of 
the military. Moreover, the years of Decoux’s childhood were marked by 
the virulence that divided society during the Dreyfus Affair, he was 
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exposed to AF from early on in his career, and he must have been 
influenced by his superiors’ mistrust of  the Republic. 
Over the course of his professional ascension and in the memoirs he 
wrote in the crepuscule of his life, Decoux expressed his antidemocratic, 
authoritarian, and xenophobic views. Personally chosen by, and closely 
working with, arch-conservative Admiral Durand-Veil, Decoux had 
worked at the Rue Royale in an environment that castigated the Republic 
for its perceived abandonment of the military and its subjugation to 
Anglo-American pressures; the ephemerality of its governments and the 
importance of Leftist and Jewish politicians; and the perceived decadence 
that ensued from its promotion of egalitarianism and materialism. 
Decoux’s encouragement of an alliance of Latin states demonstrates his 
willingness to emulate the ultra Right regimes of Mussolini and Salazar 
to combat the internal threats from the Left and the external menaces 
from England and Germany. This political action, coupled with his 
admitted admiration for Franco’s methods to ensure authority and 
discipline, was not only in line with Maurrassian doctrine of the 1930s, 
but it stood for a larger picture of hostility toward the Third Republic and 
a belief  in the need to alter the course of  French politics and society.
Appointed on 25 June 1940 as Governor General of Indochina, 
Decoux had the authority to actualize his political persuasions, using the 
framework of the National Revolution as a legitimizing force. Though 
Vichy was unable and unwilling to export the National Revolution as 
conceptualized by the traditionalists (see Chapter 2), Decoux’s political 
orientations found their sources in the same Maurrassian discourse that 
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inspired policy-makers during the first six months of Pétain’s regime. 
Though Decoux believed in the sanctity of hierarchy, his spirit of 
discipline is not enough to explain his zeal to implement Vichy policies; 
he had to share common ideological roots with Pétainism, ones found in 
the pages of L’Action Française. As discussed in Chapter 2, Vichy’s power 
to influence Hanoi was minimized by the colony’s isolation from the 
metropole, German pressures (in terms of its economic demands and as 
discussed below, measures such as its limitations on telegraphic 
communications between France and Indochina), Japan’s incorporation 
of Indochina into the Asian Sphere of Po-prosperity, as well as the 
emptiness of the doctrine of the National Revolution. Nothing conveys 
the sense of remoteness and helplessness in the minds of the men of 
Vichy regarding Indochina better than former Governor General of 
Indochina (from 1936 to 1939) Jules Briévé’s resignation as Minister of 
Colonies in March 1943, because he saw there were effectively no more 
colonies to administer.92  Decoux’s regime experienced a level of 
independence (due to isolation) never before experienced by colonial 
administrators, one that would provide him with the opportunities to 
implement his own political visions, with a framework adopted from the 
metropole but driven by his own ideals, adapted to what he perceived as 
Indochinese specificities. The following chapter examines the propaganda 





In 1936, Aldous Huxley observed “Propaganda gives force and 
direction to the successive movements of popular feeling and desire; but it 
does not do much to create these movements. The propagandist is a man 
who canalizes an already existing stream. In a land where there is no 
water, he digs in vain.”1 The Decoux regime’s propaganda system was by 
necessity more complex than any of its predecessors’, through its 
organization, coercive policies, and attempts to manipulate subtly local 
cultures. To win the hearts and minds of the peoples in Indochina, 
Governor General Decoux needed to channel the multiplicity of 
“streams” in the region, facing an ultimately insuperable problem: how 
would a colonial administration reconcile the different and often 
opposing interests of an ethnically, culturally, and politically diverse 
nascent federation while under the scrutiny of an occupying power at war 
and threatened by an irredentist neighbor? 
Eric Jennings contends that the impulsion behind the politics of the 
colonial administration was the very nature of Vichy ideology: the 
promotion of local traditions and values, the encouragement of local 
nationalisms, and the glorification of a great past. He argues these thrusts 
coexisted with the reinforcement of the notables and the development of 
a federal discourse.2 Evidence shows that the regime’s propaganda efforts 
mirror these drives and run throughout its communication but Jennings 
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erroneously describes these initiatives as ends in themselves.3  He fails to 
appreciate Decoux’s overarching goal, which drew from the National 
Revolution but would not—and could not—attempt to replicate it: to 
maintain French control over Indochina throughout and following the 
war by elevating France’s prestige as the only power able to invigorate the 
different countries of the region and serve as keystone of the Indochinese 
Federation.
During the July 1942 session of the Federal Council, Decoux was 
clear about how he intended to use a multi-pronged approach to 
reinforcing the local populations’ attachment to France: 
Franco-Indochinese rapprochement has a sentimental and rather 
simplistic character that we need to evolve toward greater reason and 
depth. Vast powers of sentiments have surrounded France and its chief. 
We now need to reinforce these sentiments through reason. The 
Indochinese have today rather general notions of Indochinese 
federalism, of local patriotism loosely associated with French 
patriotism, etc. We now need to explore, deepen, analyze them in order 
to have perceived all the harmonies and echoes and consequently to 
consolidate them in the minds of all, both French and Indochinese. 
Here is where the considerable role of the elite appears in the Franco-
Indochinese rapprochement. It is to this minority. . .that must be 
entrusted the task of clearing up. . .what could and must be the French 
Imperial Community and the evolution within its core of Indochina 
toward a major social and political entity. We must show, in the full light 
of the principles of the Marshal and the laws of human social evolution, 
the efficiency and the richness of hope that the notion of Empire evokes. 
[Everyone] must find the points of conciliation of the existing doctrines 
and to clear up amongst the diversity of all the systems that link 
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sometimes discouraged local traditions and languages if it went against the 
government’s interests.
Indochina to both the Western world and the Chinese world, the 
common denominator that is nothing else but French humanism in its 
highest sense.4
In this speech are all the major themes behind the policies of the Decoux 
regime, highlighting their relationship with propaganda: administrative 
and economic initiatives to mold the consciousness of the peoples to 
instill a sense of legitimacy and belonging to the French Imperial 
Community through a disciplined and hierarchical reorganization of 
society.
The definitive rupture of maritime relations with the metropole in 
1941 meant that the French population in Indochina read no recent non-
local newspaper, magazine, or book in French until the end of the war, by 
which time the respective experiences of France and Indochina were so 
different that Georges Gautier, Decoux’s cabinet director, described the 
divergences in “thinking and expression as such that we had the 
impression that we no longer spoke the same language when, in 1945, 
contact was reestablished.”5  The difficulties in communication and the 
acquisition of propaganda materials meant Decoux often had to feel his 
way in the dark when drawing from elements of the National Revolution 
to promote France’s prestige.6 Without a dependable flow of information, 
it was the Maurrassism that influenced Decoux’s worldview—as it had 
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those of the ultraconservative architects of the National Revolution—that 
served as the vehicle to elevate France as the only possible benefactor of 
the Indochinese peoples. 
Decoux used the National Revolution as one tool to achieve his most 
important propaganda objective: to show the benefits and necessity of the 
Franco-Indochinese collaboration and the symbiosis between the cultures 
under the French-led Indochinese Union.7  The colonial administration 
formulated its propaganda to position France as a benefactor and rebuild 
its prestige in spite of the metropole’s occupation by Germany and the 
stationnement of Japanese troops in the colony. Decoux understood that 
given France’s tenuous situation in Europe and Asia, the administration 
risked losing whatever legitimacy it pretended to have in the colony if it 
did not mobilize every resource at its disposal to publicize the depth of 
French efforts in the region.8  He insisted that France’s oeuvre colonisatrice 
always be presented as a whole, independent of the political vicissitudes 
of the metropole. He openly called for state propaganda to channel 
nascent patriotic sentiments through the ideals of the National 
Revolution, of federalism, and the empire to destroy “unrealistic 
aspirations or dangerous illusions” of local nationalism. This effort 
needed to convince the Indochinese peoples that local moral and 
intellectual spirits could only flourish within an occidental synthesis, that 
is under French tutelage and not within the context of the pan-Asianism 
that the Japanese were espousing.9 
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Many of these policies were continuations of his predecessors’ 
initiatives under the Third Republic and did not present fundamental 
policy shifts.10  Decoux’s regime promoted patriotism and traditional 
values to fight off external (Japanese and Thai) and internal (Gaullists 
and Viet Minh) enemies while generating feelings of solidarity amongst 
all the different pays and an attachment to France through the federalist 
project. Faced with nationalists threats, Governors General Pierre 
Pasquier and Jules Brévié had also sought a return to Vietnamese 
tradition and tried to resurrect them as means of growing French power 
and influence.11  Pasquier and Governor General Alexandre Varenne 
pushed the concept of a federal Indochina to ensure political and social 
stability, with France as the unifying cement that held the entity together 
(see Chapter 5).12
In spite of his political views, elevating the French oeuvre in 
Indochina meant Decoux could not break (that is, openly denigrate) with 
the Third Republic with the same force as Vichy in the metropole, lest the 
entire colonial effort—and the supposed benefits that it brought to 
Indochina—be tarnished, weakening the credibility of French tutelage in 
the region. His regime criticized the Third Republic when it was useful 
but was careful not to disparage it unnecessarily in the eyes of the locals, 
fearing that systematic attacks on the Republic turned into attacks on 
France as whole, weakening the respect that he imagined the Indochinese 
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owed it.13 The Governor General stressed the need to adhere to Pétainist 
doctrine but also thought repeated criticisms of the preceding 
governments had no constructive value and he was aware of the grave 
danger that they could produce in the minds of the locals who he believed 
could not make the distinction between France as a nation and its 
particular type of government.14  More than anything, this was an 
admittance that the National Revolution had very little to do in 
Indochina, or rather, that his administration could not differ much from 
the previous ones.15 The regime’s doctrine went so far as to claim that the 
vices of the Third Republic, denounced by the Marshal, never reached 
Indochina, whose political and administrative structures allowed France, 
for three quarters of a century, to give the region its all.16 In one instance, 
the weekly publication Indochine ran a series of articles on great Governor 
Generals of Indochina, including Pasquier and Paul Doumer, to stress 
the longevity of the French oeuvre in the region.17 The Admiral held two 
propagandistic positions: building his case on a supposed continuity of 
the colonial oeuvre to preserve authority and administrative institutions on 
one hand and calling for moral rebirth through the new values of the 
National Revolution on the other.
Conducting the National Revolution without vilifying the Republic 
so as not to call into question the entirety of the French colonial effort 
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required a careful balancing act.  One solution was simply to turn the 
page on the previous regime, admitting that its administrators had 
achieved positive results in the colony but that it was time to focus on 
renewal and building a new present and future through a return to 
authority and tradition.18  By presenting policy changes as evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary the administration believed in the potential for 
rapprochement between French and locals as the French drew similarities 
between Pétainist doctrine and the traditional Indochinese cultures, 
showing that the ideas of work, family, patrie, hierarchy, and order 
highlighted parallels between the current French government and the 
Confucian concepts of authority in Annam or the social importance of 
family in Cambodia.19 
To direct the government’s propaganda efforts and its relations with 
the press, Decoux created the Service de l’Information, de la Propagande, et de 
la Presse (IPP), headed by Captain Marcel Robbe. The IPP ensured that 
the media untiringly treat every subject—economic, political, scientific, 
literary, artistic, and religious—that underscored the image the 
government wanted to create of Indochina’s vitality and its aptitude to 
resolve any problem that presented itself.20  Though the IPP didn’t 
officially own any publications, it coerced newspaper and magazine 
owners into covering topics of its choosing by enforcing censorship over 
any content that was deemed unacceptable to the colonial authorities or 
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withholding resources, whose distribution it controlled, to prevent 
publication. It also used local chapters of the Légion française des 
combattants to diffuse the regime’s messages throughout the different 
communities. Propaganda served to uphold the idea of the 
administration’s legitimacy but also to rally locals around colonial 
projects supposedly aimed at tackling the worsening conditions due to the 
war. As isolation and bombardments took their toll on Indochina, 
culminating in the 1945 famine in Tonkin and northern Annam, the 
propaganda machine worked ceaselessly to extol the benefits and 
achievements of  Franco-Indochinese collaboration.
Decoux recognized that he could not rely solely on the media, as 
censorship would inevitably lead to a desensitized and cynical readership 
and alienate readers from the government. His administration understood 
that it had to reach the peoples of Indochina during leisure time and tap 
unlikely sources that were not known to be directly under government 
orders.21 While films depicted the great realizations of the French culture 
and theater groups toured with plays exalting Eastern and Western 
collaboration, the authorities promoted festivals and sporting events to 
distract the crowds or turn its attention in periods of agitation.22 Lastly, 
oral propaganda used locals, under the direction of the IPP, to diffuse 
rumors or instructions to counteract foreign or nationalist influences.23 
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In all of these initiatives, direct or indirect, the IPP was the motor 
behind the colonial administration’s efforts to fight internal and external 
enemies and rally both French and Indochinese communities to its cause. 
No matter what the method, the message was the same “Unity behind 
the Marshal is the safeguard of our future.”24 This chapter will examine 
the IPP as an organization and coercive force that openly promoted the 
policies of the government and used indirect methods such as festivals 
and the cultivation—as well as creation—of Western and Eastern cultural 
parallels to reinforce the links between all the peoples of the Indochinese 
Federation. 
The Service de l’Information, de la Propagande, et de la Presse 
(IPP)
On 10 February 1941, Capitaine de vaisseau Marcel Robbe embarked 
on a ship in Marseille and arrived in Hanoi three months later.25 He had 
never met Decoux and learned only shortly after doing so that the 
Governor General had decided to appoint him head of a new department 
called the IPP. Montavani, Head of the Direction des Affaires Politiques, had 
had the idea for this department before Robbe’s arrival. He wanted to fuse 
two already existing organizations into one entity: the Commission Centrale 
du Contrôle des Informations et de la Presse (CCIP), created by General 
Catroux, Decoux’s predecessor, and the propaganda service. Established 
immediately after the outbreak of the war, the CCIP was the “negative” 
branch, which controlled information and engaged in censorship in 
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offices in each of the five capitals of the Union. The colonial authorities 
created the second organization following the conflict with Thailand, as a 
more “positive” means of promoting French interests, particularly in 
Laos. The IPP was originally part of the Direction des Affaires Politiques, 
but having no administrative attributions it was placed under the cabinet 
of the General Government of Indochina (GGI) in November 1941 by 
Gautier. Stretched for resources (in particular personnel), Robbe set up 
local offices in every capital, whose chiefs were chosen by and reported to 
the Heads of the local administration (ADLOC),26 not to Robbe himself. 
In his deposition given after the war, Robbe stated that any instruction he 
gave had to be approved by the ADLOC. This may have been technically 
accurate, but the IPP controlled the politics behind propaganda efforts, 
from strategy to positioning (including where to place physically articles 
in publications). Requiring the signature of a Head of ADLOC had 
mostly to do with ensuring consistency of policies and tapping into local 
knowledge of  specific issues.27
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The IPP’s first bureau, Information, relied on the police, the army, 
and postal control for intelligence in various areas such as public order, 
the country’s economic situation, harvests, or the black market. These 
reports, along with the information gathered by the radio listening and 
press review services, supplied Decoux with daily accounts of the 
situation in Indochina, which the Governor General returned with 
instructions on how to address certain topics for public consumption: 
usually whether to promote, refute, or ignore. These in turn were 
distributed by the IPP to whichever service head was most concerned 
(e.g. Political Affairs, Diplomatic Service, Military Affairs) and then sent 
back to Decoux for final approval.28  Since this section gathered 
information to be processed, it did not produce propaganda in any 
substantial form.
The Propaganda bureau was responsible for printing and diffusing 
materials and organizing events throughout the Union to promote French 
interests and convince locals of the benefits of the French colonization 
efforts. It used Radio Saigon to broadcast Voix de France, which provided 
French and Indochinese alike with information from the metropole and 
news of loved ones through personal messages. The IPP showed films 
produced by the private companies “Indochine Films et Cinémas” and 
“Ciné-Théâtres.” It financed theater groups to put on plays reinforcing 
colonial policy and printed brochures, posters, and billboards with themes 
and slogans of the National Revolution, and ensured the omnipresence of 
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portraits of Pétain. It was also in constant collaboration with the Légion 
to organize conferences and festivals across the federation.29 
The Press bureau’s mission was to lean on publications to stress the 
ideals of the National Revolution and promote the French oeuvre in 
Indochina. Newspapers received verbal directives from the local IPP 
chiefs during press conferences or one-on-one meetings with journalists. 
The bureau had a double mission: propaganda and control. It pressured 
publications to address specific themes and actively censored articles, 
editorials, literature, and public events.
During his trial, Decoux stated that it was the IPP’s duty to 
recommend cohesion and conformism to the French, loyalty and 
obedience to the Indochinese, and to develop the theme of a more 
pronounced Franco-Indochinese collaboration.30  The IPP was not, 
however, responsible for disseminating blindly the propaganda issued 
directly from Vichy: it tapped heavily into themes and imagery, but only if 
they confirmed to the Admiral’s vision of policy implementation in the 
colony.31  Robbe claimed that during his time as Head of the IPP he 
thought propaganda geared toward the French community was of 
secondary importance because he did not feel he could change 
Frenchmen’s opinions one way or another and that it was best “to save 
one’s strength for more important questions such as French sovereignty,” 
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leaving the Légion to focus on rallying the French to the National 
Revolution.32  In the game of placing the blame on everyone else, the 
légionnaires in charge of propaganda averred on the contrary their 
instructions came directly from the IPP.33  It seems that Decoux did use 
the Légion as the voice for his ultraconservative views, through Le 
Légionnaire, the Légion’s publication that appeared in different editions in 
each of the five countries.34  Robert Garry, former Propaganda 
Commissioner to the GGI and légionnaire, described himself as Decoux’s 
spokesman and recalled the Admiral requesting he speak to légionnaires 
chapters, saying what Decoux couldn’t say officially because of the 
potential repercussions with the Japanese.35
The self-exonerating depositions by those having been involved with 
the IPP, the media, and the Légion paint a confusing picture of how the 
IPP operated internally, full of contradictions and blame. It remains clear 
the IPP censored the press heavily and encouraged the media to highlight 
or avoid specific topics. It is equally certain that the IPP produced direct 
propaganda to rally Frenchmen and nurture an emotional rapprochement 
between Europeans and Indochinese peoples. Many within the IPP were 
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close to the anti-republican stance of Vichy.36  Since anyone within the 
media chain of production who was openly critical of the government or 
its propaganda—from the IPP to the press—was reprimanded by the 
authorities, it follows that everyone who continued to be involved 
preferred to be part of the machine than bear the consequences of 
opposition, whether through personal conviction or cowardice. As such it 
is useful to examine the IPP’s two principal activities of output, press and 
propaganda.
Press. While the IPP forbade contentious French works, “licentious” 
Vietnamese literature, and English language books imported from 
Shanghai, it directed most of its offices’ resources to controlling 
publications in French, quôc-ngu, Chinese, and even English and 
Japanese. It received frequent instructions on how to exercise this control, 
whether in broad outlines or case-specific topics.37  The media were told 
to abstain from all editorials on the course or possible outcome of the war 
and abide strictly to the communiqués from Vichy, German, or Japanese 
news agencies (respectively OFI, DNB, and DOMEI), leaving 
publications able only to treat French or Indochinese events.38 
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Before a piece could be printed, newspapers submitted articles to the 
IPP, which in turn rewrote or blacked out parts it deemed inappropriate. 
After cutting text, censors added information, made linkages, rearranged 
sections so that the author often didn’t recognize his original article. The 
IPP prohibited editors from showing where it had made changes or which 
parts had been inserted by the authorities. Furthermore, it often violated 
the rules of deontology by not using quotation marks, using “interpretive 
license” to attribute comments to those who never made them directly. 
Once the IPP made changes, the original author was not allowed to 
withdraw his name from the article.39  This process of censorship had a 
toll on readership as it caused significant delays in production and 
distribution.40
The IPP coerced publications into falling in line by threatening their 
ability to go to press. It attributed and could revoke press licenses, without 
which a newspaper could not legally exist, and controlled the supply of 
paper itself, which it distributed to each publication.41  The authorities 
reserved higher quality paper for friendly publications, such as L’Action, 
and punished those who resisted following government directives with 
grayer paper—sometimes in insufficient amounts for publication—which 
made the type more difficult to read. Conveniently, the IPP also supplied 
the typeface characters themselves and followed a similar policy of carrot 
and stick quality allocation. When all else failed, before shutting a 
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newspaper down, the IPP threatened to denounce editors to the Japanese 
authorities or simply refused to provide paper, officially stating that the 
government lacked the quantity necessary, as happened in 1943 with Voix 
d’Empire and Hanoi-Soir.42  This policy was particularly hard on local-
language newspapers, many of  which were forced to shut down.43
Of course the best way to avoid sanctions was to praise the politics of 
the colonial administration, loyally follow its directives, and cover 
subjects that the GGI found useful.44  The IPP pressured newspapers into 
inserting its own articles with clear instructions not to indicate anywhere 
that this was a government communiqué. According to Saumont, the IPP 
went so far as to impose headlines, page layouts, and pictures on 
publications, a credible assertion given that the government issued precise 
directives to address specific issues, and a refusal to cooperate led to the 
retaliations mentioned above.45  During his postwar hearing, Robbe 
denied ever giving direct instructions, claiming his service provided only 
general propaganda themes, but ultimately this was a matter of degrees 
and the media were coerced into following anything the IPP desired. 
Decoux intervened personally to criticize or confirm IPP directives and 
the IPP kept close track of which newspapers reproduced which of its 
suggested articles.46 This reinforces the idea that the IPP and the ADLOC 
shared responsibilities as the former needed the latter to monitor and 
enforce directives and ensure the proper relationships with the media.
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Vichy sent explicit instructions to Decoux’s administration to 
maintain neutrality in the Pacific conflict, as it did in Europe and Decoux 
was happy to oblige since it was in his interests to keep the Japanese out 
of Indochina’s affairs as much as possible. This meant the IPP had to 
walk another tightrope: vigorously attacking Gaullists and other 
dissidents of the regime while not ruffling the feathers of either the Axis 
or Allied powers.47  Decoux was obsessed with fighting foreign 
propaganda, most of it transmitted through British Radio Delhi, whose 
French language shows, incessantly criticized the Vichy and Hanoi 
governments.48 He demanded that all means be put to use simultaneously 
to counter what he labeled “lying affirmations.” Vichy itself was 
concerned that Decoux repress with extreme vigor English and Gaullist 
propaganda and requested regular reports on the evolution of the 
situation.49  The IPP told the press it was its duty to stress that all 
sympathy toward Gaullists was unpardonable and to be condemned 
without pity.50  Through the media, the colonial authorities sought to 
portray Gaullists as threats to French unity, who weakened the position 
of France no matter the outcome of the war as dissidence could only play 
in the hands of foreigners.51  Who these foreigners were exactly was left 
intentionally vague: the British, the occupying powers, the Soviets, or the 
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48. Exposés et entretiens, 13 July 1943, 19.
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Jews. A regime bent on projecting an image of unity among Frenchmen 
needed the flexibility that comes with imprecision to provide cohesion 
and self-identification.52
Until the 9 March 1945 coup de force, nothing could be published or 
broadcast that would offend either the Americans or the Japanese, though 
much of the information from the war came from Axis sources.53 
Moreover, Decoux asked the press to minimize friction with the British 
since its empire was at Indochina’s doorstep.54 Since Indochina continued 
to sell portions of its rubber production to the United States until 
December 1941, the IPP was careful to censure any disparaging remarks 
about the Americans to preserve economic relations.55  A year later, 
Decoux continued to dissuade the press from printing anti-American 
pieces because he wanted to avoid alienating the US and put French 
Indochina—and himself—in a precarious position after the war. Gautier 
recounted that by the end of 1942 the Admiral knew that the Allies 
would prevail and was convinced that Indochina would stay out of the 
war zone as its geographic position was not strategically determinant to 
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54. Directives politiques, 9 October 1940.
55. RSC 307, Telegram No.3937, Gougal to Goucoch, 3 August 1941.
the outcome of the conflict.56  This is corroborated by a Free French 
intelligence report from January 1943 that explicates the Admiral’s 
dangerous balancing act and states: “Decoux has profoundly evolved in a 
favorable sense toward the Allies, in particular the Americans. His 
constant worry is to avoid any incident with the Japanese, who would use 
any pretext to increase their hold on the colony.”57  Decoux must also 
have been apprehensive to alienate the Americans further, knowing their 
President seemed inclined not to return France’s colonies after an 
eventual Allied victory. Decoux may have prided himself on his apolitical 
character, but he continually hedged his positions throughout the war to 
save Indochina and possibly himself.58
Anti-British propaganda focused more on dissuading dissidence than 
attacking the former ally, claiming that London did not have France’s best 
interests in mind.59  This also required a delicate approach. During the 
conflict in Syria, Decoux warned against any article that would further 
sour the Anglo-French Indochinese relations and preferred to focus on 
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the “Anglo-Gaullists’” refusal to come to Indochina’s aid in 1940.60  The 
IPP also pushed the media to report on the damage caused by Allied 
bombardments in the metropole and how Great Britain failed to meet its 
reciprocal trade obligations with Indochina, leaving the colony lacking in 
necessary goods.61 While there was accuracy in these depictions, pushing 
these themes provided a useful and ubiquitous scapegoat to explain 
deteriorating living conditions due to the scarcity of resources, somewhat 
shielding the government and preserving its legitimacy. Nevertheless 
Decoux knew of the devastating effects of Radio Delhi and Radio 
Singapore (until 1942) on French and Indochinese morale and, while he 
punished anyone caught listening to foreign broadcasts, he proposed to 
the British General Consul in Saigon that the Allies stop emitting pro-
Gaullist propaganda in Indochina and in return the GGI would cease 
anti-Free French messages destined for the South Pacific. Ultimately 
Decoux’s regime and Britain continued their propaganda warfare, both 
aware of the risks it posed to Indochinese stability but unwilling to back 
down.62
Propaganda. The IPP’s propaganda efforts also consisted of printing 
materials (such as posters, billboards, and brochures), promoting theater 
productions, showing films, and broadcasting radio. Unlike the press, 
which it coerced into following its agenda, the IPP had absolute control 
over these activities insofar as organization and production. One of the 
first brochures put out by the IPP was “Paroles du Maréchal,” a collection 
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of Pétain’s speeches, printed in French and quôc-ngu.63  The authorities 
printed two editions in quôc-ngu: a luxurious version for the elites (5,000 
prints) and a more popular version for the petite bourgeoise. Decoux 
personally called on all Heads of ADLOC to publicize the tome and 
compared it to a plebiscite, believing the success of its sale would give a 
clue about the attachment of Indochina to France and its leader.64  It is a 
surprising connection to make given that many within the target audience 
probably purchased the brochure to ingratiate themselves with members 
of the French community, and perhaps it was just a vulgar pressure tactic 
to encourage Heads of ADLOC to act. The GGI advertised the brochure 
well before its publication calling it “more than a book—a treasure,’’ and 
promised to donate proceeds to the Franco-Indochinese Assistance for 
Victims of the War.65  By 1942, the GGI printed over 60,000 editions of 
the second volume, in both French and quôc-ngu, with slightly fewer 
printings of the first.66 Other brochures, many of which were signed with 
pseudonyms, intended to educate the French and Indochinese peoples on 
topics popular with Decoux such as the similarities between French and 
Vietnamese cultures, the insidiousness of Gaullism, or the importance of 
cultivating tradition (over 400,000 were printed by February 1942 on a 
broad range of  topics).67
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The IPP also printed over a million posters by 1942 alone, most of 
which consisted of Pétain’s portrait or slogans but others emphasized the 
links between France and the Indochina, such as with images of Jeanne 
d’Arc or the Trung Sisters. The administration sold portraits of Pétain 
(70,000 by the end of the first quarter 1941) and placed billboards in 
various large city centers with similar themes (800,000 by February 
1942).68  The French were aware that the Indochinese often derided these 
posters but left them hanging until the liberation of Paris when they were 
discreetly taken down.69  In spite of the ridicule they drew, disposing of 
them earlier would have been an even bigger embarrassment for the 
regime.
Decoux understood the need to carry his message to non-urban 
areas, even though Japanese troops were seldom seen there. The Admiral 
was a fervent proponent of tours and direct and frequent contact of 
French officials with local populations. The IPP created a system to 
broadcast speeches in urban and rural regions alike, using vehicles 
equipped with speakers to reach areas that had no fixed apparatus.70 The 
administration promoted plays, gave prizes for best dramas and even 
worked with the Annamite Philharmonic Society to present a live portrait 
of the three principles of the National Revolution (Work, Family, 
Homeland). As with every other medium, the IPP pushed works that 
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II. 
adhered to its propagandistic designs while censuring those it found 
reprehensible.71 
The IPP used film to reach quickly large numbers of people  by 
transporting projection equipment by vehicle to remote areas devoid of 
screening rooms. Superseding all censorship measures in place since 
1926, the 6 March 1942 decree left two commissions, located in Saigon 
and Hanoi, to decide, based on the principles of the National Revolution, 
whether to issue permits for the import of films to the entire colony.72 
Vichy insisted that the GGI not allow the screening of any anti-German 
films, though ultimately left censorship to the discretion of the colonial 
authorities.73  Private companies such as Ciné-Théâtres d’Indochine 
provided films specific to Indochina, but after 1943 local IPP offices 
produced and showed their own works with equipment ordered from 
Japan. Most screenings consisted of short films on the Marshal’s speeches 
or travel (at least during the early years) and events in Indochina, such as 
festivals, ceremonies, or sporting events, with each segment separated by 
a cartoon. In Vietnam, a native speaker provided explanations to the 
public.74  
One of the IPP’s most controversial initiatives was the production of 
the film Documents because of its glorification of Hitlerian Germany at 
the expense of French society under the Third Republic. Screened across 
Indochina, one witness described the movie as a series of contrasts 
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between identical social events in France and Germany: on one side the 
disorder, laziness, and waste of France and on the other the order, 
method, and work of Germany. One scene showing abandoned fields in 
France, with rusty carts was followed by another of German harvesting, 
organized and efficient among happy farmers. Another scene showed a 
fiery and quarrelsome session in the French Chamber of Deputies, 
contrasted with the dignified and disciplined session of the Reichstag. 
According to Colonel Legrand, stationed in the colony at the time, the 
film was extremely popular with Vietnamese of all classes, who fought 
over tickets to enter, though whether the this was because the locals could 
relate to the subject is questionable as it was it is just as likely that some 
found pleasure in ridiculing the colonial power. It is also uncertain 
whether less controversial films were equally popular, in which case the 
scene described would have had few connections to Documents itself. It is 
any case surprising that the colonial authorities would have found any 
interest in promoting the film within the Vietnamese community given 
their stress on promoting the entire French oeuvre in the region and their 
stance that Indochina had remained isolated from all that was nefarious 
in the Third Republic.75 Legrand also claimed that many of the French in 
Hanoi had to wait months for the film to show again in cinemas located 
in Vietnamese quarters, though it is possible that "enthusiasm" to see the 
film was due to government pressure.76 
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Decoux’s regime did not stop at encouraging attendance as once 
inside the theaters, it coerced the public into staying until the very end, 
creating a captive audience that had to endure a multi-pronged campaign. 
Propaganda speeches sometimes preceded the films and in one instance, 
students in Hanoi were told they were about to witness the “emotional 
minutes when thousands of Frenchmen greeted, as was their duty, the 
Savior of our country, the builder of a new France,” a curious (and rote) 
use of language given the students were Vietnamese. They would see 
their “supreme leader, alive, alert, sometimes serious, sometimes 
smiling. . .speaking with the poor, comforting the wounded, the unhappy, 
encouraging the youth” (like the audience).77 The GGI gave instructions 
to project before and after each intermission Pétain’s weekly words of 
wisdom entitled “Paroles du Maréchal” in both French and local languages, 
which when possible were read out loud. At the end of each screening, 
before leaving, the public was told to rise and listen to La Marseillaise 
while a photo of Pétain appeared on screen.78  The GGI was very 
attached to these rituals, to the point where Robbe wrote a note on 15 
September 1941 complaining that the Paroles were presented too quickly 
between two short films and that the audience had not had the time to 
read and meditate upon its wisdom.79  Claiming that most locals left the 
theater early out of ignorance or negligence, Decoux asked the IPP to 
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intervene in the press and in youth organizations to inform the 
Indochinese of their duty to stay until the end. He believed it was 
particularly important that the youth be taught the importance of 
showing respect to the Head of State and get in the habit of observing in 
this matter a certain necessary discipline.80  Habit of observation and 
internalization of values are two different things (that is appropriating 
and living by what is observed in order to be learned) and the Admiral 
was either blinded by his preternatural need for obedience or this 
audience participation in patriotic ritual was just another part of the 
show.
Whether for obedience or spectacle, Decoux’s determination to have 
everyone stay until the end was such that he signed a circular on 16 
September 1942 threatening legal action against anyone exiting before the 
presentation of Pétain’s portrait.81  Dupré, Head of Judicial Services, 
wrote a circular two weeks later claiming that leaving the cinema before 
this ritual was unacceptable and that all passivity regarding the National 
Revolution should be considered an act of hostility toward the new 
regime and its leaders based on the 21 January 1942 law against 
antigovernment demonstrations. He found it impossible to accept that a 
spectator who sat through a film for at least two hours could not sit a few 
minutes longer to assist in the ritual patriotic demonstration.82 From this 
point on, policemen and légionnaires waited for spectators keen to leave 
too early, but according to one Gaullist informer, about a quarter of the 
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public left half an hour early to avoid having to stand up in front of 
Pétain’s portrait.83 
During his trial, Decoux defended his actions, claiming that a refusal 
to stay in the theaters and stand up during La Marseillaise compromised 
French unity which would have been seen as a sign of weakness in the 
eyes of the Japanese and the Indochinese peoples, perhaps giving some 
indication as to the reasoning behind the ritual.84  He added that the 
national anthem was played in the cinemas and theaters of the British 
Empire, with few complaints, and he wanted to do the same in 
Indochina: 
We were not in France, but in Indochina and I had to take into account 
not only the quasi-unanimous sentiments of the French, but the deep 
and hidden thoughts of the Indochinese, and above all the mistrust of 
the Japanese. . .Could we have tolerated that our national anthem and at 
the same time the image of the Head of State be ridiculed in public 
under the eyes of  our administered Indochinese?85
Radio. The IPP used radio to create linkages between the colony and 
Pétain’s France, particularly through the broadcast of the Vichy-produced 
Voix de France channel. The GGI however never used radio as a principal 
tool of propaganda as it saw danger in promoting a medium that relied 
on airwaves that opponents of the regime could exploit through 
broadcasts of their own, particularly through Radio Delhi. Decoux was 
constantly battling against the foreign propaganda and could never decide 
on whether radio should be a means to counter these messages or 
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whether simply to confiscate radios to prevent people from listening at all. 
He often criticized Voix de France as an ineffective tool, pointing to the 
more polished and convincing broadcasts from the BBC.
Decoux saw Voix de France as uninformative, unreliable, and even a 
risk to the morale of the colony’s population. Early on Decoux wanted to 
use radio to transmit Pétain’s speeches, which he believed to be the best 
way to bring the Marshal closer to the colony and explain the 
achievements of the National Revolution. He had local administrators 
organize collective listening points in cafés and bars to reach audiences 
beyond owners of radios.86  In 1941, Decoux asked Vichy if it was 
possible to have Pétain address the Indochinese directly, which the 
Admiral asserted would boost local morale.87  Decoux called for fewer 
stories of heroism and more extracts from the French press that were 
really characteristic of the situation and analysis of words of the great 
writers of the National Revolution as well as details on the daily lives and 
activities of the different social categories.88  He was presumably not 
referring to the assassination of hostages by the SS, the Rafle du Vel d’Hiv 
(when over 17,000 Jews were handed over to the Germans), or the French 
workers forced to leave their families to work in German factories as the 
only means of earning subsistence wages.89  He asked for greater 
clarification on the domestic political situation of France since Voix de 
France provided Indochina with world news several days after foreign 
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agencies had transmitted their own versions, a risk to morale and 
credibility.90  He complained to Vichy that the personal messages to 
families were broadcasted haphazardly, with no warning, so that the 
families concerned would often miss them, and admitted his disconcert 
when on one occasion in 1942 Voix de France transmitted its broadcast in 
Romanian. He reported that its signals were too weak, therefore 
inaudible, and when Germany refused to allow an increase in the signal, 
Vichy suspended broadcasts until the issue could be resolved.91  Decoux 
worried these cuts too would affect morale, and when Allied 
bombardment destroyed cables in June 1944, he feared panic among a 
population deducing that the political and military situation had 
worsened in the metropole.92 Ultimately, the inability to tell more stories 
of the metropole, specifically about how on the progress and 
achievements of the National Revolution, accelerated the weakening of 
the propaganda effort in the later years of the war as the colony was 
disconnected from France and the theory behind Pétainism was never 
backed up with concrete examples.
While Decoux admired Radio Delhi, with its clear transmission, 
good music, and clever speakers whose eloquent French was excellent, he 
decried Voix de France’s uninteresting stories and superficial news, and 
asked IPP to work on ways to make Radio Saigon more effective, 
particularly for counter-propaganda.93  Distancing himself from Voix de 
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France, he told Vichy that it was preferable that the GGI alone should 
have a say in the manner in which Radio Saigon (through which Voix de 
France was broadcast) contributed to the propaganda effort since it was in 
the best position to assess needs on the ground.94  He stressed Radio 
Saigon’s potential role in affirming French sovereignty in the region by 
demonstrating that it was not under Japan’s control, but to do this, he had 
to man the levers and dispense with Vichy’s directives, which were under-
informed and lacked dynamism due to time delays.95  By claiming 
ownership of the propaganda machine—Indochina’s isolation and poor 
communication with France allowing the Admiral considerable if not 
total leeway in the crafting of the GGI’s message—Decoux was asserting 
his independence from Vichy because the latter was incapable of 
projecting itself  in the colony.
It seems that Decoux was so unhappy with Voix de France that he was 
willing to forego any of its potential to create emotional linkages with the 
metropole, preferring to focus on local issues. Internally, Radio Saigon’s 
programs aimed to reinforce nascent awareness of the federal nature of 
the Union through shows and press reviews in both French and 
Indochinese languages.96  It was also a way for the GGI to fight 
tendentious information and saturate (if not dominate) the airwaves in 
calling the populations to rally around the Marshal.97 Programs touched 
on the war in its global context, sometimes using British and American 
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sources, though never citing them and careful not to present anything the 
Japanese may have found controversial and only using DOMEI to relate 
events in the Pacific. The authorities were aware that a lack of 
information on Allied successes hurt Radio Saigon’s credibility and 
pushed the public to BBC instead, as the “only radio able to tell the 
truth,” but they preferred to defer to Japanese sensibilities.98 
Decoux also recognized the importance of using Radio Saigon to 
improve its image among audiences outside Indochina.99  From 1943 
onward, Radio Saigon, broadcasted shows in English and Chinese on 
news and events in Indochina or on French politics in Asia, stressing the 
successes of the French oeuvre in Indochina, targeted at audiences outside 
the region, in particular dissident colonies in the Pacific, namely New 
Caledonia.100  Decoux told Radio Saigon to recount French activities in 
Indochina and provide political information (written by the GGI) while 
relying less on pro-Axis sources for information on the war (though in the 
Pacific it would have to continue to rely on DOMEI). Decoux also 
insisted upon improving the quality of English-language broadcasts, with 
more accurate translations and more eloquent speakers. Lastly, he sought 
to distinguish French Radio Saigon from Japanese transmissions in the 
colony, which began each broadcast announcing in English “This is 
Radio Saigon,” lending to confusion as to the source of the information 
119
98. Directives politiques, 23 May 1943.
99. Directives politiques, 21 June 1943.
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and, in Decoux’s eyes, was a deliberate attempt to undermine French 
sovereignty in the region.101  After the liberation of Paris the colonial 
administration continued to use Radio Saigon as its principal tool of 
external public relations. While the GGI dismantled few internal 
structures after August 1944—with the notable exceptions of the 
dissolution of the Légion and the removal of images of Pétain—Radio 
Saigon’s tone changed drastically, qualifying Germany as the enemy and 
reporting more on the activities of  de Gaulle’s government.102
Oral or “La Chaîne locale.” In spite of its proclaimed neutrality, the 
GGI had to find ways to counter the Japanese threat to French political 
domination, a task altogether delicate yet essential to maintaining 
Indochina within the French empire. The presence of Japan’s 
overwhelming military on Indochinese soil was a potentially explosive 
situation and the IPP reminded the press not to make any comments that 
could be found offensive.103  However, the Japanese efforts to undermine 
French authority, through its commitment to its “Asia for Asians” 
discourse aimed at the Indochinese to highlight the benefits of 
participating in the Japanese-led Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 
jeopardized the government’s efforts to defend the legitimacy of its rule 
over the region, particularly as it was the only remaining colonial power 
in Southeast Asia. While the Japanese openly showed films and taught 
Japanese-language classes—to the great frustration of the colonial 
authorities—they also supported anti-French groups such as the Cao Dai 
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and Hoa Hao sects and the Vietnam Ai Quôc Dang (Vietnam Patriotic 
Party), giving its members protection against the French police.104 
While on the surface the Japanese and French authorities pretended 
to be on amicable terms, Decoux asked the IPP to organize a network of 
pro-French locals—called “La Chaîne locale”—to combat rumors spread 
by the Japanese who were competing with the colonial administration for 
the hearts and minds of the populations.105  Using trusted Indochinese 
rather than government channels served the double purpose of increasing 
credibility106  and avoiding Japanese objections by claiming such 
information as rumors spread outside administrative circles. Decoux 
envisioned a network that transmitted instructions from the IPP through 
the ADLOC to influential members of society in contact with the 
population at large. These contacts could come from any social 
background so long as they were trustworthy and credible in the eyes of 
locals. While this meant using “respected” individuals in the hierarchical 
sense, Decoux understood that certain elements closer to the public could 
also be effective in spreading rumors. He explained through the drawing 
below what the network could look like (the underlined names designate 
individuals in contact with the population): 
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106. Decoux believed that “the Indochinese public, in this area, is more permeable to 
the neighbor’s talk than that coming too visibly from the administration.”
Decoux instructed the Heads of ADLOC to give orders or 
information to influential locals orally or by secret and personal letter 
containing a typewritten page, with no signature, date, or any 
administrative letterhead that would allow its origin to be identified, so 
that if discovered, the letter could easily be called a fraud.107 This meant 
that the messages the GGI wanted to spread were inherently secretive, 
“whisper campaigns” rather than public statements so that, presumably, 
the administration could reap the benefits of the distortions of rumor 
mongering. The messages the GGI wanted to diffuse sought to discredit 
the Japanese and raise the prestige of the French, taking on a life of their 
own as they spread through society. Robbe explained after the war that 
these themes 
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were communicated to the ADLOC who orally passed them to their 
Chiefs of Provinces, who in turn orally transmitted them to 
propagandists [on the ground] and so on, so that they [the themes] 
penetrated the population. These themes were generally borrowed from 
Japanese propaganda and turned against it. This network functioned 
until the end without getting burned.108
It is difficult to measure just how effective these networks were in 
promoting French themes among the locals because of the very nature of 
rumors and the Japanese may not have considered them enough of a 
threat to their own endeavors to deploy a plan to counteract them. By the 
time the authorities established reports—whose accuracy were debatable 
to begin with—many factors could have influenced public sentiments 
beyond the information originally injected by the French, which was just 
left to take on a life of its own. It seems that if the networks had worked 
as well as the government claimed they did, the French would have made 
better use of them to displace blame for scarcity of resources on the 
Japanese or the Allies, particularly during the Tonkinese famine of 1945. 
Instead, many within the Vietnamese community attributed the lack of 
food in Tonkin to French hoarding.109
A United French Bloc as a Show of  Strength: The Use of  the Légion
Decoux understood that in order to show France’s capacity to lead 
the Indochinese Federation into a bright future, the French community 
had to appear to be unwaveringly supportive of the government and its 
initiatives. The Admiral never stopped insisting on the importance of the 
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French demonstrating their unity to show that the presence of Japanese 
troops in the region did not weaken the colonists’ altruistic efforts in 
Indochina and prove that the authorities retained their legitimacy. 
Because of the severance in maritime relations with the metropole, 
Decoux could not replace administrators who were not genuinely 
conquered by the ideals of the National Revolution (see Chapter 5) nor 
could he be satisfied with his propaganda bureau as the only vehicle to 
push the benefits of the French oeuvre on the populations. Decoux used 
the Légion française des combattants (LFC) as a substantiation of French 
unity, and he did not hesitate to use coercive tactics to swell its ranks.110 
Moreover, the Légion served as a tool to impose discipline among its 
members, specifically to exert pressure against dissenting voices. To 
convey confidence to the Indochinese peoples that the administration had 
the resolve and the support to continue to implement the French oeuvre in 
Indochina, Decoux wanted the Légion to constitute a compact and 
imposing bloc, giving everyone the impression of French permanence 
and vitality.111  His position was that Frenchmen had the duty to forget 
their personal political preferences and unite around the government as a 
show of authority for the Japanese and the indigenous peoples when they 
witnessed the Légion’s ceremonies, though he seemed to take this more for 
granted than base it on anything tangible.112 
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It is questionable whether the Légion’s ritual demonstrations mattered 
to the locals, who would not have been able to relate to them given their 
own exclusion from real decision-making within the government 
apparatus and the very French nature of the symbols and discoursed 
utilized. In addition, most would not have been privy to—or in likelihood 
even much interested in—the European political debates. This mattered 
even less to the Japanese whose only real concern was that France fulfill 
its part of the Franco-Japanese agreements in place, which included the 
effective administration of the colony.113  Nevertheless, discipline and 
unity were the administration’s only tools to present the French as a force 
able to govern Indochina in the postwar, convinced that the locals looked 
up to the colonists; the French could not be tutors if they did not appear 
confident of the lessons they were teaching. One cannot lose sight of the 
importance of Decoux’s military background in taking such an 
uncompromising stance, underscoring his penchant for discipline above 
all else. The Admiral saw his mission to keep the French flag flying over 
Indochina as a struggle against forces of opposition and just like on the 
theater of military operations, the commander could not tolerate any 
questioning of his decisions lest he endanger the success of the operation. 
Decoux’s cabinet director Gautier described the Admiral as difficult 
leader to serve, whose penchant for decorum reflected his sensibilities for 
presentation rather than depth.114  Juxtaposed to Decoux’s personality 
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traits, parades and oaths of loyalty were very much part of high-ranking 
naval officials’ repertoires, and in the officer’s spirit, Decoux demanded 
unquestioning adherence to this course. For him, the Légion's ceremonies 
were an important part of  the propaganda machine.
The Légion constituted a rigid, militarized, and hierarchical 
organization with which the authorities tried to influence its members 
with ultraconservative values of authority and discipline, but above all, 
Decoux wanted to regroup all Frenchmen no matter their social or 
professional positions, as a means of presenting the community as a 
unified bloc.115  For the Admiral, the Légion was the best instrument of 
French unity because it embraced Maurrassian values of hierarchy and 
order, which could be incarnated in the person of Pétain, a tangible focus 
point and example of which course to follow.116  It was the vehicle with 
which to drive the spirit of the Marshal.117  For Decoux, the National 
Revolution encouraged all Frenchmen to unite as one bloc following a 
doctrine designed to restitute to France its power and its global rank 
(through efforts of recovery and renewal into the postwar era), one 
dependent, as it had been for the previous hundred years, on the 
preservation of its empire, of which Indochina was an integral piece.118 
Pétainism, built upon a Maurrassian base, rejected democracy and 
equality, and Decoux had to have known he would not be able to 
convince every Frenchmen, yet at the very least he tried to create a 
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culture that discouraged dissent (one leveraged by threats of 
imprisonment). He was successful for the greater part of his 
administration—even if only in stifling open dissent, which was 
ultimately more important than ideological conversions—until the fall of 
the Vichy government rendered his embrace of Pétainism absurd and 
many Frenchmen suddenly rallied to de Gaulle.
Officially the Légion in Indochina shared the same objective as its 
metropolitan counterpart; the promotion of the values of the National 
Revolution. Decoux wanted the légionnaires to be militants, on a perpetual 
mission to convince those who doubted the doctrines of the new 
regime.119  The Légion printed brochures summarizing the ideas of the 
National Revolution and organized conferences around Pétainist themes, 
designed to explicate the needs and benefits of the programs to France 
considering its recent collapse.120 From 1941 onward, each chapter had its 
own bimonthly publication, Le Légionnaire, at first distributed free of 
charge and then through paid subscription. It contained information 
designed to indoctrinate members further and equip them to explain the 
ideals of the movement. Some of its contents were read aloud on Radio 
Saigon.121  In spite of the force the GGI tried to put behind this 
propaganda effort, it lacked two components necessary for success: a 
continuous flow of information from the metropole regarding the 
successes of the National Revolution and a population that had witnessed 
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the collapse of the Third Republic. As time passed, the Légion lost any 
momentum it had, unable to frame its doctrine with concrete examples. It 
simply stood no chance of convincing anyone if it could not go beyond 
fiery speeches with nothing concrete to move beyond theory.
Ultimately, Decoux realized that adhering to the Légion did not 
constitute an acceptance of the values of the National Revolution but he 
nonetheless applied pressure on Frenchmen, particularly civil servants, to 
join its ranks. In the Admiral’s view, even if the Légion was not able to 
turn those functionaries who remained, at least privately, loyal to the 
Republic (see Chapter 5), the sight of so many Frenchmen participating 
in public demonstrations of patriotism could only impress both Japanese 
and locals.122  Early on, the Admiral called for all veterans to join the 
Légion to work toward recovery and regeneration.123  In January 1942 
those who were not veterans were allowed to join as Volunteers of the 
National Revolution, which had equal standing with the veterans, though 
the latter kept a certain moral precedence.124  The opening of the Légion’s 
ranks to non-veterans (as had been done in the metropole) was the event 
that Decoux had been waiting for to push the rest of the French 
community to join, a step toward achieving the union of all Frenchmen, 
which served his political agenda better than limiting membership to 
veterans, which meant processions that were quantifiably less 
impressive.125  It is also likely that the Governor General believed that 
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once in the Légion, an esprit de corps would materialize promoting 
discipline (meaning the self-silencing of dissident voices) that could not 
exist if Frenchmen remained atomized outside the paragovernmental 
organization. Even if members did not become ardent Pétainists, 
belonging to the organization might dissuade them from betraying it 
(through open opposition to the government).
According to Decoux’s hearing testimony, he only transmitted 
Vichy’s orders to organize the Légion, after which the French community 
rose up with great enthusiasm, but this is hardly believable as the GGI 
engaged in coercion to increase membership until at least the summer of 
1944.126  The Admiral most likely took this position to downplay his own 
despotic leadership. During the postwar trials, some witnesses denied 
having felt pressure to join the Légion, and Boisanger himself was never a 
member in spite of his prominence as a high ranking official.127 The court 
however found a basis for allegations that Decoux demanded that 
functionaries affiliate themselves with the Légion, regardless of the 
Admiral’s claims that he only “recommended” them to do so.128  The 
strong language in Decoux’s 27 June 1941 circular letter underscores the 
GGI’s commitment to seeing every eligible civil servant join the Légion, 
without openly threatening those who refused: “I ask you to pursue an 
active propaganda aimed at veterans so that laggers sign up urgently for 
the Légion, as is their duty. This obligation is particularly imperious for 
functionaries and we must not have any defections,” especially at the 
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higher ranks as this would “encourage indiscipline” among subordinates. 
He warned that the refusal to join would promote a spirit of anarchy of 
ideas and consequently anarchy altogether.129  While painfully dramatic, 
this position reinforces the idea that Decoux wanted to create an esprit de 
corps, a culture of discipline through belonging that superseded individual 
action, thereby presenting a united bloc to the locals and the Japanese.
After the creation of the Volontaires de la Révolution Nationale (which 
opened the Légion to non-veterans), Decoux called those civil servants 
who refused to join “deplorable examples” and wanted to know which 
functionaries refused to enroll, envisaging professional sanctions against 
them, such as withholding their advancement.130  Decoux asked his 
subordinates to establish lists of those who “persisted in their culpable 
abstention.”131 The repercussions of having one’s name on such a list are 
unclear as testimonies of non-légionnaires given after the war are 
themselves contradictory. One civil servant testified that he was never 
overtly pressured into joining, but saw his name on a list meant for the 
GGI and was made to understand that when it came to his career 
“nothing was guaranteed.” Others claimed that Decoux paid no real 
attention to the lists and promoted functionaries regardless of whether 
they were members.132 The perception that career opportunities depended 
on one’s affiliation to the Légion led many, who were otherwise 
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lukewarm, to join through fear or opportunism as some civil servants 
attested that légionnaires received significant privileges.133  One witness 
testified that it was official policy, originating from Vichy, to promote 
légionnaires “as often as possible,” and top ranking members had 
extraordinary access to the Admiral to give their opinions.134  On this 
issue as well postwar statements are contradictory.135  Officially, Decoux 
insisted that the Légion should not be a means to personal gain, preferring 
to deny admission to those seeking advancement.136 He openly promised 
to stress quality over quantity, but as discussed, this is in contradiction 
with the Admiral’s goal of seeing every Frenchmen a légionnaire, 
suggesting that he may have been out of touch with the National 
Revolution’s power to regroup and unite. He must have realized that 
many within the French community resisted Pétainism and it seems 
absurd that he viewed adherence to the Légion as a demonstration of the 
popularity of the government. Perhaps the quest for quality over quantity 
was more for show, and if so then all declarations that there was no 
relationship between non-adherence and career possibilities can be 
ignored. In any case, the fear of reprisal was real—this may have been the 
government’s best weapon—and whether or not there were real 
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consequences mattered little since the outcome was that few wanted to 
risk sticking out.137
The case of Georges Auvray, Chief Engineer of Public Works in 
Laos, illustrates how the government coerced civil servants to join the 
Légion through fear rather than direct consequences. On 8 July 1941, 
Gauthier, Résident supérieur du Laos, wrote Auvray that he considered it 
“an imperious duty and a question of discipline on a national level” for 
functionaries who were veterans to join the Légion and wanted to know if 
Auvray continued to refuse and if so, to explain his reasoning.138  The 
engineer replied that his experience during the Great War prevented him 
from adhering as it deprived him of the “spirit of collaboration with the 
invader [Germany]” that he perceived to have taken over the LFC.139 
Gauthier unsurprisingly retorted that it was inadmissible that the Chief of 
an important department dissociate himself from his comrades and refuse 
to conform to the directives given by the Chief of the Colony.140 
According to Bigorgne, Auvray’s superior, Decoux himself wanted 
Auvray to join the LFC to appease the “worried minds” of the small 
community of Frenchmen in the region by proving that he was not an 
opponent of the regime’s policies.141 Auvray persisted in his refusal with 
no apparent repercussions, until the end of 1942, when he was expressly 
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asked to fill a subordinate vacancy with a légionnaire.142 Incensed by this 
request, Auvray declined to exclude co-workers who, like him, preferred 
to distance themselves from the National Revolution, which he accused 
of cozying up to the New German Order.143 Less than three weeks later, 
Decoux issued a decree suspending Auvray without pay.144  Auvray was 
known to have sympathies for the ultraconservative ideas behind the 
National Revolution, but the GGI felt his comments on the Légion’s 
collaborationist propaganda reflected poorly on the government, and it 
was officially on this basis that a furious Decoux decided to dismiss 
him.145 Whether other civil servants believed the official version or saw in 
Aubray’s dismissal proof that the government was on a mission of 
épuration (see Chapter 5) cannot be ascertained, but certainly Bigorgne’s 
response to an unsuccessful petition to reinstate Auvray could not have 
alleviated fears: “Our first duty, our only duty, is to serve; serve without 
[discussing] the government’s policies. . .I am counting on the spirit of 
discipline of all to conform rigorously to this order.”146  What is 
interesting about this case is that membership in the Légion was more 
important than adherence to ultraconservative values. Certainly Auvray 
criticized the government indirectly through his association between the 
National Revolution and collaboration, but he could have been left alone 
to his ultraconservative ideas. Instead, he was harassed for setting a poor 
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example by not joining the Légion and setting a poor example to others. 
This shows the administration’s stress on quantity rather than quality and 
the predominance of  unity over ideological conviction (or persuasion).
While the administration prided itself on the Légion’s swelling ranks, 
Vichy condemned the strong arm tactics to recruit members,147  but it 
seemed mostly motivated to avoid including “undesirables” within the 
ranks. Vichy preferred the use of “persuasive propaganda” to attract 
members, leaving individuals free to decide.148 There was real pressure to 
make this propaganda effective, as the metropole asked Hanoi to provide 
it with monthly updates regarding the Légion’s activity and numbers.149 By 
July 1943, Indochina counted 7,080 légionnaires—including roughly 2,700 
in both Tonkin and Cochinchina and 1,200 in Annam—out of a French 
population of 49,000 (it should be noted that women were almost 
nonexistent in the ranks).150 In some departments, every civil servant was 
a member of the Légion.151  Within its ranks, and particularly after 1942, 
the Légion counted Freemasons, who, according to Gaullist sympathizer 
General Sabattier, were willing participants in légionnaire processions.152 
All signs however point to a GGI that continued to replace persuasion 
with coercive tactics in spite of  Vichy’s own pressures.
Cult of  Personality, Cultural Parallels, and Festivals
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Decoux’s military background and Maurrassian influence made him 
particularly receptive to building a cult around Marshal Pétain to rally 
both French and Indochinese populations. Decoux did everything to 
maintain the spirit of veneration of Pétain across the society by making 
him the authentic representative of the distant homeland and the 
aspirations that he embodied according to the discourse of the National 
Revolution.153  The care involved in creating this cult of personality did 
not necessarily go further in Indochina than in Vichy, where busts of 
Pétain in military attire were placed in every city hall, countless books 
targeted at all age groups published to sanctify his life, and where the 
Marshal personally asked photographers to increase the blue of his 
eyes.154  Vichy sent some of these propaganda materials to Indochina, 
providing Hanoi with footage and photographies of the Marshal, but this 
was intermittent at best until maritime relations were severed, after which 
physical materials only trickled into the colony.155  That said, even when 
the materials no longer reached Indochina directly (by 1941), the GGI’s 
efforts continued unwaveringly. The Governor General believed that for 
most of the French community in Indochina the Marshal incarnated 
France and that among the Indochinese, this sentiment was even more 
alive. It is plausible that Pétain did incarnate France within the French 
community in Indochina, as much evidence points to similar sentiments 
in the metropole, but even if the Indochinese peoples made the same 
association, it is unlikely that there would have been many positive 
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emotional connections with the leader in a distant land. Yet is on this 
basis of this belief that the GGI drew parallels between Pétain and 
Confucius (see below), but unlike within the French communities, the 
image of Pétain had to be created as it is doubtful that many locals had 
heard of the Victor of Verdun, much less had any sentimental 
attachments to him or the legend that surrounded him.
The cult of Pétain could only exist within the idea of the National 
Revolution, not the actions of the Vichy government. The GGI could not 
replicate the Pétainist program as it existed—if only theoretically—in the 
metropole because it lacked the depth of information and more 
importantly, it understood that it had to be flexible to reach the local 
populations and maintain French sovereignty over the region.156  During 
his trial, Decoux defended his actions by claiming that Indochina 
received only truncated and tendentious information on the actions of the 
Vichy regime, and ensuring the absolute loyalty to the Marshal, through 
the extolment of his virtues, was critical in maintaining Indochina in the 
fold of the empire.157 The Admiral also denied an overzealousness in his 
promotion of Pétain’s cult, claiming that he was often accused by other 
Frenchmen of tepidness toward the Marshal, but the ubiquitousness of 
the Marshal’s image (if nowhere else on the millions of posters and daily 
publications printed) seems to contradict this position.158  In many ways 
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the lack of information coming from Vichy provided excuses for the GGI 
to make its own propaganda policies, though the GGI understood that a 
balance had to be achieved between messages that would resound with 
the local populations and keeping with the general themes that would 
make it easier to report back to Vichy. Robbe wrote to his subordinates in 
the IPP:
It seems essential to repeat that propaganda in Indochina does not 
obligatorily have as a goal the extension or amplification of the 
metropolitan propaganda. It would be distancing oneself from all reality 
not to give our propaganda the local character that fits in with the 
permanence of the interests that we must defend and with that which 
expects the government of the National Revolution. . .[P]ropaganda 
must put at the forefront Indochinese problems, and underline the 
necessity for all to rally around, with order and discipline, the Head of 
the Federation. . .Less philosophy and more action.159
The administration pushed themes they believed fit well with local 
values, such as hierarchy, and the creation of Pétain’s cult of personality 
fit these objectives well.160 Despite Decoux’s protestations during his trial, 
the discourse under his regime elevated Pétain to almost Christ-like 
heights. The government asked that each week, in every school and 
public institution, people meditate on the Marshal’s sayings or extracts of 
his speeches, which were also reprinted in the newspapers.161 In his 1943 
New Year’s message, Decoux asked for quasi-religious devotion in the 
name of  Pétain’s sacrifice:
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The luminous figure of the Marshal detaches itself more and more in 
the tormented background of events like the very image of the patrie. 
There should be no place from now on, in our hearts, for sentiments 
other than total veneration in his person, while at the same time the 
absolute desire to serve, more loyally than ever, the great oeuvre to which 
he dedicated his life. His example must dominate each of our thoughts 
and actions.162
When calling on the French colonies in India and the Pacific to end their 
dissidence, Decoux promised that the Marshal “in his high wisdom and 
immense goodness, [would] know how to distinguish the criminal 
instigators of dissidence and having punished them, [would] open the 
doors of the patrie to its reunited [retrouvés] children.”163  The weekly 
Indochine went so far as to print “Philippe Pétain, on his forehead that 
knew the laurel, wore the crown of iron of responsibility, and will have 
the crown of  thorns of  pain.”164
Decoux’s administration sought to accelerate Franco-Indochinese 
rapprochement by stressing his patriarchal qualities and imagining 
parallels between the Marshal and Confucius. Decoux asserted that the 
prestigious symbol of the Marshal could help him maintain the allegiance 
of 25 million Indochinese, through his age, which the French believed the 
Indochinese people to associate with wisdom and virtue.165  The 
administration depicted Pétain as the essence of the superior man, and 
the press exalted the Marshal’s qualities as a leader, recounting stories of 
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his glorious past.166  Maurice Ducoroy, the General Commissioner of 
Sports and Youth wrote in his memoirs that Pétain’s “universally known 
name, his prestige of victor in the Great War, his advanced age, his 
peasant origins, made him, in this part of Asia, a respected and venerated 
standard bearer of our patrie.”167 Corroborating this view on the colonial 
government’s reasoning and beliefs, Gautier wrote after the war:
For the people of the Far East, Marshal Pétain was the embodiment of 
the superior man [i.e. the Confucian ideal of junzi, Viet. quan tu]. 
Carrying many years [chargé d’années], equating wisdom, covered in the 
triple glory of the scholar, the diplomat, and the military mandarin, 
expressing himself with messages both clear and profound, translatable 
in all languages, and transposable in all traditional philosophies, never 
had a French Head of State generated in Indochina such respect and 
admiration.168
When Laval received de facto full powers in November 1942, Hanoi 
shifted its discourse and presented the Marshal as a symbolic personage 
and no longer the Head of State, placing him above politics and 
maintaining his patriarchal aura.169  The government had to create the 
idol and the attachment to Pétain within a population that did not share 
the same emotional connection as the French following the Great War. 
This remained nonetheless an invention, or rather the GGI had to infuse 
the Marshal into the local context, in an Orwellian attempt to create a 
narrative that Pétain had always had an important place in Indochinese 
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lore, a dubious assertion. Effective or not in the long run, Decoux’s 
regime placed all its bets on its ability to forge these emotional links.
Hanoi drew tenuous parallels between the National Revolution and 
Confucianism to promote locals’ loyalty and minimize political 
disturbances. The colonial administration was convinced that Pétainism 
would appeal to the Indochinese peoples through the Marshal’s persona 
as a revered sage juxtaposed with its promotion of tradition.170 Under the 
Third Republic, colonial authorities had seen Confucianism as means of 
preserving the monarchy, but Western reform and its cultural influences 
eroded many of its values. Governors General like Pierre Pasquier 
already tried to revive traditionalism in Vietnam, including 
Confucianism. Early on, the French understood Confucianism as based 
on a hierarchical view of society, obedience, and filial piety leading 
individuals to shun political and social conflict in favor of moral and 
ethical development and Decoux’s efforts continued in this vein (see 
Chapter 5).171 In Pétainism, whose Maurrassian roots emphasized social 
hierarchy, order, and the community, Decoux had a more powerful 
ideological tool to create parallels between France and Vietnam, one that 
previous administrators lacked, catching them in a contradiction between 
the values of the republic from which they came and the colonial society 
they maintained. In his memoirs, Decoux made a tendentious connection 
between the new slogan “Work, Family, Homeland” and the traditional 
aspirations of the peoples. For the Admiral, these were unhoped for 
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conditions that permitted the construction of parallels between Pétainism 
and Confucian morality.172  Even Georges Sabattier, not renowned as a 
Pétainist zealot, concurred: “it is undeniable that the motto ‘Work, 
Family, Homeland’ had, because of its objectivity and its kinship with 
ancestral traditions, a particular resonance with the Annamite spirit.”173 
The press repeatedly published articles establishing parallels between 
Confucius and Pétain that transcended time and space. In 1940, Nguyên-
Viêt-Nam claimed that “Work, Family, Homeland” was the European 
equivalent to the four essential duties taught by Confucius: Tu, Tê, Tri, 
Binh, or self-cultivation, managing one’s family, governing one’s country, 
and keeping peace in the world. He asked “Throughout the centuries and 
the continents, a same elevation of thought inspired the directives of the 
great philosopher whose moral influence is still so vivacious in our 
country, and that of the great Soldier and statesman who intends to 
regenerate France. Is this not the mark of the common destiny of France 
and Annam?”174  Another author wrote:
The Marshal never hesitated to sacrifice his person, in the most difficult 
circumstances, to serve men overwhelmed by a great moral and material 
disaster. Confucius never ceased to renounce all favors, all honors that 
were offered to him to keep the freedom of his thoughts and his word, to 
serve the cause of the little people subjected to the demands and 
ambitions of princes and their ministers. . .The two people, French and 
Annamite, have found a common spiritual patrimony: their respective 
director of conscience practiced the same moral doctrine, the same 
social action.175
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The press extracted phrases from Pétain’s speeches and juxtaposed them 
with traditional sayings to establish further connections between the 
thoughts of the Head of the French State and the ancestral Vietnamese 
culture while the government published 70,000 pamphlets in quôc-ngu 
entitled Parallel Franco-Annamite Maxims.176 
 In the same vein, GGI propaganda emphasized the hierarchical 
nature of both Confucianism and Pétainism as part of its efforts to 
elevate the prestige of the local monarchs. In this effort, the colonial 
administration found an ally in the court-controlled Gazette de Huê. In his 
1942 article, Nguyên Tiên Lang affirmed that the Vietnamese monarchy 
conformed to the ideals of social hierarchy which Pétain (and Maurras) 
so often evoked as essential for national renovation. According to the 
author, serving the Vietnamese monarchy meant serving France and the 
National Revolution which wanted to give back to its empire a sense of 
its own ideals. Loyalty to the emperor meant loyalty to France.177 Effigies 
of Pétain and the Vietnamese emperor Bao Dai were placed side by side 
as guarantors of  the traditional order.
From drawing extemporal parallels between Pétainism and 
Confucianism it was a small step to linking the destinies of France and its 
colony, claiming that France’s oeuvre would root Indochina in the 
greatness of its history while allowing it to flourish and join the 
community of modern nations. In spite of defeat, France alone, one 
editor wrote, could let the region “advance on the road of Progress and 
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Civilization.”178  Another newspaper claimed that the work of the 
National Revolution toward national recovery fit in “perfectly with the 
current needs of [Vietnam]. Its program of restoration of moral values, of 
invigoration of the youth, applies well to the Annamite people.”179  One 
could read in Indochine that 
France, thanks to the immense wisdom of the Marshal, propose[d] a 
doctrine of conciliation of a universal coherence and reach. It need[ed] 
to allow Indochina, to Annamites, to find the equilibrium point that 
suits them and that is no more the traditional and Confucian concept 
than democratic individualism, daughter of liberalism. . . The return to 
traditions, as much for the French as for the Annamites, must be 
matched by a positive effort of renovation that alone [could] allow to 
surpass the present and the past. France’s current experience, by which it 
is universal, must help the Annamites to search and understand.180
This stress on universality is key to understanding the overall French 
effort: it is on this linearity of thinking, this idea that all peoples follow a 
similar progression, that the French based the legitimacy of  their tutelage. 
However, in wanting to transpose these ideals, the French 
overestimated the importance of Confucianism in Vietnam. While parts 
of the Indochinese elite may have fallen under the spell, it is doubtful that 
the majority of the population gave credence to the parallels drawn 
between Pétain and Confucius. As noted, the French had to infuse society 
with the myth of Pétain, who was said to be twice the savior of France, 
but never the savior of Vietnam. The possibility that the myth could be 
transposed in Indochina was minimal and any amount of propaganda 
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was not likely to create an emotional attachment among the Indochinese 
peoples, who were never going to feel connected to a European, 
particularly one who had never set foot in the region. While the French 
administration may have interpreted the pervasiveness of Pétain’s 
portraits inside homes as a sign of approval and loyalty, little evidence 
points to a genuine popularity of the Marshal with the masses and 
government intelligence reports consistently lamented that the 
Indochinese peoples concerned themselves only with their daily needs, 
staying away from politics.181 The government often used these reports to 
make policy (given that it was often the only information it had), in spite 
of their questionable capacity to assess public opinion accurately given 
cross-cultural differences. It would seem that the French confused 
disinterest in politics with disinterest in French symbols.
The colonial administration relied heavily on ceremony and festivals 
to inculcate the values of the National Revolution; reinforce the imagined 
linkages between France and Indochina, including the forging of the 
Indochinese Federation under French leadership; and strengthen colonial 
authority. While the administration reserved its greatest fanfare for Joan 
of Arc Day every year, it never neglected to fuss over minor events such 
as inaugurations of monuments or statues of Pétain.182  As part of its 
mission, the IPP promoted most of these festivals alongside local 
authorities, while the Commissariat général aux Sports et à la Jeunesse 
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organized youth and sporting events and the Légion orchestrated its own 
ceremonies. 
Each festival—no matter the scale—was an integral part of the 
government’s efforts to rally French and Indochinese communities and 
continue to equate Pétain and national renovation.  While the First of 
May, Workers Day, was politically charged in Europe before the war, it 
seldom witnessed class related disruptions in Indochina apart from 
sporadic violence in the 1930s.183  Abiding by Vichy’s policies in the 
metropole, Workers Day was renamed Day of Work and Social Peace, in 
harmony with Vichy’s corporatist ambitions and away from its disruptive 
syndicalist roots. Moreover, 1 May fused celebrations of St. Philippe (as 
in Philippe Pétain) with Joan of Arc Day (a few days later), symbolically 
linking the two personages and their common struggle, and emphasizing 
unity and discipline based on nationalistic sentiments (see Chapter 2). 
Joan of Arc Day was supposed to reinforce the achievements of the 
National Revolution—while refraining from criticizing the previous 
regime in order not to affect the prestige of France’s oeuvre in the eyes of 
the locals—and remind the French community of its duties towards the 
state.184  These festivals encapsulated the efforts of the administration to 
rally French and locals alike (often through pressure or coercion), evoking 
moral obligations that, under the guise of a blueprint for social renewal, 
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provided the authorities with justifications to punish those whose actions 
or words ran counter to said duties and thus opposed to the interests of 
the state and the collective whole. 
 Joan of Arc Day also provided the opportunity to link further 
French and Indochinese (though particularly Vietnamese) histories and 
destinies through the triangulation of Pétain, Joan of Arc, and the Trung 
Sisters. The Trung Sisters, regarded as national heroines in Vietnam, led a 
revolt for three years (40-43AD) against Chinese rule when the Chinese 
governor moved away from a policy of associationism toward outright 
Sinicization.185  In the early twentieth century, Vietnamese society had 
witnessed a revival of this legend through plays recounting their heroics. 
One of the most famous hagiographies was Phan Boi Chau’s 1911 drama 
depicting the sisters’ love of country and their desire to expel the foreign 
invader.186  Of course the French had to achieve the virtually impossible 
task of trying to retain retain the idolization of the Trung Sisters while 
redirecting the morale of the stories away from the independentist 
messages of many plays, including Phan Boi Chau’s work.  More useful 
were works emphasizing nation building and the loyalty of untrained 
peasants who willingly risked their lives in following the sisters.187  The 
colonial administration tried to create a collective memory to reinforce 
the bonds between French and Vietnamese, where the former was no 
longer another foreign aggressor, having a shared set of experiences, but a 
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friend and empathizer against the Japanese occupier.188 Like Joan of Arc, 
the Trung Sisters suffered in death. The story of Jeanne d’Arc was meant 
to stir up nationalist sentiments within the Indochinese peoples that were 
delineated within the framework of the French empire and the 
Indochinese Federation. As Christianus wrote in Indochine:
Jeanne wouldn’t approve any colonial doctrine other than one generous 
and without reproach, mindful of justice and charity. . .It is beautiful to 
think that while wanting to be themselves [that is in cultivating a sense 
of national identity], the wise Annamites will recognize themselves as 
sons of the empire, such has the reality of France entered the history of 
this people to make up its nature of today and of tomorrow with the 
other realities of  the soil, of  the face, and the secular traditions.189
Every year the festivals surrounding Joan of Arc Day were marked 
with fanfare and orchestrated acts of loyalty and devotion to the empire, 
with strong emphases on youth and vitality. In 1941, in Vietnam and 
Laos, French and Indochinese (including 20,000 students in Hanoi and 
7,000 in Hué) gathered in front of statues of Jeanne d’Arc to vow their 
allegiance to the empire and the Marshal. In France’s first attempt to 
associate Jeanne with the Trung Sisters, children reenacted scenes of both 
Jeanne and the Sisters’ lives and sang La Marseillaise in front of tens of 
thousands of spectators, and processions marched through town streets 
carrying statues and portraits of Jeanne d’Arc and the Marshal, giving 
the ceremonies a quasi-religious feel.190  The following years witnessed 
similar fanfare across Indochina and the Légion participated more actively 
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in the day’s organization.191  Celebrations sometimes mixed youth and 
workers, as occurred in the Clotilde mine (near Uong Bi in Northeastern 
Tonkin) in 1942 when miners and students pledged their loyalty to France 
and listened to stories of Jeanne d’Arc and the parallels between the 
French heroine and the Trung Sisters.192  The administration’s confidence 
in its ability to create lasting linkages between the Trung Sisters and 
Jeanne d’Arc was baffling. Official documents warning of the risks posed 
by the association—that is invigorating anti-French sentiments—are 
almost nonexistent. It seems the government was both unrealistic about 
its influence on the Indochinese peoples and aware it was caught in an 
impossible situation, clinging on to fading hopes of maintaining control 
and whatever legitimacy to which it pretended, making policy decisions 
from which it could not turn back, even in the face of  absurdity.  
Though Joan of Arc Day was arguably the non-sporting event with 
the most fanfare, the IPP organized other celebrations and 
demonstrations within the context of the National Revolution or toward 
Franco-Indochinese collaboration. One such festival was the Day of St 
Philippe, on 1 May, which Vichy transformed from what was traditionally 
a day of class celebration into a corporatist Day of Work and Special 
Peace. This act was more than nominal since according to the regime’s 
propaganda, under the Popular Front 1 May had stopped being a 
celebration of the working class and became a platform for class 
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warfare.193 Like his republican predecessors,194 Decoux feared any kind of 
organized labor, even under corporatist structures, and used St Philippe 
as a solemn day to emphasize the need for unity and discipline and 
commemorate French and Indochinese fallen soldiers: the 1943 
celebrations in Hanoi began with a 7:30 mass in the cathedral (a 
Protestant service was held at the same time elsewhere), followed by a 
speech by the local President of the Légion and a laying of wreaths on the 
monument to fallen French and Vietnamese soldiers.195   There is no 
evidence of the effectiveness of these parades, only the overconfidence of 
and self-congratulations from an administration intent on creating 
linkages between the colony and its metropole. In 1941, the papers 
printed Pétain’s speech where he reminded the colonies that in spite of 
defections by Gaullist elements, almost all the territories of the empire 
had rallied to the government of Vichy, thereby preserving the unity of 
the empire. Forgetting that for centuries the Lao and the Khmer suffered 
from vassalage vis-à-vis the Vietnamese as much as the Siamese, Decoux 
evoked the recent conflict with Thailand where French and Indochinese 
spilled blood together in what he described as a forging of  fraternity.196
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The government even used the Têt as an opportunity to stress the 
benefits of the National Revolution and the importance of Franco-
Indochinese collaboration. In 1941, the administration distributed 
traditional images representing symbolic images of animals, elders, or 
historical scenes, on which it printed Pétain’s well-wishes. According to 
the Tonkin bureau of the IPP, these images were in such high demand 
that it was not able to print enough to satisfy everyone.197  In 1943, 
Tonkin’s local Head of IPP wrote a circular to newspaper editors openly 
asking them to publish stories on the moral recovery that resulted from 
the juxtaposition of Pétainism’s new principles and the ancestral 
traditions and discipline of Vietnam; an imagined symbiosis between 
French mind and Vietnamese labor. The same document, neglecting the 
scars left by the Franco-Thai conflict and the blood that was supposedly 
spilled together, stressed the work of the GGI allowing Indochina to 
remain “true haven of  calm and peace in a world singularly troubled.”198
Ceremonies orchestrated to entrench Indochina emotionally in the 
empire were not limited to yearly events as children and civil servants 
saluted the French and local flags concurrently in daily rituals across the 
region.199  By raising the colors in schools, in public spaces, and at 
sporting events, the GGI sought occasions for public acclamations of 
France, particularly among the youth.200  Decoux hoped tostrengthen the 
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bonds between the new generation of Indochinese and France by 
molding the local youth (see Chapter 6). The ritual was a quasi-religious 
affair that served as a visual and symbolic reminder of the relationship 
between France and its colony to build the basis of the Indochinese 
Federation. Orders to raise the colors came from Vichy in January 1941, 
but the GGI had the freedom to organize the formalities as it saw fit, and 
given the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, the ceremony was 
critical to impress French sovereignty on Indochina, or at least put on a 
show telling this story.201 At the government council session of December 
1942, Decoux reminded his audience that Indochina was one of the last 
bastions where the French flag continued to fly freely.202  Decoux was 
proud of this image and used it to reinforce the notion of French 
sovereignty in Indochina.
In both public and private schools children vowed loyalty to France 
in an oath that had strong militaristic overtones. At the Lycée Albert 
Sarraut in Hanoi, the children made the following pledge of  allegiance:
Sacred emblem of our patrie we swear to have the same deep love for 
France that children have for their mother. We swear obedience and 
loyalty to the Head of State Marshal Pétain, who in the most dramatic 
trials of our history assembles all the energies and exalts all hopes. We 
swear to associate ourselves with all our hearts to the immense work he 
takes on by practicing in schools the virtues that made his life strong and 
noble life: work, loyalty, discipline. We swear finally, at the call of the 
country, to make the supreme sacrifice in worthy sons of those 
generations of soldiers whose courage in battle and generosity in victory 
have made the grandeur and the glory of  France.203
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The children were reminded of their duties and the reasons to love 
France and to have faith in its destiny. At the Lycée Chasseloup Laubat in 
Saigon, Decoux presided over the ceremony and told the students that in 
seeing “rise toward the sky these three colors that are like the soul of the 
patrie, you will find reasons to hope in the future. . .During this ceremony, 
you will accomplish an act of love and faith in the patrie. . .You promise 
finally to devote yourself body and soul to the glory and the salvation of 
France.”204  At the Ecole Supérieure d’éducation physique de l’Indochine, the 
ceremony took place twice daily. When the chef moniteur called out “to 
serve,” the students, lined up regimentally, responded “always” and they 
all sang La Marseillaise.205 
 Légionnaire pomp was another means through which to build the 
facade of a National Revolution that enjoyed the support of the French 
community. Decoux counted on the Légion’s outward manifestations of 
unity, including an oath of loyalty to France and the Marshal and 
festivals, to prove the extent of the French bloc’s indivisibility and support 
of the GGI. The oath was a spectacular biannual ritual held during the 
celebrations of Jeanne d’Arc in May and in August to mark the 
anniversary of the creation of the Légion.206  According to Decoux, the 
oath marked the loyalty of those who took it to the patrie, promising to 
sacrifice just as the Marshal had.207  Decoux told the ranks that by 
pronouncing the oath, they committed themselves “before all to obey,” 
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which would not be difficult since this obedience would “flow from their 
faith.”208 Through discipline, the légionnaires would do no less than “take 
place among the artisans of the National Renovation, [contributing] their 
stone to the edifice that [Decoux claimed was already] rising, thanks to 
the faith of all the good Frenchmen in the recovery of [the] patrie and in 
the values of the chief who [led] it.”209 Again we are confronted with the 
contradiction between the desire to swell the Légion’s ranks and the 
principle that the members within the organization buy into the National 
Revolution. It is unlikely that Decoux believed that every member was a 
convert given his suspicion that the civil service contained functionaries 
who remained loyal to the Republic so the best explanation for the pomp 
surrounding the oath ceremonies was to put on an impressive show for 
outsiders, putting the supposed loyalty of the French on display.210 Again 
it is highly questionable whether these displays had any real effect on the 
locals, but if anything it points to the Admiral’s penchant for style over 
substance and a self-delusion that promoted rituals in which participants 
experienced some level of coercion as means of demonstrating, through 
some bizarre sublimation, these same participants’ adherence to the 
values they were supposed to incarnate through the ritual.211 It is equally 
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telling that Decoux believed the légionnaires’ processions would impress 
locals, suggesting a potential lack of appreciation for Indochinese 
cultures, which did not necessarily lend themselves to place much value 
in such demonstrations. .
The oath was intentionally broad to permit as great a union as 
possible. The légionnaires spoke—and signed— the following:
I swear to serve France with honor and to devote all my strength to the 
patrie, the family, to work. I commit myself to practice friendship and 
mutual help vis-à-vis my comrades of the Légion. I accept freely the 
discipline of the Légion for all that will be ordered of me in view of this 
ideal.212
In every pays, légionnaires gathered at daybreak to wait the arrival of high 
ranking government officials: Decoux, Ducoroy, Berenger, or at 
minimum the Superior Resident. After the raising of the flag, the 
administration’s representative and the President of the Légion chapter 
made rousing speeches evoking national recovery, the duty to sacrifice 
oneself for the patrie as Pétain had, and the need to serve. Afterward the 
légionnaires repeated the oath as one, before crying “Vive la France! Vive le 
Maréchal!” In Saigon in 1941, planes flew overhead dropping leaflets with 
some of Pétain’s sayings, and pigeons, “messengers of encouragement 
and hope,” were released before the légionnaires laid a wreath on the 
Monument to the Dead in the Temple of Memory. After every event, the 
GGI telegrammed Vichy proclaiming the Légion’s loyalty to and best 
wishes for the Marshal.213
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The Légion helped organize many of the regime’s festivals , but those 
commemorating the founding of the LFC were particularly geared as 
manifestations of strength in unity to the outside. The ceremonies 
mirrored those in the metropole and Vichy provided detailed programs of 
its own events, but the Ministry of Colonies only asked Hanoi merely to 
inspire itself from this information, giving Indochina free reign to 
organize according to how it saw fit.214 In the colony, the military style—
including the Roman salutes that reminded some of Nazi 
demonstrations215—was intended as a display of discipline and energy 
aimed at the Japanese and Indochinese peoples. Decoux believed 
outsiders could not fail to be impressed by Frenchmen grouped in an 
imposing order under the French flag to La Marseillaise, celebrating their 
attachment to the distant patrie.216  Through well orchestrated militaristic 
rituals, Decoux wanted to show “the living symbol of French unity,” 
positioning this unity as the primordial condition of French recovery and 
salvation.217  It is striking that very few feared that these displays of 
patriotism (and even fewer voiced their potential concerns), often backed 
by social nationalistic undercurrents, would seep into the locals’ own 
worldviews, prompting their own calls for regrouping around the nation 
and the sovereign state. It seems that in the GGI’s obsession with French 
unity to show strength and the resolve to keep the French flag flying over 
Indochina, it failed to appreciate that the Indochinese peoples would not 
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so much be impressed with this determination but rather with the 
ideology underpinning this supposed resolution, the National Revolution 
and its call for a restructure of society based on natural groupings. So 
convinced were the French of the locals’ attachment to France that it did 
not enter their thinking that the social nationalism they presented as the 
road to the rebirth of their own civilization could be turned against them, 
providing impetus for the August Revolution.
Decoux took advantage of Vichy’s own festivals to promote the 
indivisibility of the empire. Held in 1942, one of the most striking 
demonstrations of unity was the collection of soil sent back to France 
and placed in a cenotaph to be buried in the plateau of Gérgovie. 
Gérgovie, “natural bastion of the patrie,” was the site where two thousand 
years earlier Gaulish leader Vercingétorix defeated the Roman armies, the 
first step toward the unification of the patrie.218 Organized by the LFC in 
the metropole, earth was gathered from every commune in the metropole 
and region of the empire in which a Légion chapter existed, symbolizing 
the wholeness of France in Europe and abroad, eternalizing the empire 
by blending its different soils as one.219  This was the quintessential 
exaltation of Barrès’ idea of “the earth and the dead,” which so 
dramatically altered the meaning of nationalism in the nineteenth 
century (see Chapter 3). This was a celebration of the nation for which 
millions died and tellingly, many of the communes in the metropole and 
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the majority of the colonies chose to send soil from sites symbolic of 
French military campaigns and nation building. Even soil from Saint 
Helena, British island of Napoleon’s exile, was donated by the Museum 
of Châteauroux. In Indochina, as in every other colony loyal to Vichy, 
the Governor General reiterated the Federation’s union with the 
metropole and the empire and its spirit of attachment to France.220  The 
mixing of the soils at Gérgovie was an elevation of the indestructibility of 
the French spirit and nation, through union around the Marshal. In 
Pétain’s own words, “French unity has found, thanks to [the légionnaires] 
the power of  its symbol.”221 
For Decoux, this was an ideal event to project a French bloc without 
fissures, but to the locals, it must not have seemed like more than another 
ritual involving Frenchmen celebrating an obscure affair to which 
Indochina had no connection. While the message of the indivisibility of 
the empire may have been received—though there is no reason to think 
that it would have been more powerful than any of the other speeches 
made during these years—the meaning of Gérgovie would have been 
completely lost on the Indochinese peoples, the vast majority of whom 
would never have heard of the battle before. The collection of soil came 
at Vichy’s request and Decoux could have gone about the ceremony with 
discretion, since it would have had such little effect on the locals, who 
again, did not associate Gérgovie with anything symbolic. There was 
even risk that by learning of Vercingétorix’s tragic fate and subsequent 
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martyrdom, the locals find encouragement in glorifying those fallen in 
resistance to the empire (the same risk posed in glorifying the Trung 
Sisters). Decoux nevertheless did choose to make this an affair of great 
pomp, demonstrating his lack of concern that French symbols of 
resistance and nation building would be appropriated by the locals, which 
must have come from a mix of naiveté and delusion regarding the locals’ 
attachment to France. The Admiral seized any occasion to march 
Frenchmen down the streets to project (even invent) an image of French 
unity in spite of the tribulations that it knew in the metropole and in its 
colonies.
Conclusion
During his speech at the 1934 National Socialist German Workers 
Party (NSDAP) rally in Nuremberg, Reich Minister of Public 
Enlightenment and Propaganda Joseph Goebbels reminded his audience 
that “[i]t may be a good thing to possess power that rests on arms.  But it 
is better and more gratifying to win and hold the heart of the people.”222 
The presence of Japanese troops and their efforts to promote an “Asia for 
Asians” policy meant that Governor General Decoux could not 
completely break with the colonial heritage of the Third Republic and 
had to balance the ultraconservative discourse of the National Revolution 
with the achievements of French colonialism as a whole in order not to 
discredit the benefits of its tutelage. While the administration geared 
many of its policies to alter intracolonial relationships and reorganize 
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political and economic structures to strengthen the Indochinese Union, it 
knew that it would achieve little success in winning the loyalty of the 
Indochinese peoples if it did not publicize these changes by appealing to 
the public’s emotions while suppressing dissenting opinions. This was not 
a new problem for the colonial authorities as previous Governors General 
had implemented changes designed to assure the loyalty of the 
Indochinese peoples by dangling the wonders of Western culture and the 
promises of better lives if the locals were willing to abandon some of the 
traditional elements of their societies that held them back. As Chapter 5 
examines, Sarraut and Pasquier were particularly eager to reform 
administrative, educational, and mandarin structures to raise local 
standards of living. Decoux’s reforms were the continuation of 
associationist efforts of reform, but the means with which he publicized 
the changes, the propaganda machine he used to pass his message and 
silence dissent, was more sophisticated than those of his predecessors. 
Though referring specifically to Laos, Director of Public Education (and 
at the IPP at the time of his letter) Charles Rochet‘s belief that 
“propaganda can do anything if well constructed” extended to 
administrative circles in all countries of  the region.223
Decoux reorganized and centralized the colonial propaganda 
apparatus to promote the French colonial oeuvre through control of the 
media, production of materials, and the orchestration of events, all 
designed to extemporally tie the destinies of France and Indochina. 
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Through the IPP, the government ensured that its message was read in 
newspapers across the region and that no other points of view could 
flourish legally. Sources show that Decoux was not the mastermind 
behind propaganda campaigns in the press; rather fervent anti-
republicans of both ultraconservative and revolutionary profiles staffed 
the IPP and ADLOC bureaus, taking broad directives from the GGI and 
implementing them according to their own agendas. This resulted—
particularly in the regime’s later years when the IPP perfected the process
—in the difficulty to identify where and when the administration 
infiltrated stories in newspapers. Yet this absolves no one from 
responsibility. The GGI was able to be hands off in implementation only 
because it put trusted men in charge of execution.  This nebulousness 
underscores Vichy’s lack of direct control over the propaganda efforts in 
Indochina. No matter how propaganda was produced, no matter where 
the varying degrees of responsibility lay, Vichy did not clone itself in 
Indochina, though the ideas that underpinned (and therefore predated) 
Pétainist ideology existed in the colony. In the end, the machinery most 
likely led to nothing more than extreme cynicism and a distrust of all 
things printed so the GGI created a secret network of individuals to 
spread rumors that was not linked to the authorities. While it is difficult 
to measure this network’s reach of effectiveness, it shows that the GGI 
understood the need to reach the population in creative ways.
The Admiral’s administration also made use of structures (such as 
the Légion) created by Vichy to advance its policies in Indochina, within 
both French and local communities. It exercised significant—albeit not 
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always direct—pressure on civil servants to join the Légion, stressing the 
importance of showing one’s allegiance to the government and to the 
values of the National Revolution. For Decoux, the Légion’s most 
important task was to ensure discipline within the French community. Its 
secondary objective (though it was officially its first) was to inculcate the 
values of the National Revolution through its propaganda efforts and its 
commitment to serve while abandoning the behaviors under the Republic 
Decoux believed were responsible for the debacle of May 1940. Decoux 
acknowledged by the end of his administration that the Légion largely 
failed in this second objective, admitting that many joined out of fear and 
failed to make the spiritual shift toward the organization’s ideals.224  He 
was politically responsible for propagating this fear. It should have come 
to no surprise that the Légion was largely ineffective in widening its base 
of support. Those who joined immediately upon its creation, including its 
most zealot members, had certainly already been won over by 
ultraconservative or nationalist revolutionary causes (see Chapter 2) 
before the outbreak of war, leaving those who joined later to a mix 
between those who did so out fear of government reprisals, opportunism, 
or a herd mentality. The oath Decoux imposed on the légionnaires and the 
propaganda actions the organization undertook were more useful as a 
spectacle for outsiders than as a process of inculcation of Pétainist values 
among the population since it is highly likely that many functionaries 
only pretended to take the oath seriously (see Chapter 5). It is uncertain 
whether Decoux even privately respected the Légion in Indochina, as one 
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witness claimed the Admiral declared several times it was a joke [trois fois 
rien].225 Decoux counted on the Légion, however, to impose discipline and 
to silence opposition. To create the image of an immovable bloc of united 
Frenchmen willing—in action if not in spirit—to serve and obey, the 
Admiral curbed the Légion’s anti-Jewish and especially anti-Masonic 
actions. Silence and displays of loyalty to the regime were more 
important than ethnicity, religion, or affiliations (see Chapter 5).
Decoux’s regime was the first to utilize on a broad scale the cultural 
heritage of Vietnam (above and beyond the monarchy) to further its 
ambitions. It strove to establish linkages between French and Vietnamese 
histories through the triangulation of Pétain-Jeanne d’Arc-Trung Sisters 
while fusing the wisdom and religious powers of Pétain and Confucius. 
Decoux’s regime tried to canalize French Indochina’s existing cultural 
streams to transcend the racial appeal of Japanese pan-Asianism and 
create bonds through imaginary common destinies. The daily ceremonies 
that raised French and regional flags concurrently not only served as a 
symbolic reminder of French sovereignty in the region, but they 
attempted to create an emotional base upon which to build the 
Indochinese Federation, under French leadership. As Chapter 5 
examines, the government would have one believe that this French 
Federation would allow the Indochinese countries to embrace their pasts 
while joining the community of modern societies. The government 
pushed on all fronts France’s unique ability to guide the region through 
the glorification of its own humanistic past, which contrasted 
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significantly with that of Japan. While this tutelage was promoted 
through propaganda, the colonial authorities recognized that it had to 
commit to altering the political and economic structures of the region to 
demonstrate the benefits of colonial rule. Judging by the events of August 
1945, France’s propaganda efforts failed to entrench the spirit of a 
France-led federation within the consciousness of the locals. The 
ceremonies and rituals did very little to attach anyone to France and the 
ease with which the Japanese eventually swept away the French in March 
1945rendered in hindsight the raising of the colors and the singing of la 
Marseillaise a pathetic display.
No matter how often postwar testimonies contradict one another in 
efforts to evade blame, no propaganda initiative could have taken place 
without Decoux’s approval and directives (or conversely a reprimand in 
case of disapproval). He ultimately held responsibility for all propaganda 
initiatives. For a regime so intent on building relations with the 
populations—through tours, associations, personal contacts, or the 
employment of more polite and respectful pronouns (vouvoiement)—it is 
surprising how entire policies could be based on the presumption that the 
Indochinese would readily accept that their cultures could exist in parallel 
with that of the French, creating idols and rituals from nowhere. No 
matter how close the regime thought it was to the locals, it could not 
break away from the stigmatization that the locals were unconcerned 
with politics, which, upon closer look, was at odds with the other 
conviction that they loved their colonial masters. The events of August 
1945 and the two Indochinese wars that followed contradict every 
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intelligence report produced by the IPP. The Decoux regime’s 
propaganda, like the policies it publicized, was devised without knowing 
where the streams of  which Huxley wrote were located.
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Chapter V: Continuing to Create a Federal Consciousness 
In its efforts to glorify the French oeuvre and tutelage in Indochina, 
the colonial authorities needed to convince the populations that in spite 
of recent setbacks, the collaboration that supposedly existed between 
France and its colony remained promising and fruitful. The government’s 
propaganda, aided by its suffocating censorship, spoke of the 
incontrovertible rewards this relationship brought to Indochinese societies 
thanks to the wisdom and magnanimity of the French. Decoux placed 
significant hopes in the idea of an Indochinese Federation to maintain 
France’s sovereignty in the region, through his irrepressible belief that a 
federal structure would interlink the Indochinese peoples while France 
assumed a leadership position from which it could exercise this 
supposedly beneficial tutelage. As with all other aspects of Decoux’s 
policy-making, France’s defeat in Europe and the presence of Japanese 
troops in the colony forced the government to accelerate its efforts to 
convince the Indochinese population that France merited their allegiance 
with promises of a better and more just future. Again, there was no 
turning back no matter how ineffective were the initiatives.
The paradox of Decoux’s administration lies in the Admiral’s view of 
how the colonial authorities should run Indochina, which neither went 
against his ultraconservative, and Maurrassian influenced, worldview nor 
represented any significant change from his predecessors’ efforts over the 
previous thirty years. While the National Revolution ambitioned the 
destruction of the Third Republic’s values and apparatuses in the 
metropole, Decoux could not afford to disparage publicly the totality of 
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French colonialism lest he undermine the confidence—or what the 
French believed to be confidence—of the Indochinese peoples in French 
civilization (see Chapter 4). In the realm of the development of the 
relationship between colonizer and colonized, Decoux’s reforms were in 
many ways the continuation of the policies of the Third Republic, which 
if anything the Admiral could have criticized for not going far enough. 
Even the end of elected council bodies was the logical next step in the 
politics to raise the prestige—though not power—of the notables1 which 
began under Governor General Jean-Marie de Lanessan at the end of the 
nineteenth century.
To an even greater degree than his predecessors, the discourse of 
Decoux’s regime emphasized the need for authority, hierarchy, and 
tradition—values found in Maurrassism but also reflected in naval culture
—but the principal vectors of his administrative reforms were the 
continuation of ideas formulated under the Third Republic. These vectors 
can be identified as: 1) the strengthening of the Indochinese Union under 
the leadership of the French, through reengineered councils, the 
promotion of solidarity, and a coexistence with local patriotisms; 2) the 
politique d’égards (politics of prestige) towards the Indochinese notables; 3) 
the increased inclusion of locals within the government process through 
the opening of the administrative apparatus; and 4) the attempt to direct 
the locals’ daily activities, through sports and youth organizations, in 
hopes of promoting bonds with one another—on national and federal 
levels—and create an attachment to France through the infusion of 
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Western culture and practices (the most drastic of Decoux's policies). 
These initiatives were part of the agendas of every administration for the 
fifty years preceding Decoux’s proconsulship, to greater or lesser extents 
based on particular Governor Generals. They masked behind a rhetoric 
of respect for pre-colonial societies and local customs a desire to limit 
popular dissent, increase control, and keep administrative costs down by 
relying on local officials as much as possible.2  Even under the Popular 
Front (1936-1937), few questioned the notion of the white man’s burden, 
incarnated by the conviction of the innate superiority of republican 
values, which paradoxically created more distance between colonizer and 
local and whose principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity were only 
imported in Indochina as a motto.3  This chapter examines the four 
vectors of Decoux’s administrative reforms and how they defined the 
relationship between the French and the locals. It suggests that these were 
made to minimize threats of the loss of French sovereignty in Indochina 
through measures designed to create a federal consciousness that 
ultimately glorified the French oeuvre, its history and its potential, in the 
region. It also looks at how these reforms, and the discourse that 
surrounded them, while never betraying Decoux’s ultraconservative 
convictions,  did not break with the policies begun under the Third 
Republic.
Developing the Indochinese Federation
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Indochinese federalism was the natural progression of colonial 
consolidation that began at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Christopher Goscha’s study Vietnam or Indochina? argues that French 
colonial policies created the Indochinese space and embedded this 
concept through the development of infrastructure, the writing of 
schoolbooks, and the drawing of maps. The notion of an Indochinese 
Union took root fairly early on in the colonization process as a means of 
pushing the region toward a relative self-sufficiency. In 1887, the same 
year the Indochinese Union was created as an administrative entity, 
French diplomat Jules Harmand declared:
Here is the goal: The foundation of a colonial empire, the creation of a 
vice state, an expression that I like because it characterizes well my 
thought; that is a political organism dependent on the motherland, but 
capable of surviving on its own, capable of self-sufficiency in times of 
peace as well as war, and that, far from being for the motherland a 
source of expenses and weakness, augments on the contrary France’s 
political and military forces, while at the same time offering an outlet to 
its industries, its commerce, its capital, and each activity of its citizens. 
To [make this possible] that is to be able to constitute a political 
organism large enough to live a quasi-independent life, strong enough to 
find in itself all the resources necessary for the existence and defense of 
a state, there is only one procedure, that is to associate one with the 
other the different regions of Annamite and Cambodian Indochina, by 
making them depend on a single authority, creating, in one word, 
Indochinese unity.4
The republican administrators created a geographical construct called 
Indochina, concretized by cartographers in 1907 when France and Siam 
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finalized the colony’s western borders. The French saw in this 
Indochinese unit, as a geobody,5  a means of involving the locals in the 
defense of their own country (or rather Indochina as an entity), which 
signified that the authorities had to create the consciousness of a country 
itself. Led by the French, who positioned themselves as the protector of 
the region, each pays was distinguishable from its neighbors but spiritually 
and materially tied to them.6  Governor General Paul Beau (1902-1908) 
sparked the efforts to settle Vietnamese peasants to other parts of the 
colony to ease demographic pressures in Tonkin and increase the colony’s 
production of foodstuffs, but he also had strategic designs to protect 
western Indochina from Siamese expansionistic threats.7  The French 
considered the Vietnamese racially superior to their Khmer and Lao 
counterparts, and as such wanted them to serve as the backbone of the 
nascent construct.8  This demographic redistribution was key to 
interlinking the peoples of Indochina in such a way as to bolster the 
French administrative apparatus (see below). 
For the French, the raison d’être of the Indochinese Union (used 
interchangeably with the term Federation), in whichever nascent form, 
was both for administrative and strategic necessities, requiring an 
increased interdependence of both bureaucracy and identity. As an 
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administrative apparatus, the Union was established to facilitate the 
governing of the colony under a Governor General, reporting to the 
Ministry of Colonies in Paris. Each pays, however, existed within distinct 
juridical contexts. Cochinchina was an incorporated colony, while Luang 
Prabang, Cambodia, and Annam were protectorates. Tonkin was also a 
protectorate, but under direct administration. From the onset, Cambodia 
and Laos (Luang Prabang and the collection of smaller muangs, or 
principalities) were claimed by the French as a buffer against Siam and 
the colonists understood these territories in relation to their tributary 
histories with Vietnam, that is, justifying their annexations because of the 
long-standing Vietnamese suzerainty. By emphasizing such claims, the 
French saw Cambodia and Laos from the perspective of Vietnam, placing 
the latter’s interests over the former two territories. This is the basis on 
which the Indochinese administrative apparatus that relied on 
Vietnamese functionaries across the colony was built, particularly in 
Laos, which was deemed a hinterland of Vietnam.9  Revealingly, then-
Governor General Albert Sarraut wrote in 1912, “French Indochina 
today is Gia Long’s empire reconstituted, expanded by us through [the 
acquisition] of exterior possessions,” that is Laos and Cambodia.10  As 
Goscha explains, the French tried to construct an Indochinese identity to 
legitimize—and render more palatable—the dominance of the French 
through Vietnamese administrators. However, the colonists understood 
the imperative of maintaining local traditions and underneath the 
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integration of a synthetic Indochinese identity there was the promise that 
the French would shield the Lao and the Khmer from the destruction of 
their own cultures, threatened of extinction because of a long history of 
decay, which would be accelerated by increased Vietnamese migrations. 
These promises of protection were the seeds of the local patriotisms that 
Decoux would later promote.11  Federalism existed as objective 
(administrative) and subjective concepts. While the French were 
successful in constructing the former, they were much less so in nurturing 
the latter.
In 1919, Sarraut called for the formation of an Indochinese Charter 
to give locals an equitable part in the running of public affairs, a policy 
that did not always achieve its intended goals.12  This entity would link 
each pays to one another, facilitating administration, travel, and 
commerce through bureaucratic and infrastructural projects. Though he 
was thinking largely in administrative terms, a few Vietnamese 
intellectuals began imagining an Indochinese entity dominated by the 
Vietnamese yet led by the French.13  This vision was promising for the 
French and those well-placed locals who aimed to benefit from lucrative 
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opportunities, but it also created the terrain for more acrimonious 
developments in intra-Indochinese relationships, ones already based on 
centuries of Vietnamese suzerainty. For the French, opening up 
Indochina to itself was in the tradition of Western progress, a clear 
example of how French tutelage would benefit the locals. It marked their 
belief  in the linearity of  the development of  all civilizations.
The migration of Vietnamese to Laos and Cambodia progressed 
steadily: the Vietnamese population in Cambodia grew from 79,050 in 
1911 to 140,220 in 1921. By 1937, immigration had been so pronounced 
that 10,200 Vietnamese lived in Vientiane, outnumbering the 9,000 Lao. 
Many of these immigrants occupied bureaucratic posts, as the French 
prepared and subsidized Vietnamese civil servants to travel anywhere 
within the colony.14  This population flux, encouraged and sustained 
through new networks of roads, was intended to bind the Indochinese 
space and peoples together, though it ultimately created disruptions—
namely in strengthening and perpetuating the existing anti-Vietnamese 
sentiments in Cambodia and Laos, which persist to this day—that pushed 
the French to play up their role as the cohesive force to keep the union 
together, to the benefit of all. To eternalize France’s role as a tutor and 
underscore the indestructibility of the French oeuvre, Governor General 
Alexandre Varenne announced in 1926 that Indochina could no longer 
make do without French protection, hinting nothing less than the region 
would collapse on itself were France no longer able to contribute its 
knowhow and guns given the changing global economic context and the 
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dependency on France the colony had developed.15  Governor General 
Pierre Pasquier, Varenne’s successor, adopted the same themes and spoke 
of an overarching Indochinese consciousness. Pasquier arguably did more 
to push the concept of an Indochinese Federation than any of his 
predecessors, putting forward in 1928 a 19-point Indochinese Charter that 
positioned France as the cement that held together the culturally and 
ethnically diverse Indochinese entity, calling for the creation of a “Federal 
Unit.”16  
Federalism entailed sophisticated constructs allowing the coexistence 
and preservation of local cultures within a unified entity where France 
was the keystone. Sarraut was one of the earliest and most significant 
Governors General to show his appreciation for local traditions and ways 
of life, and his allocation of funds to renovate Cambodian sovereign 
Sisowath’s palace as an early demonstration of this attitude.17  Pasquier 
was an ardent defender of the “Annamite identity,” which reflected more 
the colonizers’ idealization of Vietnamese society, with its halcyon past 
locked in the romantic and paternalistic vision of French orientalists, 
than how the locals felt their own culture.18 By evoking the importance of 
the local tradition and identity of each pays, Pasquier hoped to minimize 
the influence of the newly settled Vietnamese populations outside of 
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Tonkin and Annam, fearing that the rebellions that took place in those 
two pays would spread.19  He encouraged locals to return to, what he 
imagined was, the harmony of pre-colonial days, abandoning struggle 
and letting France bear the burden of guiding Indochina into a more 
prosper future.20 
Decoux’s efforts to build an Indochinese Federation was the 
continuation of the work and discourse initiated under the Third 
Republic. While Eric Jennings writes that under Decoux “federalism 
became synonymous with fanciful re-creations of Indochinese cultures” 
since its peoples were “in fact increasingly segregated [from each other], 
under the aegis of a traditionalist regime capable of conjuring up a 
folkloric past,” there does not seem to be sufficient evidence to support a 
break—that is a tendency to segregate rather than interconnect—between 
Decoux’s administration and his predecessors’ policies. On the contrary, 
Decoux promoted solidarity and kinship among the peoples of Indochina 
(necessitated in part by the economic situation, see Chapter 6). Moreover, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, “Vichy’s folkloric nostalgia” existed more in 
rhetoric than policy in the metropole and the process of “re-creations of 
Indochinese cultures” that Jennings describes was already taking place 
when in 1907 Pasquier (then in the early stages of his colonial career in 
Indochina) pleaded “Let us conserve in Annam the sweet poetry, the 
ponds where lotuses die, the subtle images, the songs between girls and 
boys during summer evenings, the lettrés [the intellectual class] with long 
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beards and the mandarins in their archaic and dazzling costumes.”21 
Indochina’s isolation from the metropole rendered Decoux’s federalist 
project—based on positioning France as the keystone of a union of pays 
where local patriotisms were encouraged but not at the price of solidarity 
with each other—more urgent to seduce the indigenous populations. Its 
evocation of an autonomous Indochina, united and able to exist within 
its regional environment, though irrevocably attached to the metropole if 
only in spirit, echoed Jules Harmand’s speech over a half  century earlier.
While the Admiral claimed to have given more structure to the 
Indochinese Federation, he admitted to the continuity of his 
administration’s reforms with the efforts of the past, based on France as 
the linchpin that nurtured solidarity among peoples. In his memoirs, the 
Admiral claimed that the federal principle as a notion had been in the air 
for quite some time, but without a clear definition or outline, and he took 
credit for its accelerated implementation, credit that was perhaps merited 
given the scale of his endeavors. He believed that the federal link, which 
French sovereignty alone was capable of assuring for the pays involved, 
would augment solidarity amongst the regions of Indochina, through a 
better understanding of one another.22  France as the cement of the 
federal system would no longer intervene in the minor affairs of the 
member pays, according them more liberty and autonomy, particularly in 
cultural domains, providing more room to cultivate local traditions. 
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Regarding political economy, however, the need to manage wartime 
difficulties meant more centralization rather than more autonomy, 
though the structures of local power needed to change to accommodate 
the new forces. Indochina’s isolation served as a centripetal force toward 
the GGI of all matters of importance, ones that affected the destinies of 
the colony and its peoples. Decoux’s administration did not, could not, 
resist the temptation of political centralization to address the problems of 
autarky.23  Interlinking the pays of Indochina meant facilitating the 
authorities’ abilities to intervene in local affairs, organizations, and 
resource allocation. Seeping into all aspects of society, Decoux’s regime 
only allowed locals a greater role in their affairs (following Sarraut’s 
vision) only insofar as they executed policy in greater numbers, but 
seldom participated in their invention. In this instance, Hanoi followed in 
Vichy’s footsteps: going against the rhetoric of the National Revolution, 
which advocated increased decentralization, by succumbing to the 
realities of administration in times of war (see Chapter 2). As in other 
areas, the implementation of this aspect of Pétain’s agenda was not 
realistic in the metropole and even less so in the colonies.
To accelerate and strengthen the interlinking of peoples, the federalist 
project had to continue developing an Indochinese consciousness, one 
that united all the peoples of the region, and the government used its 
propaganda machine to try to prepare locals for the ineluctability of this 
change. By tending to the subjectivity of federalism, that is the 
development of a federal consciousness, Decoux went further than his 
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predecessors who spent more time proposing objective, structural 
changes. Decoux’s administrative reforms (see below) were steps toward 
concretizing the federal project, but were ultimately unable to transform 
the consciousness of the locals to accept French tutelage. The colonial 
administration had to convince locals of something that was nonexistent 
or at best only nascent and which was effectively contradicted by the 
reality of French policies.24  Worse, this structure eternalized the colonial 
relationship, contradicting any justification of tutelage since France was 
not preparing Indochina for independence in the medium term. In a 
directive for the IPP that encapsulated French convictions that 
colonialism brought progress and peace to the colonized, Decoux stressed 
the need to push the benefits of federalism against the atomizing effects 
of  nationalisms:
All Indochinese who can think must understand that the French federal 
link alone has the power to maintain the cohesion of Indochina. 
Without this link, the federation will dissolve fatally. Annamite 
countries themselves may not keep for long their cohesion, the 
particularist tendencies of the South taking it on a road of greater or 
lesser extensive autonomy. What would become of these small patries 
hatefully withdrawn on themselves? It is easy to predict that they would 
soon be the prey of outside countries, not having enough to survive on 
their own. Independence would be a short-lived illusion. Any link other 
than the French link—and there are many quite close—would prove 
singularly heavier, and certainly less respectful of local patriotisms, in 
spite of  promises or much-talked-about satisfactions.25
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In this view, Indochina as an entity was the evolution of a region touched 
by Western civilization. Just as France had taken form after centuries of 
expansion and centralization by royal power, Indochina would come 
together, leveraging its strengths (such as the superiority and work ethic of 
the Vietnamese) to develop into a modern, competitive body.26  Though 
the French feared the disintegration of the Indochinese Federation 
(namely due to the “wrong kind” of local nationalisms), by the 1940s 
they no longer questioned the artificiality of this union, no longer asking 
themselves whether it was justified or sustainable. These subtleties tell the 
story of a colonizing power convinced of the linear evolution of societies 
and the positive, in all senses of the word, influence of Western culture. 
Based on this  view, the peoples of the region had to move forward to 
create a belonging to Indochina as an entity or risk destruction.27  At its 
roots, however, is the exaggerated conviction that Vietnamese regionalism 
was stronger than its nationalism28. There was a tendency to 
underestimate the force to unite all three pays of Vietnam, naturally 
creating a cohesive unit within itself. This of course would turn against 
the French, who ultimately would have benefitted from some level of 
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28. It should be remembered that it was the French who divided Vietnam into three pays 
to keep them apart and ostensibly, weakened. 
disunity (that is, regionalism) since this could have weakened the 
Vietnamese independentist movements.
Under Decoux, the press extolled the federalist project and the 
sentiments of regional harmony and solidarity that France engendered 
through its oeuvre. It positioned Decoux’s reforms as the culmination of 
France’s vision of the previous forty years, which began under Paul 
Doumer’s administration, thereby trying to justify the longstanding 
benefits of French tutelage (see Chapter 4 regarding Decoux’s reluctance 
to disparage the works of  the Third Republic).29 Phap Nam wrote 
Through the development [mise en valeur] of the pays’ [transportation 
systems, for which Doumer and Sarraut played critical parts], France 
has allowed the different parts of Indochina that were isolated and 
withdrawn for so long to wake up to sentiments of complementary unity 
insofar as their productions and needs. At the same time, France has 
created the solidarity or at least the cultural comprehension of the 
composing civilizations.30
Government propaganda went on an all out campaign to convince that it 
was through the public services that France managed (that is, all aspects 
of federal government) that the pays of the Union would nurture the 
solidarity required to face the common needs that they could not meet 
alone.31  Rather than segregation, the authorities sought overarching 
bonds of Indochinese solidarity, stressing complementarities over 
isolation. 
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The government, directly or through its propaganda machine, tried to 
link the destinies of France and Indochina, imagining a future for the 
region where France was the force that would transform the region 
through the transposition of its wisdom and knowhow, a process that had 
supposedly been taking place for decades. One author believed that the 
national pride that would emerge from working within an effective 
federal entity—which he pointed out was a continuation of Pasquier’s 
vision—would forge “a union between [French and Indochinese] peoples 
[that would] be intimate, deep, that allow[ed the Indochinese] to look 
toward the future with confidence. . .in complete fraternal confidence.”32 
One newspaper editorial read “Our peasant, who may not appreciate the 
true worth of the achievements of modern technique, knows well how to 
concretize in one word this immense oeuvre: he knows that he owes 
France tranquility. . .Nonetheless this French peace does not represent the 
entirety of the French oeuvre. True French imperialism is that of the 
spirit.”33  Decoux took the opportunity during King Sihanouk’s 
coronation to remind the populations that the French brought order and 
discipline to the administrative, judicial, economic, and social 
administration of Cambodia, bringing the pays into the modern age.34 
Again, this belief in the linearity of progress was innate to French 
colonialism, and the National Revolution justified tutelage through its 
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ideological emphasis on hierarchy.35  The Republic, on the contrary, was 
built on spreading liberation and equality, a paradox it never escaped in 
spite of its own speeches on helping other civilizations since it never 
intended to bring either to Indochina. Maurrassism lacked this hypocrisy, 
this contradiction between the values of the Republic and its colonial 
policies, and Decoux presented himself as the guarantor of this natural 
order of  civilizational tutelage. 
Decoux pushed the idea that federalism nurtured the interregional 
solidarity that was necessary to overcome the economic difficulties. Only 
through the Union, under French leadership, could works be achieved 
that were beyond the capabilities of each individual pays.36  This was 
especially true in times when goods were scarce.37  Decoux had to 
convince the peoples that it was in their interests to assist one another, 
preparing them for material sacrifice (such as the Cochinchinese sending 
rice to Tonkin) and at the same time strengthen the idea of the federation 
as a meaningful, working entity. The press echoed these assertions of 
increased solidarity despite recent hardships, claiming that “all the pays of 
the Indochinese Federation [were] integrating in the sphere of common 
prosperity, their destinies linked. . .What before [the war] some 
considered a utopian conception or myth [was] becoming a living 
reality.”38  Unlike what Jennings asserts, the Decoux regime never 
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intended to segregate because in doing so it would never have been able 
to manage affairs in a war time economy. As discussed below, the 
promotion of local patriotisms was part of an effort to elevate the local 
elite, but this was not in contradiction with federalism.39
While centralizing real power, Decoux sought to bolster local 
administrative structures to ensure that his government’s policies were 
implemented. Local bodies were given more responsibility but less 
independence. By strengthening the authority of these local bodies, 
Decoux was not moving toward indirect French rule and greater 
autonomy for the individual pays, run by locals, in spite of his claims. He 
worked through the intermediary of the local authorities to carry out his 
will, disguising what was in effect more direct rule, in spite of his rhetoric 
Decoux wanted the French to be involved at every level of 
administration, though he understood that they could not be seen as 
doing so.40 To achieve this, he needed an even more subservient notable 
and administrative corps, with more attractive (and addictive) reward 
structures, while raising the prestige of the sovereigns and notables (see 
below). The elevation of local traditions and patriotisms was 
instrumental in this effort. Decoux drew from the elite, including the 
sovereigns, desirable benefits and actions, by elevating them in the eyes of 
the peoples—which sometimes meant catering to the hedonism of the 
elite—while minimizing real power.41 
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With a quintessentially Maurrassian worldview, Decoux believed this 
revived respect for the local elites required the extremely delicate and 
difficult task of encouraging a controlled and non-threatening pride in the 
nation: only by imagining a glorious past could traditional structures of 
authority be revered anew, minimizing potential revolutionary forces. It 
was this tension between “nation” and “pays” that threatened the French 
colonial project in Indochina. The GGI had to stir emotions to revive the 
past yet channel them away from either independentism or opposition to 
other pays. The solidarity that Decoux often evoked was a concept 
designed to assuage feelings of resentment of sacrifice (for instance when 
locally produced foodstuffs were sent to other regions) and to quell 
nationalist fervor. As such, the government engaged in seemingly 
contradictory lines of action, vowing to protect local traditions to 
reinforce the authority of notables and create sentiments of strength and 
parity of power among the pays, while promoting the development of an 
Indochinese consciousness which facilitated the maintenance of French 
rule. The policy nonetheless remained consistent: a promotion of local 
traditions was necessary to elevate the elite, who were necessary to carry 
out the will of the French and work together with other pays’ elites 
toward the sophistication of the Indochinese Federation. In 1941, 
Decoux explained: 
[This] superior union of diverse pays doesn’t imply for any of them the 
slightest renunciation of their moral and political patrimony. Each one 
conserves on the contrary its individuality, its culture, its customs, its 
laws, and pursues its evolution, according to its own merits. Federalism 
would not negatively affect the prerogatives of the protected sovereigns 
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or the responsibilities of local Chief administrators, whose authority 
and prestige must remain intact. Their respective powers keep all their 
extent. The achieved rapprochement must have for only result the more 
vigorous development of the creative forces of the whole, through the 
placing in common of resources and possibilities of the pays that make it 
up.42
A year later he continued:
[Federalism] proposes not to invade and absorb, but to favor the 
flourishing of sovereignties and local personages. Far from us is the 
thought of leveling nationalities by weakening the distinctive character 
of each. We intend, on the contrary, to rely heavily on the protected 
governments and on collaborating more closely with their natural chiefs 
the sovereigns, safeguarding the civilizations that [their] ancestors have 
forged. We also want to regulate the impulsion of the whole, efforts, 
correlate activities. Our goal is to harmonize all that must and be done 
so.43
Local elites were the paradoxical key to greater centralization and the 
promotion of local traditions the vehicle with which to ensure respect for 
these elites that obeyed the administration.
Decoux understood the risks posed by the promotion of patriotisms, 
which could easily turn into xenophobic and anti-French nationalism, 
and sought to utilize the discourse of the National Revolution to channel 
patriotisms in what he thought were healthy directions. He wrote:
The ideas of the National Revolution must not, like liberal and 
individualistic doctrines, lead astray patriotic sentiments. These 
doctrines could only. . .lead to a principle of nationalities and to the 
theory of the rights of peoples to self rule, thus facing any colonizing 
action with unsolvable contradictions, from which it was possible to 
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extricate it only by associating it with perspectives of untying 
[détachement] and of ineluctable independence vis-à-vis the 
metropole. . .The National Revolution, on the contrary, through its 
familial and communitarian doctrine, starting with the grouping of 
society and individuals in hierarchical families, admits that the existence 
of a tutelage of certain peoples is a natural law, while the empire and the 
federation bring to the different pays of Indochina this context of natural 
tutelage in which their patriotism can express itself. . .[The idea is] to 
destroy through the adroit propagation of the ideas of the National 
Revolution, federalism, and the empire, the concepts capable of 
misleading [patriotic] sentiments toward unrealizable aspirations and 
dangerous illusions.44
This circular is key to understanding how the French tried to manage the 
forces behind the creation of a federal consciousness under French 
tutelage and the potential to have it backfire and stir xenophobic 
nationalisms. Decoux was convinced that the values of the National 
Revolution could channel local energies toward a concrete, positive 
outcome. Order, hierarchy, and solidarity were values that would engross 
societies and individuals into embracing the Federation. Confucianism 
(respect for authority) and Buddhism (detachment from the world), as 
understood by the French, provided the ideal terrain for Pétainist values 
and would be reinforced by exalting the “positive” aspects of tradition 
(hence local patriotisms) while replacing the “negative” with modern 
European values (through tutelage).
Decoux’s policy was based on convincing the Indochinese peoples of 
the benefits and the necessity of a union without forcing any individual—
and by extension any people—to repudiate his origins and customs, since 
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this would erode the authority of elites whose legitimacy derived from 
tradition. He warned against “the unintelligent nationalisms for small 
patries hatefully withdrawn on themselves and determined to pout rather 
than live.” Particularly aware of the tensions caused by the Vietnamese 
immigration in Laos and Cambodia, which Decoux nevertheless believed 
was necessary for the development of these pays, the Admiral sought to 
avoid the nascence of racial nationalisms, products of longstanding 
ethnic divisions coupled with European notions of nationhood. Careful 
to steer sentiments in his direction, he declared “a patrie is not constituted 
of tribes or villages of the same race dispersed over a territory more or 
less vast; a patrie, the patrie of all great modern peoples, is before all a 
land fecundated by the united work and the effort of all the men who 
inhabit it;. . .that patriotism is above all the love of the land, the collective 
conscience, and the sense of solidarity.” By emphasizing the path to 
modernity, the French wanted to infuse European concepts of 
nationhood into Indochina. Decoux believed that the elite had a pivotal 
role to play to reverse the racial antipathies of  the past. He wrote:
We have carefully to avoid everything that offends and divides—race 
and racial nationalism—and accentuate all that brings closer and unites
—interests and culture—under the common tutelage of France, to 
whom is given the mission to balance, reconcile, and lead the evolution 
with order. We must harmonize, in a word, local patriotisms, multiply 
the contacts between elites, and orient them toward a sentiment of deep 
solidarity, based on a widespread patriotism.45
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Decoux saw the rapprochement of the elite of each pays as an 
effective means of raising their prestige while nurturing solidarity 
amongst peoples. Unlike his predecessors who did not allow Vietnamese 
emperors to visit Cochinchina, the Governor General encouraged 
sovereigns to tour other pays, as in 1942 when he suggested Vietnamese 
Emperor Bao Dai stop in Saigon and Angkor on his way to visiting 
Sihanouk. Plans were also drawn to have the King of Cambodia tour 
some of Cochinchina’s industrial and agricultural sites before taking the 
newly built Route 13 to Luang Prabang to meet with its ruler Sisavang 
Vong.46  The French authorities organized simultaneous training for 
Vietnamese and Khmer notables at the Ecole Supérieure d’Education 
Physique in Phan Thiêt so that they could “know in common the salutary 
joys of physical effort.”47 The press did not fail to exalt these exchanges, 
which according to one author, were “manifestations of this ‘team spirit’ 
that is no less indispensable between collectivities as it is individuals.”48
Government pushed the media to exalt the coexistence of local 
patriotisms, alive through a powerful elite, with an overarching federal 
consciousness. One article read:
Only federalism can allow Annamite, Cambodian, or Lao patries to 
achieve conjointly the nationhood that they could not achieve alone 
through lack of space, material wealth, and, if we can say, permeability; 
only the Indochinese whole possess a national virtuality. . .Let the elite 
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of each pays of the Union understand therefore. . .that it must go beyond 
its attachment to the village, the city, the local patrie to extend its loyalty 
to the nation in power, the Indochinese Federation. . . Let all recognize 
that [the Annamite, Cambodian, and Lao patries] have convergent 
interests, that they must lean on one another.49
Another made clear parallels between the development of local 
patriotisms and the greater whole of the federation, asserting “The 
Cambodian and Lao renaissance. . .demonstrated as much the testimony 
of the efficiency of [the] federal policy that contribute[d] daily to 
reinforce moral and spiritual cohesion as the social and economic 
solidarity of the Indochinese bloc.”50 Knowing the various filters through 
which articles had to pass before publication, it is striking that no one 
caught on to this demonstration of complete ignorance of the history of 
the region, not just pre-colonial, but the history of the formation of the 
colony (the French promised to protect Laos and Cambodia from the 
Vietnamese!). This reference to imagined attempts to achieve an 
“Indochinese nationhood” was not a major theme of French propaganda. 
It does, however, hint at how far French creativity took the rhetoric of 
Federalism. 
Rebuilding the Elite
The Decoux administration’s vision to raise the prestige of the elite to 
facilitate French rule had little to distinguish itself in theory from the 
governments that preceded the war, though the degree to which he tried 
to improve status and his real efforts to redress salary inequities was 
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much more pronounced. Decoux’s GGI was not caught in the paradox 
and contradictions of its republican predecessors: the republic, a 
democratic system, relying on local sovereigns regionally and village 
chiefs locally to sustain the colonial apparatus.51  The discourse of the 
National Revolution catered to the Admiral’s penchant for social 
hierarchy and legitimized policies that had always been part of French 
colonialism but now found a new impetus. During his proconsulship, 
Decoux adopted measures to recruit notables of certain profiles (young, 
loyal to France, open to Western values) and make it materially and 
honorifically worthwhile for local elites to work closely—or at least 
loyally, that is, with little risk of causing trouble—with the colonial 
authorities. Decoux’s government saw notables as the last cog of the 
administration, whose duty it was to not only apply administrative acts, 
but also to explain their purpose to the people, an approach that inscribed 
itself in the continuity of the Third Republic.52 In 1889, shortly after the 
height of the Can Vuong insurgency led by Vietnamese mandarins 
against colonial rule, Jean-Marie de Lanessan, who would become 
Governor General of Indochina two years later, wrote after returning 
from the colony: 
Instead of continuing to follow missionary policies [designed to 
marginalize the lettrés who resisted French religious teachings and to 
oppose the Nguyen Dynasty which had generally been hostile to 
Catholicism] that have bore such sad outcomes, we must loyally accept 
and without restriction the only rule of conduct that is appropriate for a 
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protectorate, that is to govern Annam and Tonkin by leaning on all the 
live forces of the pays: the king, the court, the secret council, the 
mandarins, and the lettrés. In this way we will gain more surely than 
through any other means employed to this day the trust and sympathy 
of  the Annamite people and we destroy the forces of  rebellion.53
By 1892, most of the mandarinate had abandoned the struggle and 
Lanessan sought the collaboration of the court and the elite by treating 
them with greater respect and making certain concessions.54
The French needed notables to help them administer the country, yet 
had to alter the traditional power and reward structures. They realized 
that direct administration in Tonkin and Annam—which would have 
entailed abolishing the mandarinate as had been done in Cochinchina—
would never be accepted and that they would benefit from drawing on the 
bureaucratic organization that had functioned for centuries and was 
adapted to the social and political conventions.55 The colonial authorities 
relied on the elite to overcome their paucity of knowledge on local 
customs and language. They turned notables into the mere executers of 
the decisions of the foreign power, rewarding them for their servitude.56 
In 1898 in Tonkin, the French introduced modifications to the entry 
examination into the mandarinate, adding French language and quôc-ngu 
proficiency sections to the traditional test on the Chinese classics.57 This 
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meant that to be successful, a candidate had to have been exposed to at 
least some elements of a European-style education and therefore 
mentalities, though the Franco-Annamite education structure remained 
in its infancy at this point. Having taken away much of the notables’ real 
power, the French distributed titles, money, and medals, cultivating the 
desire for a panoply of  symbols of  power rather than the real thing.58
During the 1920s and 1930s, the French continued to rely on the 
traditional notable institution while simultaneously trying to modernize 
the recruitment of the notable corps. The administrators blamed the 
notables’ insufficient preparation for their functions and even their 
vainness for the government’s need to increase its powers, though they 
admitted to the transitory nature of this stage once educational 
institutions became widespread and sophisticated enough to create an 
indigenous elite they deemed capable of exercising public functions in 
relative independence.59 Until the mid 1930s, the colonial authorities had 
preferred to reward docility over competence, but this changed 
incrementally as more and more graduates came from Western-
influenced institutions. In 1934 in Annam, only 28 of 899 mandarins held 
diplomas from European-type institutions and 193 from education 
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systems with some component of modern, European teaching.60 Between 
1934 and 1937, 100 mandarins were forcefully retired and replaced by 
156 holders of modern diplomas of which 11 came from French 
universities.61 Only in Laos were attempts to modernize the elite minimal 
as the French authorities, too few in numbers to effectively rule directly, 
relied heavily on Vietnamese administrators to govern the provinces (each 
of which was headed by a French Résident and a provincial chief drawn 
from the local Lao nobility), or muang (though each muang was presided 
by a leading member of the local Lao nobility). This benefited French 
and Lao nobility alike—though with deleterious consequences for the 
future—as all local grievances (regarding questions such as high taxes, 
corruption, or excessive corvée, that is labor for the state required by law) 
focused on the Vietnamese. Nonetheless the French did introduce reform 
in Laos in 1920 creating an elected Indigenous Consultative Assembly, 
whose members were restricted to those who had reached higher grades 
in the civil service or who possessed the requisite level of  education.62 
Decoux’s policies vis-à-vis the elite differed little from those of his 
predecessors. He sought to raise the prestige of the mandarins (that had 
steadily deteriorated) and their compensation to allow them a sufficiently 
high standard of living to act with what Decoux called "integrity and a 
devotion to the public cause." This in effect continued past policies of 
rewarding docility and compliance since it followed that a devotion to the 
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public cause meant obeying government orders without question or risk 
losing said rewards. The Admiral also sought to inject new blood in the 
notable corps and replaced those elite he deemed unacceptable (often due 
to lack of energetic support for the government or a stale disposition) 
with younger subjects who were promised improved possibilities for 
advancement should they prove outstanding in their function, that is, 
with a clear and unquestioning understanding of what it was the 
authorities expected of them.63 Under Decoux, the administration’s entire 
policy vis-à-vis notables (both village-level officials and higher level 
mandarins) was to provide a larger place for younger and educated 
elements of the population based on the idea that results obtained in 
villages where village chiefs had received a certain European culture had 
been excellent.64   While Hanoi was keen to tap into the traditional 
authority of the mandarins, the administration wanted to ensure that the 
corps executed the GGI’s orders obediently, cultivating a profile and 
rewards structure to reinforce this policy. Again, efforts to modernize the 
notable body sought not to tap a more dynamic, go-getting elite capable 
of imagining and implementing changes to the administration, but rather 
to deepen the allegiance of the mandarins by hiring Western-influenced 
graduates whose compensation and social rank was linked to their 
performance as executers of the government’s will. In this sense, Decoux 
sought to revive traditional reverence for the elite, but with a less 
traditional corps.
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The Admiral even asked the French to change the way they 
addressed locals, using the formal French pronoun vous over the more 
informal, and condescending, tu. This politique d’égards intended to 
maintain the dignity of what the French called the “evolved Indochinese" 
and show respect for those who had bought into the European system. 
Changing the form of address was a means to accept locals, particularly 
those who had received European educations, not so much as equals, but 
as humans.65 This effort distinguished Decoux from his predecessors and 
underscored his personal affinity for showing special consideration for an 
elite that took its rightful place in the social hierarchy. There were also 
more pragmatic reasons behind this push to use vous, namely as a move 
to endear the local bourgeoisie and aristocracy and accelerate the Franco-
Indochinese rapprochement that Decoux judged so important for the 
future of the colony, particularly if French attitudes were contrasted with 
those displayed by the Japanese, which they assessed as far from 
cordial.66
Decoux intended to govern the colony through these mandarins (but 
also local officials), relying on a more pronounced social hierarchy to 
ensure that the elite’s renewed authority served the interests of France. 
He reminded the mandarins of Annam that they should be leaders and 
give themselves entirely to serving their pays and its populations. Decoux 
believed that once the traditional structures of the mandarins were 
reinforced he could advance his plans for an Indochinese Federation. He 
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called on the mandarins to assume no less than traditional roles of 
“father and mother of the people” as artisans of the supposed common 
cause of the Indochinese Union, which would help the peoples of 
Indochina traverse the difficulties of the time. Decoux openly sought to 
juxtapose the old and the new—ancestral tradition and a more modern, 
European way of  administration—to build his version of  federalism.67
Decoux, who “governed Indochina as he would have a ship,”68 was 
obsessed with hierarchy, adding impetus to the French policies of 
reinforcing mandarins’ authority as means of achieving colonial 
objectives. By reintroducing direct administration by the locals—who 
remained under the control of the French—Decoux sought to give 
mandarins real power and authority to end the debates and discussions 
within elected councils that Decoux found so distasteful.69  Doing away 
with these bodies was integral to the restoration of authority because it 
elevated the elite above the people, shielding them from the scrutiny that 
is intrinsic to democratic debate. While the Admiral anchored his 
promotion of elite authority in tradition—and the discourse of the 
National Revolution—he did not believe it should exist outside the 
context of the imperial project, which again meant serving the interests of 
France above all else. In a 1943 telegram to Vichy, he wrote “in 
Indochina as in France the principle of authority [is being rehabilitated] 
opening possibilities for those who wish to learn and grow conforming to 
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the principles of the National Revolution.”70  These principles meant 
subservience to French colonial structures through an administrative 
apparatus that rested on cultural notions of hierarchy while eliminating 
elements of tradition that Decoux found objectionable for the carrying 
out of French policy. More than tradition or modernity, the Admiral 
sought obedience through a realignment of values to better serve the 
state, and just as he placed trusted French naval officers in key 
government positions, he made sure that a new generation of notables 
was in place to carry out his orders. In his 24 November 1941 speech to 
fresh graduates of  a training course for district chiefs, he told them:
The time is gone when, visiting villages, the mandarin, lying on his 
palanquin or sat on his horse, only saw bowed heads and joined hands, 
receiving for only response to his orders or admonishments the 
respectful approbation of. . .the inhabitants. Yet these ancestral virtues 
of our Annamite populations have remained intact and among these 
virtues obedience to representatives of authority. But today, more than 
the prestige of the function, the prestige of he who exercises it counts, 
and you will only possess it by demonstrating the best qualities of the 
man and the chief. . .The state expects from you a devotion without 
reservation, a perfect dignity of  life, an absolute integrity.71
Throughout the provinces, administrators echoed the idea of reinforcing 
traditional authority with more flexible, “enlightened” methods modeled 
on French wisdom. The Resident Superior of  Tonkin declared in 1941:
Mandarins are, within villages, the representatives of central power, and 
all this constitutes an ensemble of tradition and liberty, of organic 
authority and hierarchy whose harmony is unquestionable. . .France can 
bring to your traditional institutions the light of its spirit and the warmth 
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of its heart. From the harmonious fusion of our two cultures a glorious 
and prosper Annam can be born.72
This meant that the elite had to change their mentalities to keep up with 
changing times and were told that it was on them that depended the 
realization of the oeuvre that France endeavored in Indochina and that 
they should conduct in their public and private lives in absolute probity, 
an essential condition for the moral ascendency that they would acquire 
on the population.73
The problem was that the profession of notable remained 
unattractive for most young graduates. The government’s longer term 
objectives of improving its corps of notables (that is, mid-level officials) 
ran into its immediate needs to fill vacant positions for the administration 
to run properly. It decided to open positions to lateral recruitment from 
elsewhere within the civil service, meaning there were two paths to 
becoming a notable, both through examination: one reserved for those 
holding a French university diploma (either from the metropole or 
through an institution of French educational heritage) and another, 
temporarily until the first avenue became more reliable, to civil servants 
from other departments.74  Decoux envisaged starting those from the 
former category at a higher rank than their counterparts coming in 
laterally, thereby providing them with an immediate advantage and 
higher compensation.75  The Admiral believed that the need for lateral 
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recruitment in Vietnam would diminish as European education became 
more widespread.76  The authorities understood however that the 
Vietnamese system was inadequate for Cambodia and Laos as 
desperately low education levels there meant they could not draw from a 
large enough pool of potential candidates. One report suggested that of 
217 members of the elite in Cambodia, only one had a degree in law and 
31 held the baccalaureate.77 Furthermore, some circles within the colonial 
regime believed Cambodian culture was too individualistic for the 
“collective spirit” of the notable function and thus the role would remain 
unattractive.78  In this view persisted the prejudicial racial hierarchization 
placing the Vietnamese at the top of the intellectual food chain in 
Indochina, providing real insight into the faint hopes the French had for 
Laos and Cambodian development no matter what was said in speeches.
To attract candidates, the administration raised compensation for 
mandarins, directly improving overall standards of living and 
consequently, it was hoped, prestige while reducing corruption. Decoux 
believed that mandarins who represented the authorities, to whom the 
government gave political responsibilities, and from whom the GGI 
demanded the most scrupulous integrity, must have a lifestyle worthy of 
the position.79  The administration sought for instance to reduce the 
overall burden of official travel for the mandarins, which had become a 
source of unhappiness among the elite and a deterrent for recruitment.80 
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It was also put forward that having French administrators visit mandarins 
(rather than ask the latter to travel to meet their European superiors) 
would increase prestige and incentivize the elite to assist the 
government.81  In the eyes of the GGI, frequent contact was essential to 
raise the morale of the population, fight “dangerous propaganda,” and 
clarify certain policies so that the mandarins in turn could explain them 
to the people in the area.82  Unfortunately, the desire to cut down 
mandarins’ travel juxtaposed with difficulties in recruitment (particularly 
in remote areas with highly uneducated inhabitants) made it nearly 
impossible to resolve the problem of mandarins not knowing segments of 
their populations, especially in the high regions where high fragmentation 
of racial and cultural diversity existed, thus making it more difficult for 
the administration to use mandarins (and notables) to explain 
government policy.83  It is curious how Decoux could have given in to the 
mandarins’ complaints about travel when he repeatedly stressed the 
importance of close contact with the population. Similarly, accepting a 
relatively immobile elite corps did not fit with the image of modernity 
and energy Decoux was trying to create, particularly given the nationalist 
threat in the countryside which, albeit significantly weakened after harsh 
reprisals, also fought for the hearts and minds of the populations.84  As 
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such there resulted a tension between modernization and the need to 
preserve the traditional authority of the elite that Decoux had to manage 
carefully.
Ensuring the Loyalty of  the Administrators
More than any of his predecessors, Decoux made changes in the way 
administrators were hired, retained (or dismissed), and compensated. 
Indochina’s isolation meant it was impossible to replace European civil 
servants who reached the end of their tour of duty, but more troubling for 
Decoux, it meant the GGI had to keep administrators who had served 
under the Republic and therefore potentially against Vichy. Decoux’s 
authoritarian character and his preternatural inclinations for hierarchy 
and discipline exacerbated tensions as he did not tolerate dissent and 
sanctioned or dismissed any civil servant who spoke or acted against the 
National Revolution. Decoux opened administrative positions to locals to 
resolve the problem of lack of personnel and build the Indochinese 
Federation through a process of indigenization already begun under the 
Third Republic, accelerating its implementation in order to develop its 
structures and the federal consciousness that he wanted to be the 
consequence of  greater interdependence of  the pays.
The process of indigenization of the civil service had gained 
momentum in the 1920s. In 1897, Governor General Paul Doumer had 
sought to centralize power in the hands of the French by taking away 
from the court the collection of all taxes, immediately putting all civil 
servants on the colonial payroll. He recruited new groups of Frenchmen 
to administer myriad areas from enforcement of production to issuance 
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of permits to running post offices.85 From that year, the first of Doumer’s 
governorship, to 1911, when Albert Sarraut moved into the governor’s 
residence in Hanoi, the number of European civil servants increased from 
2,860 to 5,683.86  As part of his “pro-native” policies, Sarraut opened 
positions in the administration to locals, though never replacing 
Frenchmen in decision or policy-making positions. In Tonkin, he 
encouraged the promotion of Francophile values by reserving certain 
roles to graduates of metropolitan or Franco-indigenous schools. In 1922, 
Pasquier, then Administrator for Civil Services in Indochina, established 
the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Annamites in efforts to continue the process of 
modernization of the Indochinese administration, contributing to the 
marginalization of the lettrés. Most of the positions remained closed to 
the Indochinese peoples and the only real way in which a local could 
access certain echelons was to be naturalized a French citizen.87 During 
the 1920s, Alexandre Varenne extended Sarraut’s efforts by creating a 
lateral administrative cadre that raised compensation for Vietnamese civil 
servants.88  Nonetheless Indochina during this period supported the 
heaviest functionary structure of Europeans within the French empire 
with an average of 5,000 civil servants for a population of 21.5 million, 
compared to 500 officials in French West Africa, whose population was 
15 million.89
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Decoux recognized the importance of a keeping a strong presence of 
French administrators in Indochina to maintain France’s sovereignty in 
the colony,90  but he saw the épuration, or purge, of the civil service as 
necessary to the implementation of his version of the National 
Revolution, ridding it of those who voiced their opinions against it.91 For 
the Admiral, this action served both pragmatic and propagandistic 
causes. He invoked the National Revolution as means of reaffirming 
authority and firing functionaries who were too old (read potential 
republicans, having served under previous administrations) or 
incompetent (again, potential republicans). He declared that “a culpable 
sentimentality [was] no longer warranted. . .and only those functionaries 
who [were] active, honest, and loved [France]” should be kept, a less than 
subtle call to replace dissent with Pétainist loyalty. Decoux asked his 
Heads of ADLOC to work toward the purging of undesirables and the 
moral recovery of the functionary corps. He demanded that all civil 
servants, French and local, live exemplary lives, building and promoting 
the French oeuvre of national restoration, following the government on 
the road it had traced or else be removed.92  In an action encapsulating 
Decoux’s thirst for show over substance, on 6 February 1942, the Admiral 
instructed all higher echelon functionaries to prepare and read texts 
condemning Gaullism and reaffirming their loyalty to the legal state, 
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which would have to be rewritten if they were deemed “a bit flat.”93 This 
show also had the benefit of reinforcing Decoux’s image as a good state 
employee, minimizing the risks of concerns from Vichy and thereby 
giving himself  more leeway for action.
Decoux’s efforts to purge the administration targeted mostly 
suspected Freemasons, at least early on, and Gaullists. He feared that 
even passive opponents of the regime, those who voiced their dissent only 
in private quarters, posed risks of sabotaging the government measures. 
The Admiral believed former Leftists (supporters of the Popular Front, 
for instance) or Freemasons could not be trusted to carry out 
administrative reforms nor see to it that the values and principles of the 
National Revolution be championed and he was merciless in his hunt for 
suspected dissidents, which undoubtedly worked in keeping opposing 
voices silent as fear of career suicide seeped through the ranks. He asked 
the ADLOC to provide him with lists of and recommended actions for 
functionaries whose loyalties were questionable.94  Decoux also 
encouraged the Légion to work closely with administrative heads to 
identify troublesome elements.95  In spite of aggressive rhetoric, the 
number of functionaries dismissed was relatively low, pointing not to a 
corps conquered by Pétainist enthusiasm, but rather a subservience driven 
by the fear of reprisals, either professional or judiciary. By the end of 
1941, after the initial momentum of purging subsided, 150 French 
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administrators had been fired, with an equivalent number of locals.96 The 
process of indigenization itself was a byproduct of épuration in the sense 
that Decoux needed to replace French civil servants, but the numbers of 
Frenchmen replaced overall was simply not large enough to drive the 
process itself. That numbers of functionaries purged was low fit in with 
Decoux's objective of presenting the image of a united French bloc, for 
replacing significant portions of his civil servants due to suspected 
disloyalty would have exposed fissures to outsiders. In the end, lack of 
alternatives for resistance ensured most functionaries fell in line. By 
employing harsh rhetoric, Decoux also gave outsiders the impression that 
there would be no tolerance for dissent and thus, with relatively few 
convictions, the administration could pretend that it had the support of 
the functionary corps.
Though the GGI had to adhere, at least in part, to the 3 October 1940 
law promulgated in Vichy—known as the First Jewish Statute, which 
excluded Jews from the civil service—political views that aligned with the 
GGI trumped exclusionary laws emanating from the metropole whenever 
Decoux was able to build a case, particularly considering the difficulty in 
replacing administrators. The postwar tribunal admitted that Decoux 
often tried to circumvent Vichy’s exclusionary laws, keeping as many 
Jews and Freemasons in the administration (either by reclassifying them 
to avoid sanctions or pleading their cases directly to Vichy) and helping to 
find new positions in the private sector for those inevitably affected. 
Decoux claimed he had to implement the exclusionary policies or risk 
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compromising French authority in Indochina, since open dissent would 
have turned the Japanese against Hanoi, the entire Franco-Japanese 
relationship resting on the idea that the GGI was loyal to Vichy, as a legal 
entity.97  This justification is hardly plausible since there is no evidence 
that the Japanese cared one way or another about the fate of the Jews or 
the Freemasons and the refusal to implement exclusionary laws was 
hardly grounds for severing ties between colony and metropole. 
Moreover, Decoux had to comply with regulations, though, as discussed 
below, he   only did so when it fit his political purposes. One witness 
testified to Decoux’s belief that persecutions could only do harm to the 
French oeuvre as it threatened to tear apart the tight colonial community.98 
Though there may be some evidence to corroborate this statement, it is 
not so clear cut. If it were, how could the GGI have published a book 
calling democracy the reign of the “Jewish and métèques dynasties, at first 
hidden, then brought to light?”99 The regime’s rhetoric, including what it 
allowed to be published in periodicals, attests to an underlying anti-
Semitism that existed alongside pragmatism.
The First Jewish Statute was promulgated in Indochina on 5 
November 1940. Though Jennings and Sébastien Verney contend that 
this rapid implementation demonstrated the “flawless legislative 
continuity” between Hanoi and Vichy,100  telegrams show that Decoux 
rapidly seeking exceptions to the law, pointing to the GGI’s inability to 
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replace valuable members of the army and administration given 
Indochina’s situation.101  Jennings wonders how Decoux could have so 
zealously excluded Jews given that he was constantly bemoaning this lack 
of personnel.102  It seems, actually, that Decoux continued to telegram 
Vichy over the course of the war to spare Jews within the administration 
but, unable to win every battle, nevertheless had to let go 15 
functionaries, for whom he even insisted they continue to receive colonial 
remuneration.103 That is not to say that he tried to save all 15—he used 
the law to rid the administration of “troublesome elements”—but had he 
had his way, the number would have been lower.
There was some confusion within the administration as to who 
should be categorized as Jewish and therefore targeted. As examined in 
Chapter 2, Vichy law looked upon anyone as Jewish who had two Jewish 
grandparents and was married to a Jew or belonged to the Jewish 
religion. Since French civil records did not indicate religion (unlike 
German ones), the government identified anyone who belonged to the 
“Jewish community” as Jewish by race, though how this community was 
defined was left unclear, to the frustration of some administrators.104 
Decoux followed Vichy’s orders, informing his subordinates that Jews 
were no longer allowed to hold certain functionary positions as well as 
some liberal professions. The Admiral, however, made it a point to apply 
Article 8 of the 3 October law exempting anyone “having provided 
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exceptional services in the literary, scientific, or artistic domains.”105 It is 
on this basis that Decoux argued with Vichy for certain Jews to remain in 
their posts. He also pushed for certificats d’Aryen to be delivered to avoid 
complications posed by the law.106 Civil servants and military personnel 
had to give their word that they were not Jewish.107  This was hardly the 
most efficient way of implementing the law if one was seeking to cast the 
net as widely as possible. The 2 June 1941 law called for a census to be 
taken to count the Jewish population, with Jews needing to declare 
themselves to the authorities, but here too the administration had trouble 
establishing origins with absolute certainty.108  Though Decoux sent 
circular letters reminding his subordinates of the need to establish lists, 
the lack of significant follow up indicates this may have been nothing 
more than lip service.
Though some witnesses claimed that few Jews escaped the GGI’s 
exclusionary policies,109  the empirical numbers, backed up by numerous 
telegrams, simply don’t support this assertion.110 To repeat, only 15 Jews 
were affected by the law, some of whom Decoux fought unsuccessfully to 
maintain. It seems, however, that Decoux was influenced more by the 
ideological orientation of the person in question than by his racial or 
religious background. This was the determining factor for termination. 
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The example of Engineer Kaleski is telling. In 1941, Kaleski was hired by 
the newly created Importers Federation, drawing complaints from certain 
elements of the Saigon business community because he was Jewish. 
Decoux vouched for Kaleski’s competence for the job, but Vichy insisted 
that he be removed from the position because the Federation received 
0.3% of the value of the merchandise imported as royalty, thus making it, 
according to Vichy, a government subsidized entity, and justifying 
Kaleski’s removal. In spite of Decoux’s continued protests, the 
Commisariat général aux questions juives (CGQJ) in Vichy maintained that 
Kaleski should be fired. Even with the support of the Ministry of 
Colonies, Decoux was unable to reverse orders for Kaleski’s 
termination.111
Decoux understood that to maintain the loyalty of his administrators, 
it was necessary to increase remuneration levels for both French and local 
civil servants to minimize disgruntlement given soaring inflation, 
believing the rise in costs of living posed both social and political 
problems.112  He and the Ministry of Colonies agreed that it was 
important to keep small low-level local functionaries happy as their direct 
contact with the population was one of the government’s best sources of 
propaganda.113  On 9 February 1942, he informed Vichy that he planned 
to raise local functionary wages by 10% (with 144 and 72 piasters per 
annum minimum for cadres and subalterns respectively).114  In January 
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1944, he proposed a further 10% increase for both French and local 
administrators, though the former benefitted later that year from 
reclassifications and saw compensation rise from a range of 9,000-12,000 
to one of 12,000-70,000 Francs.115 The administration prided itself on the 
success the measures had on improving the lives of the salaried 
Indochinese populations, but later on one source from the de Gaulle 
government in Paris claimed that the loyalty of the functionaries had 
been “literally bought” through the pay increases, a conclusion that, 
albeit expressed cynically, was probably not far from Decoux’s original 
intentions since he had done the same with the mandarins.116  By 1944, 
inflation was so rampant that these increases in remuneration could not 
keep up with the rise in cost of living for functionaries on fixed salaries, 
particularly in Tonkin where they were often two to three times as high as 
in other parts of the colony (see Chapter 6).117 The inability to keep real 
wages from falling was inevitable given the disarray of the economy by 
this time.
Decoux also tried to ensure that local functionaries sought roles 
based on their competencies rather than compensation by rectifying 
inequalities of pay amongst Indochinese civil servants occupying the 
same hierarchical position within the administration. The Admiral 
identified a loophole, albeit anomalous, where some Indochinese 
functionaries received the same expatriate (for living outside their home 
country) or natality (based on the number of children) allowances as their 
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European counterparts, making some lower rank positions more 
attractive to locals than some of higher rank because they could receive 
more perquisites. The government realized that local degree holders 
sometimes preferred to accept employment based on these allowances, 
even if they could contribute more in another, higher position, 
threatening the effectiveness of the apparatus as a whole. Of course this 
was tied to the more serious problem of inequality of base pay for the 
same position for locals and (sometimes less qualified) Frenchmen.  For 
Decoux, addressing this issue was an important step toward improving 
the efficiency of the administrative machine and assuage the discontent of 
those who did not benefit from the system. Decoux rectified the problem, 
with the 16 November 1942 and 16 March 1943 decrees, by ensuring that 
all functionaries received the same compensation at the same hierarchical 
level (revised upward rather than downward), though Frenchmen would 
continue to benefit from expatriate and natality allowances and their local 
counterparts would not. Decoux saw this reform as an important step in 
facilitating access to the higher echelons of the administration to locals, 
particularly those coming from European-friendly educational 
institutions.118 
Decoux opened up administrative positions to locals that before were 
reserved for Frenchmen to make up for the retirement or deaths of 
European functionaries who could not be replaced. This was also a 
means of appearing more liberal through a willingness to cede some 
administrative power to the locals, a nice spillover effect. In his memoirs, 
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Decoux condemned the practice of reserving execution-intensive 
subaltern positions (such as clerical or secretarial jobs) to Frenchmen 
since locals could have held them with little inconvenience. During his 
proconsulship, Decoux saw the practice of excluding Indochinese peoples 
from certain posts as a danger for France’s prestige and sovereignty in the 
region, increasing discontent and betraying the image of France’s 
benevolent oeuvre in the region.119 In his view, the creation of local cadres 
would revaluate local diplomas and provide the necessary career outlets 
to mitigate the frustrations of the elite.120 This also had the potential to be 
a huge propaganda coup, demonstrating how there were tangible benefits 
to French tutelage, even though no matter how high the position, locals 
were excluded from real strategic decision-making. The number of 
Vietnamese occupying middle or high positions in the administration 
doubled from 1940 to 1944, which may have provided enough experience 
for the young Democratic Republic of Vietnam not to collapse in the 
years immediately following the war.121 That said, there was no intention 
of  giving locals control.
The indigenization of the administration was not in any sense 
equivalent to a sharing or transfer of power. Were Indochina not to have 
been isolated from Europe, and questionable functionaries replaced easily 
with loyal Pétainists, it is unlikely that Decoux would have been so keen 
to accelerate the opening of echelons to locals, though he made sure he 
turned the situation to his advantage through publicity. In early 1941, 
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Decoux asked Vichy to send young Frenchmen to fill midlevel positions, 
and given the difficulties already encountered, envisaged using locals as 
replacements on a trial basis.122 Once maritime traffic became unreliable, 
the Admiral tapped Indochina’s “inexhaustible supply of men” to fill the 
gaps, entrusting positions of management or execution to Indochinese. 
Though the French had to fill these administrative positions, they 
remained reluctant to move toward a more indirect administration which 
would have given the locals too much power and control over the region. 
Decoux wanted to rely more heavily on locals in the administration, but 
only insofar as the French government kept its power to act, direct, and 
above all control, at all levels. Though positions opened up to locals, 
Decoux wanted to ensure that the government employed “Europeans in 
positions of direction and control, [with] all other positions, of management 
and execution, being progressively entrusted to Indochinese,” meaning that 
the administration would have to hire more locals as worker bees but 
seldom if ever as policy-makers. The Admiral warned his immediate 
subordinates that the authorities would have to proceed with these 
reforms with caution, but that there was no other choice.123  The 
impossibility of replacing Europeans played in the locals’ favor, though 
Decoux used this demographic constraint to his political advantage by 
celebrating the efforts made by the GGI to open up the administration. 
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All in all, from 1940 to 1944, the number of Vietnamese occupying mid 
and high-level functionary positions doubled.124
Decoux positioned these reforms as part of France’s efforts and 
ability to build a better future for the region, proving that recent setbacks 
during the war were not going to slow the French oeuvre.125  Decoux 
claimed that by giving the Indochinese peoples a greater part in the 
administration, the region’s population would progress socially and 
materially as their exposure to European methods led them to abandon 
all that was toxic (according to the French) in traditions, rites, and 
customs, and were obstacles to the necessary evolution of the region.126 
Again, the French selected what was toxic and what was valuable, or 
even quaint, based not just on positivist European concepts, but on 
pragmatic grounds; clearly evolution could never entail equality, social or 
racial, because that would have gone against imperial structures. 
Decoux’s Maurrassism espoused tradition when it promoted hierarchy 
and order and colonial interests blended well with this ideology.127  Of 
course the locals could not be counted on to change by themselves and 
Decoux encouraged his Heads of ADLOC to mentor their Indochinese 
subordinates, so they in turn could train the functionaries under their 
orders. In what is a fit encapsulation of the white man’s burden, he 
explained the French had to develop their local employees since the latter 
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“generally [did] not find, neither in the family nor in the environment in 
which he live[d], any person able to counsel or guide him and above all 
encourage him.”128  Again, Decoux targeted the youth to accelerate the 
generational divide that would ensure a future Indochinese Federation 
that embraced France and its values.
Through its propaganda machine, the authorities made use of the 
press to salute its own efforts. It commended “the culture that France 
intend[ed] to give the young Indochinese. . .[helping them] affirm [their] 
personality [and] work[ing] toward the interpenetration of [the] two 
civilizations." They claimed that through "access by the Indochinese to 
liberal careers and administrative functions. . .little by little cadres 
[would] develop and collaboration [would] make its way toward total 
realization.”129  The administration’s actions, wrote one author, followed 
”the notion of reward for those whose loyalty resisted hardships [and] 
follow[ed] above all the call of Franco-Annamite collaboration for a 
participation always more confident of the Indochinese elite in the 
common work.”130 This collaboration, the authorities contended, was the 
basis of the Indochinese Union, and would “reconcile and blend, in the 
hearth of the common interest, individual antagonisms and local 
particularisms to give a vigorous personality to the constituted 
collectivity.”131 Though the French tried to turn a difficult situation into a 
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propaganda coup, the ethnic harmony between Europeans and locals 
they pretended to foster never realized.132
The Federal Council
Before the 8 November 1940 decree suspended elected bodies, 
Indochinese assemblies in each protectorate pays (Tonkin, Annam, 
Cambodia, and Laos) consisted of a French and an indigenous council, a 
dual structure created in 1913 by Sarraut. A French Council of Economic 
and Financial Interests was, depending on the pays, composed of nine to 
20 members elected by limited suffrage, responsible for providing advice 
and insights on local budgets. With a permanent commission, these 
assemblies met annually. The local councils, called Chamber of 
Representatives of the People, counted 40 to 120 members, some of 
which were elected by political and business elites, and the rest simply 
nominated by the authorities. They had similar responsibilities as the 
French council. Provincial councils existed in Tonkin, Annam, and 
Cambodia and were responsible for provincial budgets. In Tonkin, they 
were composed of Frenchmen appointed by the government and 
Vietnamese mandarins elected by restricted segments of the population. 
The administration also appointed members of the elite from the ethnic 
minorities to sit on the council. In Annam, the provincial councils were 
exclusively composed of Indochinese, partly elected, partly nominated 
(including those from ethnic minorities). In Cambodia, most of the 
members were elected. In Cochinchina, the only colony in Indochina, 
councils were modeled on French structures and predated the other pays’ 
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councils. The Colonial council, established in 1880, was comprised of 10 
Frenchmen (elected through universal suffrage) and 10 locals (elected 
through limited suffrage). Its public sessions were broader, deliberating on 
budgets and powerful enough to make taxation and spending decisions. 
Cochinchina’s provincial councils, dating from 1889 and composed of 
elected Vietnamese and appointed Frenchmen, met twice a year to 
deliberate on provincial budgets.133
The Indochinese Federal Council (IFC) and later the Grand Federal 
Council (GFC) were the new formal structures that Decoux felt he 
needed  to develop the Indochinese federal consciousness simultaneously 
with the elevation of the elite. Rather than a legislative or executive body, 
the Federal Council in both its forms (FC) was a body constituted of non-
elected elites who gave their opinions to the Governor General to assist 
him in his decision-making, and served as a forum to strengthen the 
relations between these elites and the authorities. Officially, its role was 
“to enlighten the Head of the Federation on the aspirations and needs of 
the inhabitants of Indochina,” though Decoux had no obligation to act 
upon anything that was said during its sessions.134  Suspicious of 
democratic institutions, Decoux leaned on laws passed by Vichy to justify 
the creation of this consultative corps that deliberated questions 
submitted by the GGI.135 Decoux envisioned the FC as a corporatist body 
(See Chapter 6 for Decoux’s corporatist ambitions in economic spheres), 
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nominating its members himself and Ralph Smith suggests that sitting on 
the FC was no more than a means to reward those who had supported 
Decoux’s policies, which would be consistent with Decoux’s policies in 
other administrative areas.136 The road to an Indochinese Federation was 
paved with material rewards.
The IFC met twice a year until the creation of the GFC and its 
inaugural session was held on 3 December 1941. Though the IFC and the 
GFC differed in size and national representation, they were both mere 
consultative, non-democratic bodies designed to tighten relations between 
the authorities and the elite, while strengthening ties between French 
Indochina’s elite. The GFC was composed of 25 members—all 
Indochinese and chosen for their expediency in public affairs and for their 
loyalty—and was intended to play up the links that existed between the 
different pays of the union. Decoux compared it to Vichy’s Conseil national 
insofar as it maintained contact between the government and the 
intellectual elite. Drawing from the discourse of the National Revolution, 
the Admiral suspended elected bodies and stressed that the IFC 
represented the end of parliamentary institutions and its “sterile 
discussions.”137  The GFC replaced the IFC in 1943 by introducing 23 
French representatives, appointed by the government, from the 
economy’s principal sectors, making it, according to Decoux, more 
representative of the social and economic activities in Indochinese and 
more able to concretize the spirit of collaboration that he sought. He 
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added five local members to the total, ensuring that the Indochinese 
presence outnumbered the European and hoping this would reverse the 
reluctance of the locals to believe in the genuineness of the politics of 
collaboration. In addition, he certainly wanted to show the outside world 
he was making gestures of goodwill toward the Indochinese peoples since 
he and his entourage were aware of (probably through BBC radio) 
Roosevelt’s public statement that maintaining French sovereignty in 
Indochina was not a principal objective of the US.138 This too fell in line 
with Decoux’s constant hedging, doing just enough to please Vichy, 
Japan, and the Americans (by addressing their concerns for more local 
involvement) to make sure that France retained possession of Indochina 
in the postwar era, and conveniently, not so much that he didn’t have 
room to be exonerated.
Built along corporatist lines, the FC brought together members of the 
elite based on social or economic activities (hence the justification of 
bringing in French representatives for the GFC), in numeric proportion to 
the importance to the colony (for instance, the agricultural sector was 
most heavily represented).139 This was meant to offer “a harmonious and 
accurate picture of the Federation,” particularly within the GFC, which 
united French and Indochinese elites and, according to Decoux, was the 
“symbol of Franco-Indochinese collaboration.”140  This corporatism was 
faithful to Maurrassian principles of social hierarchy and groupings, 
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emphasizing authority over liberal principles (see Chapters 3 and 6). 
Chairing the council like a true proconsul, Decoux created a mechanism 
in which opinions were valued not by the number of votes behind them, 
but the value of the judgements, textbook Maurrassism. Further stamping 
his authority on the body and expunging any doubt as to its true nature, 
the Governor General admitted he wanted the social and economic elite 
to come to a synthesis of expressed viewpoints, not decisions based on a 
system of votes respective of the divergences of opinion.141  Juxtaposing 
this systemic squashing of debate with the material rewards gained from 
serving loyally on the council, the FC’s usefulness came from the 
gratitude of the subservient elite: Decoux must have counted on the 
members to carry out the work of the administration by influencing their 
respective constituents out of desire to maintain their prestigious place on 
the council.
In the Maurrassian tradition of rejecting democracy, Decoux saw the 
elimination of the voting process—both electoral and decision-making 
means—as means to reinforce the elite, not through actual but perceived 
power. Freed from electoral preoccupations, the Admiral claimed, 
members would be free from dealings and schemes from which some had 
supposedly benefitted in the past, though this forcibly strengthened their 
dependence on the whims of the GGI.142 The FC was supposed to return 
to the essential principles of strongly organized societies: discipline, 
authority, responsibility, realizing a Pétainist dictum that could have been 
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written by Maurras and his royalist counterparts, “a small number 
counsel, a few command, one Chief governs.”143 The Governor General 
explained that by associating—which does not entail inclusion—the elite 
with the policy-making process, he would be able to strengthen ties with 
the diverse elements of the population and reach “just and enlightened” 
decisions.144  In addition, he believed that by working together, 
Indochina’s elite would bolster their own relations, contributing 
developing the “community of spiritual and material interests” that 
existed between the five pays of  the union.145
The French authorities wanted to create a forum in which 
Indochina’s elite146  could collaborate closely with the government and 
one another to develop the spirit of federal consciousness that Decoux 
believed was essential to preserving French sovereignty in the region.147 
Doctor Nguyen Van Thinh, a member of the elite whose loyalty to the 
government was exemplary, summarized Decoux’s intentions when he 
asserted “Indochina will have to form a bloc and any distinction between 
[pays] will have to be banished from the Indochinese Federal 
Council. . .Collaboration between the different pays of the Union is 
proving to be necessary and it is probably toward this goal that the efforts 
of the [IFC] will be directed.”148  Of course this or any other member 
could not have said anything different lest he lose his privileges and this 
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subservient relationship must have been looked upon with derision by the 
locals, perhaps weakening the overall effort to instill this federal 
consciousness. In addition, the general perception was that the FC had no 
real power to make policy, and if it represented a structure for the 
federalism that Decoux intended to foster, it could not have escaped the 
population that the French authorities were far from magnanimous and 
perhaps they would be better off if the US did not return the colony to 
France after the war. This did not stop the Admiral from comparing the 
FC and the federalism it embodied with the traditional familial spirit 
respectful of order, age, wisdom, and opposed to individualism 
(incarnated by democracy), convinced as he was that this approach was 
bound to succeed in Indochina. With France as the keystone of this 
union, the Indochinese were told, the colony would transcend the 
difficulties of the war and, in the typical discourse of the mission 
civilisatrice, take a step forward into modernity thanks to the continued 
endeavors of the French oeuvre. Vu Ngoc Hoanh, the Federal Council’s 
eldest member, encapsulated the spirit that Decoux hoped to imbibe, and 
which now resonates so hollow given the history that followed, during the 
opening session of the GFC, in December 1943: “I hope that this union 
taken in the literal sense will be, under the aegis of noble France, a fecund 
and fraternal union and that the relations between the French, Annamite, 
Cambodians, Laotians, will be those of citizens of a same people united 
by indissoluble ties in hardship as in prosperity.”149
Youth and Sports
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While the Légion targeted Frenchmen—to indoctrinate at best, to 
ensure discipline at worst—the GGI also created or refined organizations 
to glorify the French oeuvre within the Indochinese communities. As with 
everything it endeavored in Indochina, the administration’s first goal was 
to legitimize its continued presence in the eyes of the locals by stressing 
the benefits of French colonialism and the new ideological direction of 
the state. Decoux stressed the importance of youth and sports 
organizations to inculcate the spirit of federalism and allegiance to the 
Union while exalting French contributions to the region and channeling 
possible hostile energy toward nonpolitical activities. Given Anne Raffin’s 
contributions to the understanding of youth mobilization and sports 
under Decoux’s regime, this section will focus on how the government 
wanted to use these organizations to glorify France, nurture the federalist 
spirit, and win the loyalty of  the local peoples.
Youth and sports organizations already existed in Indochina at the 
outbreak of war, with tens of thousands of members in scouts, Catholic 
groups, or sports associations. Agathe Larcher-Goscha has written on 
twentieth century Vietnam’s relaxing of the traditional Confucian’s 
disdain for physical exploits and its almost complete emphasis on 
intellectual achievements. The notion that those seeking physical culture 
did so only because they were incapable of succeeding as a lettré gave way 
to the consideration that individual athletic performance and care of the 
body was part of an overall morality seeking the perfection of the self.150 
After the Yen Bai and Nghê Tinh uprisings (1930-1931), Governor 
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General Pasquier wanted to steer the youth away from revolutionary 
temptations by providing them with activities and direction that secured a 
“proper” moral grounding. The first boy scout sections appeared in 
Tonkin in 1930, brimming with conservative and traditional values. The 
scout sub-units were named after the five Confucian virtues and the boys 
addressed their leader as “mister first notable.”151 Confronted with social 
skepticism regarding the value of outdoor activities as means to develop 
character, the French authorities were not as successful as they hoped in 
rallying members. During the late 1930s scouting expanded to public 
schools (up until then it had been practiced exclusively in private schools) 
and the Popular Front continued to promote youth and sports 
organizations, though its record remained mixed.152
Decoux claimed that the lack of inroads in making youth and sports 
organizations a central part of local lives under the Republic was due to 
the lack of experience and dynamism within the French leadership, and 
defeat (with the subsequent advent of Pétainism) allowed the 
administration to start from scratch. The Admiral was convinced that the 
principles of the National Revolution would resonate within the 
Indochinese communities by steering the youth away from selfishness and 
skepticism toward social groupings and the revival of tradition.153  He 
believed that nothing could cement federal unity better than physical 
education and sport, which offered the youth a common ideal, the cult of 
virile effort and human improvement through physical work. To achieve 
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this goal, the GGI created the Commissariat général à l’éducation physique et 
aux sports, under the direction of Commander Maurice Ducoroy. The 
Commissariat was responsible for providing formal general physical 
education, organizing outdoor events and activities, and equipping the 
population with the means to practice sports, from stadiums and pools to 
equipment. One of the Commissariat’s principal objectives was the 
development of a spirit of unity and discipline, part of which would be 
fostered through ritualization, including processions, chants, and salutes. 
Decoux was certain that to overcome “the skeptical smiles of the blasés” 
he needed the strong leadership that did not exist under the previous 
regime, to guide the Indochinese peoples toward modernity, abandoning 
those elements of the past that held the cultures back, an encapsulation of 
his vision for a Federal Indochina and its place on the continuum of 
progress.154
The administration pushed sport as the means to uplift the peoples of 
Indochina by nurturing a taste for teamwork and discipline. It was hoped 
physical education would create healthy men able to contribute positively 
to their country, one of the main principles behind Decoux’s vision of the 
National Revolution: “Let us be strong so we can serve” was the 
dictum.155  Decoux asked the youth of Indochina to follow him like 
Pétain had asked the youth of France. The Admiral called on them to 
have one common soul, to pursue one common goal: the grandeur of 
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France and Indochina.156 The weekly Sports d’Indochine printed sayings in 
both French and Vietnamese glorifying those who committed themselves 
to the pursuit of strength, unity, and work.157  The youth took part in 
processions meant to instill this sense of discipline and order through acts 
of group participation. By carrying out quotidian orchestrated maneuvers 
resembling those of armed forces, the French administration wanted to 
cultivate a spirit of obedience and exaltation of France, its oeuvre, and the 
federalist consciousness that was so vital in the Governor General’s eyes 
to preserving French presence in the region.
Cultivating a morality that fit the political needs of the 
administration, particularly in its struggle against nationalism, was a 
defining impetus of the sports and youth movements. Like their 
counterparts in the metropole, the French administration saw an 
interdependence of physique and morality, a means to fight rebellious 
natures.158  Decoux blamed the previous regime for leaving young 
generations “defenseless to every propaganda,” which is ironic given his 
desire to reach the youth while its minds were still malleable. Nothing 
had been done before 1940, he believed, to bring the youth of the colony 
to the French cause and the Admiral called upon his administration to 
form their civic consciousness and give them a sense of their social duties, 
as defined by the French.159  This consciousness was to be developed 
through the “sporting spirit," which fostered in turn “the love of 
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disinterested effort, that [was] according to the words of Marshal Pétain, 
‘the essential part of the dignity and the efficacy of man,’ [and] also the 
equality of all, politeness, loyalty, and honor.” To these virtues were 
added social qualities: “the sense of discipline and the submission to the 
rules of the game.”160  The administration believed that if the youth 
learned to practice new sports, they would learn to respect its rules, and 
this appreciation for discipline would lead them to follow the rules of the 
colonial order. Sport became an alternative to anti-French activities and a 
tool to supervise the youth by making it more obedient and less 
susceptible to revolutionary discourses. By changing the locals’ daily 
activities, the GGI sought to channel energies away from political 
activities and reinforce the culture of  rules.
The administration was especially conscious of the importance of 
rallying young men and women, whose minds they believed to be still 
malleable (and thus also prey to the Communists), but it made sure to 
provide the adult Indochinese population with opportunities to learn 
about and practice physical activities. Decoux wanted to avoid an 
“immobile,” albeit enthusiastic, crowd of spectators and called on 
everyone to practice sport.161  Sports d’Indochine published regular articles 
explaining the rules of sports and activities such as Basque pelote and 
basketball and provided tips on how to swim the breast stroke or row 
more effectively. To facilitate the practice of sport for the youth, the 
government coordinated with teachers in propaganda campaigns, 
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provided stipends to exceptional student-athletes, and made school hours 
more flexible to encourage participation, and it engaged in similar 
policies with adults, providing work breaks and early dismissals in the 
public sector to encourage more physical exercise.162 By maximizing the 
number of Indochinese participating in team or individual sports, the 
population would learn, it was hoped, not only docility, but also witness 
first hand the oeuvre of French colonialism every time it competed in a 
newly constructed stadium or a freshly dug pool. Even the mere act of 
engaging in a physical activity of Western origin was supposed to 
promote a shift of consciousness and an attachment to French culture. 
Decoux hoped to continue to break the traditional Confucian mentalities 
and thus bring the peoples of Indochina closer to France through their 
engagement in daily activities. Decoux’s approach was no different from 
that of that of Nazi Germany with the Hitler Youth or late nineteenth-
century France with Jules Ferry’s universal education: inculcate the 
regime’s values to the youth to create a generational fissure, accelerating 
certain cultural shifts to supersede the paradigms that preceded it as the 
parents are displaced physically and professionally by their children. As 
discussed above, during the twentieth century the French had sought to 
rejuvenate and modernize the mandarin, notable, and functionary corps 
by rewarding those who had been exposed to Western-style education 
(and therefore values). Decoux’s promotion of youth organizations and 
sport was a similar endeavor, widening the net since physical and outdoor 
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activities were at everyone’s reach no matter the personal attributes 
(unlike education which is selective at higher levels).
The GGI believed that promoting outdoor and sporting activities 
within specifically French organizations was a critical tool in its struggle 
with the Japanese for the hearts and minds of the locals (see Chapter 4). 
Defeated on the battlefield in the metropole, coerced into allowing 
foreign troops station in the colony, all that the French retained, Ducoroy 
explained, was “a moral force and the glorious past of [their] country.”163 
Fearing the spread of anti-French propaganda, the administration was 
keen to attract the youth to its organizations quickly, before the Japanese 
had a chance to do the same.164 Youth movements and physical activity 
were channels through which the French could inculcate their values and 
nurture the locals’ allegiance to the European power. Sport encouraged 
contact across all social layers between French and Indochinese peoples, 
helping to forge a collective consciousness that, it was hoped, would unite 
colonizer and colonized and weaken the Japanese influence.165 Spectacles 
drew Frenchmen and locals alike in the celebration of France, its flag, 
and its culture, while in parallel promoting the local patriotisms upon 
which the Indochinese Federation was to be built.166 This was a clear case 
of trying to get to the locals before the pan-Asianist propaganda of the 
Japanese had a chance to take root among the population. As discussed 
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above, Decoux understood the risks that nurturing local patriotisms posed 
for the colonists, risks that sentiments turn nationalist and anti-French. 
The National Revolution—with its stress on order, hierarchy, and tutelage 
of certain peoples as a natural law—was the vehicle with which to 
channel any potentially xenophobic sentiments. Sporting events were the 
celebration of accomplished participants (athletes) in activities in which 
the government pushed the entire population to participate. The 
promotion of local patriotisms in sport was not seen as contradictory to 
French interests because it was done within the context of the National 
Revolution, reinforcing its values rather than fomenting discord.
The cycling Tour of Indochina and the passage of the Olympic flame 
were two events that illustrate how youth and sports organizations fit into 
the federal project, layering Indochinese unity with the promotion of 
French values and the development of local patriotisms. These tours took 
events of European origin to the four corners of the colony, encouraging 
local pride through the media’s focus on one city or commune—the focus 
of the entire colony for a day—while the event progressed on its journey. 
The first tour of Indochina, modeled after the Tour de France, ran 4,100 
kilometers in January 1943, departing from the “Sports Jeunesse” 
pavilion at the Foire de Saigon. Every major publication covered the event, 
featuring each of the 25 cities in which the cyclists arrived. For instance, 
readers learned how the imperial couple greeted the cyclists in Hue as the 
Marseillaise resounded and the French and Annamite flags flew alongside. 
More than a sporting event, Ducoroy wanted it to symbolize the virile 
qualities of willpower, energy, and perseverance, a demonstration of “the 
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spirit of teamwork, in mutual friendship, without distinctions of social 
class, religion, race, the strongest helping the weakest,” a less than subtle 
allusion to the perception of the federal relationship the administration 
sought to encourage, one built on social and cultural hierarchies but also 
solidarity, exalting French tutelage of the Indochinese peoples and even 
the Vietnamese tutelage of  the Khmer and Lao.167
The travels of the Olympic flame, from the borders of Thailand to 
Tonkin, equally sought to unite Indochina through European symbols 
while strengthening national and local identities. Lit by the King of 
Cambodia on 19 November 1941 in the ruins of Angkor, the flame was 
carried by young men and women through every provincial capital of 
Cochinchina and Annam, where sporting events were organized upon its 
arrival. Two weeks after leaving Angkor, it reached Hanoi with great 
festivities, under the eye of the Governor General. Not shying from 
assuming promethean qualities, the French explained they brought the 
torch to the colony as a representation of energy and faith, even a symbol 
of youth as the torch passed from one hand to the other, as one 
generation passes on to another.168  The flame represented the nascent 
sporting spirit and along the roads where curious onlookers who 
witnessed the athletes pass the torch on to one another, French 
administrative personnel recruited new members into organizations and 
spoke of the plans to build sporting facilities. Thus the flame was to begin 
a new era in Indochina, bringing sport to the service of national 
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renovation, by showcasing the power of French organization and 
construction.169
Conclusion
Decoux recognized that winning the hearts and minds of the 
Indochinese populations meant reconciling the past and the future of the 
French oeuvre, building on themes developed under the Republic and 
looking toward what was assured to be brighter days, so long as the 
region remained under French tutelage. The Federal project, an idea born 
at the end of the nineteenth century and developed during the 1920s and 
1930s, promised to draw on the strengths of the colony’s five pays, 
through solidarity and economic ties, with France as the cement that not 
only held the union together, but gifted parts of its civilization to bring 
progress. There is a continuity in the colonial discourse thats stretches 
from Jules Ferry to de Lannesan to Pasquier to Decoux, one that seeks to 
bring the light of the West to Indochina, importing concepts of 
modernity to the region in sufficient doses to eradicate the negative 
aspects of traditions deemed toxic by the Europeans. Decoux’s notion of 
an Indochinese Federation differed little from those of his predecessors, 
though the presence of Japanese troops in the colony forced the GGI to 
up the ante to demonstrate the legitimacy of the Union with France as 
the keystone. Moreover, Indochina’s economic isolation forced the 
Admiral to push themes of solidarity between countries (ones solidified 
by a colonial federalism), not segregated through the conjuration of 
folkloric pasts.
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Where Pasquier had evoked “the ponds where lotuses die,” Decoux’s 
appeal to tradition rested on what the French perceived as the 
hierarchical characteristics of Indochinese cultures to elevate the prestige 
of the elite whose loyalty he believed to be crucial to controlling the 
populations. Republican Governors General since Lanessan had 
recognized the importance of maintaing a strong elite to administer 
effectively in spite of emasculated sovereigns and Decoux’s policies 
signified no break with the pre-Vichy past. The discourse of the National 
Revolution that sought a return to a lost tradition in France found no real 
echo in Indochina, whose industrial base was too negligible to spur the 
“destructive individualism” (with the consequent loss of tradition) that 
Pétain blamed on capitalist liberalism. Decoux’s appeal to Indochinese 
tradition made use of the same terms as that of Pétain—social hierarchy, 
natural groupings, the family—and were consistent with the Maurrassism 
that influenced him, but the Admiral sought to strengthen an existing 
system of elites rather than engineer national recovery and renewal. 
Maurrassism itself was not relevant in the colony for it addressed issues 
that were typical to France, but Decoux could not escape his common 
worldview with Action française. This led him to utilize the discourse of 
the National Revolution as the vehicle with which to enact reforms—such 
as the reinforcement of the structures of the mandarins upon which his 
government depended to maintain French sovereignty—that he hoped 
would fulfill his mission to retain Indochina as a French colony. His 
glorification of tradition was a means to reverse the erosion of the 
authority of the mandarins and the sovereigns, not a call to overhaul 
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s o c i e t y a n d r e t u r n i t t o a p r e - Re vo l u t i o n a r y p a s t a s 
happened,theoretically,  under Vichy.
There was no true break between the policies of the Decoux 
administration and those of the Third Republic, only an acceleration in 
their implementation, from the preservation of local traditions to the 
restoration of the elite to the building of roads (and in the case of youth 
and sports it was a drastic, but not revolutionary, one). Like his 
republican predecessors, Decoux sought to position France as the 
keystone of the Union, promising a better future through the 
continuation of the French oeuvre and threatening disaster should locals 
seek to sever these ties. This meant that the GGI could not fully 
implement Vichy’s exclusionary laws targeting Jews under the risk of 
increasing racial tensions in the colony (not to mention the impossibility 
of finding competent replacements). Decoux opened the administration 
to locals and reengineered the councils for propagandistic and pragmatic 
reasons. Openly calling for more opportunities and a greater voice for the 
indigenous peoples, he found ways to compensate for lack of personnel 
and to forge relationships between locals to strengthen the federal 
consciousness. 
Christopher Goscha’s work shows how the colonial authorities had 
been working toward an Indochinese Federation since the turn of the 
century, bringing locals into the administration—in particular Vietnamese 
who also served in Laos and Cambodia. Decoux’s regime did not depart 
from these policies but he publicized the opening of the administration as 
proof of France’s willingness to give locals more control, even though he 
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intended them to hold positions with no strategic decision-making 
responsibilities. Similarly, the Federal Council that he created had no real 
power yet it was positioned as a step forward toward federalism and the 
elevation of the elite. At all levels of civil service or councils, Decoux 
ensured loyalty through recruitment criteria that favored those who had 
received European education and direct nominations were a 
straightforward way in which to reward obedience. Lastly, Decoux 
resorted to increases in remunerations to maximize allegiance, often 
unsuccessfully keeping up with inflation. 
The government saw in youth and sports organizations a way to 
supervise Indochinese boys and girls and channel their energies away 
from nationalist movements and toward a spirit of solidarity and 
federalism.170  Through regimentation, the practice of sport, and the 
elevation of the cult of virility, the French went against traditional 
Confucian values and glorified the salvation of the nation: a collective 
spirit of discipline to be achieved through outdoor activities. Physical 
education was to be a means through which Indochinese peoples opened 
themselves to Western values and participated in events, spectacles, and a 
culture that reinforced the idea behind the Federal Union. Anne Raffin 
suggests that the regimentalization of these groupings—on which 
Decoux counted to instill values of loyalty, discipline, and allegiance—
contributed to the militaristic and state-building projects of Sihanouk and 
Ngo Dinh Diem on the one hand, and offered existing and complex 
networks through which the Viet Minh were able to reach the youths on 
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the other. Raffin contends that the structures created by the French 
provided a platform for resistance through the efficiency of the 
organizations’ networks, which, in conjunction with the development of 
national consciousness, provided a springboard toward independence.171 
This may be the most immediate and important consequence of the 
development of the youth and sports organizations. Any influence the 
sports and youth organizations had through changes in daily activities on 
the acceptance of Western values was not such that it strengthened locals’ 
attachments to France. The generational fissure that the National 
Revolution tried to accelerate did not materialize, not least due to lack of 
time, but at the basis of Decoux’s policy was the belief that locals’ 
energies could be channeled through Pétainist doctrine. Outdoor 
activities were the physical manifestation of these values, existing 
symbiotically with the moral regeneration that was promoted through 
sport and other means. Whatever cultural and spiritual changes occurred, 
they ultimately did not serve to strengthen bonds with France, pointing to 
a failure of  the Decoux regime.
For Decoux, the development of a federal consciousness was key to 
winning the hearts and minds of the local populations, but his record—
and therefore that of the entire French colonial effort—was mixed at best. 
After the Japanese coup de force of March 1945, there was little lingering 
sentiment among the Indochinese peoples in the value of the Union and 
France as the cement that held it together.  According to David Marr, the 
weeks following the overthrow of the French were savored and 
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communicated widely among the Vietnamese and the government of 
Tran Trong Kim, picked as Head of the Royal Cabinet, immediately used 
the Vietnamese rather than French language in official communication.172 
Even when the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) transformed into the 
Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP), its central committee outlined a 
common political and economic platform as a basis for a unified 
Indochinese socialist entity, underscoring a solidarity—or opportunism—
with its Lao and Cambodian neighbors, whose “revolutionary 
development” was seen as lagging. In 1951, the Party still advocated the 
fusion of the three revolutionary parties into the “Party of a Vietnamese, 
Cambodian, and Laotian Federation.” Goscha points out how closely the 
Vietnamese communist discourse on Indochina resembles that of the 
Indochinese Federations of republican, Vichy, and postwar French 
colonials, though the desire for association was linked to a tangible 
Vietnamese military strategy against the French, permitting them to move 
soldiers and supplies while stretching the European forces.173 
For the Lao and the Cambodians, years of Vietnamese immigration 
(and the perceived control of the Vietnamese over their political affairs) 
turned local nationalisms not against the French, who shared goal of 
seeking a return of the lands ceded to Thailand, but against the 
Vietnamese, as evidenced by anti-Annamite demonstrations appearing as 
early as mid-1945.174 Unlike in Vietnam, where Bao Dai abdicated on 25 
August 1945, Khmer and Lao sovereigns were maintained, which shaped 
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the independence movements. Sihanouk may have been marginalized by 
Son Ngoc Thanh in October 1945, but he remained the nominal Head of 
state, effectively chosen by the French. Sisavang Vong of Laos renewed 
ties with the French as early as 1945, but his cousins Phetsarath and 
Souphanouvong created the independentist Lao Issara movement. In the 
end, whatever the successes and failures of the Lao and Cambodian 
revolutionary parties, their futures were linked to the Viet Minh because 
they were in no position to defeat their colonial masters alone, but there 
was never a ubiquitously accepted association with their Vietnamese 
counterparts, certainly not long-lasting and drenched in a common ideal. 
France’s federal project, so dear to republican and Vichy administrators, 
never won the hearts and minds of the Indochinese peoples, but rather 
laid a common experience which continued through thirty years of  war.
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Chapter VI: The Economic Front
After overcoming the deep economic crisis of the early 1930s, 
Indochina presented a healthy yet underdeveloped economy when war 
broke out in Europe, one based almost exclusively on what it could grow 
from its soil or extract from the earth. The region depended on the export 
of its agricultural products and mineral resources to fund the import of 
finished or semifinished goods that its nascent industry could not produce 
in sufficient quantities. Trade with the metropole made up half of the 
colony’s activity (45% of its exports and 50% of its imports) and a system 
of protective barriers ensured that the French goods dominated the local 
market. The armistice of June 1940 cut Indochina off from France (as 
relations with Great Britain soured and traffic was first hindered and later 
stopped entirely with the start of the War in the Pacific), forcing it to 
reorganize its economy based on its geographic situation and seek 
commercial partners in Asia. The signing on 6 May 1941 of trade 
agreement between Tokyo and Vichy formalized the inevitable; Japan’s 
military domination of the region meant Hanoi had to turn to the Land 
of the Rising Sun to provide it with products it could not manufacture 
locally, in exchange for agricultural goods. 
The Franco-Japanese trade agreement theoretically opened a market 
for Indochinese rice, corn, coal, and minerals while providing the French 
colony with Japanese finished goods. Indochina continued to trade with 
Australia and the United States early on, though always under the 
watchful eye of the Japanese locally and the German occupation 
authorities back in the metropole. However, these relationships stopped 
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after the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the situation worsened over the 
course of the war: while Japan’s expansion progressed in Southeast Asia, 
its need for Indochinese raw materials diminished (leading to fewer 
exports of finished goods from the French colony) and conversely as the 
United States reconquered territories occupied by Tokyo, its navy sunk 
enemy merchant ships so that already by the second half of 1942, 
Indochinese rice and rubber destined for Japan remained stocked in 
Saigon for months before they could be loaded on boats.1  Rice never 
reached Japan in sufficient quantities to meet the quotas stipulated by the 
agreement for 1941 and 1942. In 1943 only a small fraction of the 
950,000 tons that were earmarked was ever loaded on ships as maritime 
exchanges with Japan ceased during the second half of that year. 
Commercial trade was practically nonexistent in 1944 and 1945.2
Disruptions in transport (international and local) led to problems in 
supply and distribution, while the scarcity of goods meant rationing, 
inflation, and the rise of the black market. The government intervened in 
the economy to stimulate the production of goods needed to replace 
those no longer imported while decreasing activity in sectors whose 
products were no longer exported or consumed domestically. The end of 
exports meant the encouragement of Indochinese artisan economy, or 
artisanat, which contributed significantly to the production of goods for 
consumption as well as for the industrial sector. The government also 
redirected resources toward the creation of a substitution economy, 
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critical for the manufacturing process and the day-to-day needs of the 
population; for instance, the distillation of dehydrated alcohol replaced 
imported fuel.3 Free from demands to justify expenses to Paris, Decoux’s 
regime undertook infrastructural improvements (Grands travaux) on an 
unprecedented scale: never before had the French built and spent so much 
on public works, linking the different regions of the colony with roads, 
bridges, and other projects encouraging exchanges. In Decoux’s designs 
to win the hearts and minds of the populations of Indochina, the Grands 
travaux played an integral part in demonstrating the magnanimity of 
France and building the federal interdependence of the Union.4  In his 
book Peasants into Frenchmen, Eugen Weber discussed how the 
development of infrastructure in the 1870s and 1880s broke down the 
autarky and inertia of certain isolated peasant communes in France.5 
Only a few decades later, the French government implemented similar 
policies 12,000 kilometers away, and though the Indochinese context may 
have differed, the works completed in France shaped the mentalities in 
the colonies.
The GGI effected these changes with corporatist principles in mind 
based on the economic and social laws passed in Vichy, but adapted to 
the realities of Indochina. Straying little from the Maurrassian path, 
Decoux publicly proclaimed professional groupings the antidote for the 
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on the common interests of their trade. During the inaugural session of 
the Indochinese Economic Council, Decoux called upon corporatist 
groupings to form in order to replace diversity and the opposition of 
private interests.6 Pragmatically, Decoux saw professional groupings as a 
means to direct the economy with greater efficiency and while the 
government realigned its economy based on the metropolitan model (as 
he was instructed), the Admiral sought semiautonomy from France to 
make decisions based on the particular context of Indochina, particularly 
given the region’s small industrial base. Decoux understood the need to 
minimize the proliferation of monopolies and to assuage the potential 
mistrust of the peasantry, while adding to the narrative of the benefits of 
French tutelage.7
Indochina’s isolation posed significant challenges to the GGI’s ability 
to retain some sort of legitimacy in the eyes of the local peoples based on 
its management of the economy. While defeat in Europe and concessions 
to the Japanese eroded France’s prestige, the authorities had to take 
necessary action to provide the population with basic goods and food, 
which meant redeploying resources to face the autarky in which the 
colony was placed. Intelligence reports repeatedly related the local 
population’s concern with its day to day survival and the Tonkinese 
famine of the winter of 1944-1945 played a central role in preparing the 
populace for the Revolution of August 1945. From the beginning of his 
proconsulship Decoux was aware of the likelihood of food shortages in 
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some regions and by the end the administration was powerless to grow or 
transport enough food to meet even minimal demand. Supplying the 
population with sustenance was more than a humanitarian issue for the 
colonists, it was a matter on which their continued presence in the region 
depended.
While the colonial authorities were forced to accept the trade 
agreement with Japan, during the early months of the war they had 
unprecedented freedom from the metropole to reorganize the economy to 
meet demand. The Grands travaux so dear to Decoux were designed to 
move goods across the region, but also manifested the continuation of the 
French oeuvre in the colony and served to further the government’s 
ambitions to build an Indochinese Federation. Since economic policy-
making is indissociable from ideology, Decoux’s worldview marked his 
government’s efforts in the matter and his implementation of corporatist 
principles to address the Indochinese conditions often went against Vichy 
policy. This chapter will examine the colonial authorities’ reorganization 
of the economy to face the challenges of autarky and further entrench the 
region in federalist structures under French tutelage.
The Japanese Economic Agreements and the Impact of  Economic 
Isolation
With an overwhelmingly large portion of its economy dedicated to 
the agricultural sector, Indochina relied heavily on trade in the years 
leading up to the Second World War. In 1939, the last full, normal year of 
commerce, Indochina’s exports reached 4.7 million tons, including 2.1 
million tons of rice and corn, 1.8 million tons of coal, and 215,000 tons 
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of minerals. Conversely, imports attained 587,000 tons (worth 240 
million piastres), including over 100,000 tons of fuel, 60,000 tons of 
chemical products, and 20,000 tons of textiles. One year later, the end of 
traditional trade relations meant the collapse of prices of Cochinchinese 
rice and Cambodian corn as well as the reduction of more than half of 
mining activities in the region.8  From June 1940, transportation between 
Indochina and France became uncertain and on 17 September 1940, 
Decoux requested special considerations from Vichy to maintain 
commercial relations with the Japanese, the Americans, and the British, 
lest the economy be condemned to rapid asphyxiation. Decoux warned 
Minister of Colonies Charles Platon that the inability to acquire 
necessary goods would present difficulties given the forging of new 
relations with Japan, which threatened the notion of French sovereignty.9 
The British were open to maintaining trade with Decoux’s Indochina, 
even though their relations with Vichy had turned bellicose, because they 
wanted to protect their shipping lanes in Asia and avoid giving the 
Japanese any pretext for further military intervention in Indochina which 
could potentially expand to the rest of Southeast Asia.10  Unfortunately, 
the German-led Armistice commission made it difficult for British and 
Dutch ships to dock in Indochina—given the state of war between the 
Reich and these countries—which not only threatened imports of goods 
for consumption in the Indochinese market but also exports, as Great 
Britain expressed its reluctance to engage in unilateral traffic. The 
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consequences had devastating potential; without the necessary sacks from 
India, Indochinese rice, the basis of its export economy, could not be 
packaged for transport.11  In spite of these difficulties, from mid-1940 
through the end of 1941 Franco-British relations in the region allowed 
Indochina to receive thousands of tons of precious goods from Asian 
ports—particularly Hong Kong, Manila, and Shanghai—and from the 
metropole. To facilitate the colony’s supply of goods and materials, Vichy 
granted Hanoi customs autonomy from 1 January 1941, ending the 
preferential status of French goods in place since 1928 and imposing a 
single tariff  on all imports regardless of  origin.12
Unable to trade in sufficient amounts with its traditional partners, 
Indochina was forced to turn to Japan for goods it could not yet produce. 
As early as October 1940, a Japanese mission headed by Ambassador 
Matsumiya proposed an economic agreement between Tokyo and Hanoi. 
These negotiations resulted in the 6 May 1941 trade agreement, which 
was negotiated in Tokyo by a commission headed by members of the 
Vichy Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vichy, thereby signaling the political 
rather than economic nature of the agreement.13  Renewable after three 
years, the agreement gave Japan the status of most favored nation, 
thereby imposing the minimum tariffs on its products. In theory, Japan 
paid for Indochinese goods in piastres and Indochina paid for Japanese 
products in yen, allowing Japan to keep its dollars for the international 
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market since it did not have to use its deposits on trade with Indochina.14 
French circles sardonically described this policy as “Take everything and 
pay with monkey money.”15 In reality however, the imbalance in trade (in 
favor of exports to Japan) meant that Japan often lacked sufficient 
piastres and paid for Indochinese goods partly with its own products and 
partly with gold-backed currencies, at least while shipping lanes were 
safe.16  French and Japanese authorities also agreed on lists, reviewable 
every year, of the type and quantity of goods to be traded between Tokyo 
and Hanoi. Despite efforts to promote the agreements as amicable, the 
French were in no position to adopt a tough stance in their negotiation of 
terms.17  The situation became all the more difficult because the 
authorities could not directly blame the imbalance in terms with Japan 
for the scarcity of resources and yet neither could they assume 
responsibilities themselves lest they lose prestige and legitimacy.18 Luckily 
the Anglo-Americans provided useful scapegoats for Decoux’s 
propaganda, and as the Allies advanced in the Pacific, his accusations 
took on greater validity as the disruptions caused by US bombardments 
did hinder efforts that may have otherwise assuaged suffering.
Import quotas into Indochina agreed upon by the two countries were 
never met, leading to significant shortages of products for consumption 
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and the industrial sector. As early as September 1941, the French colony 
had received almost nothing from Tokyo, in spite of the 530,000 tons of 
rice and approximately 20,000 tons of rubber that actually reachedJapan, 
leading Decoux to tell a reporter of Nichi Nichi “We are having trouble 
getting what we need from Japan, so we are reserving judgment [on the 
agreement] until articles promised have arrived.”19  Decoux may have 
been disappointed when he gave this comment in 1941, but that was as 
good as it ever got for the French and he never went public with his 
discontent, underscoring how unequal the relationship was. The table 
below shows for each year the quantity of imported goods (in tons) and 






Textiles 10,700 6,700 4,000 1,500
Paper 4,300 3,700 2,000 1,800
Chemicals 40,000 4,000 6,000 2,600
Machinery 52,360 5,000 2,000 0
Tobacco 2,800 730 2,000 0
Miscellaneou
s
N/A 16,500 13,000 2,500
Total N/A 36,600 29,000 8,400
Value in 
Piastres
N/A 112M 117M 25M
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Starting in 1942, the GGI turned to its neighbors—particularly Shanghai, 
Thailand, and Kwangchouwan (Fort Bayard, present-day Zhanjiang in 
Guangdong Province, a French concession that had traditionally been 
governed as part of Indochina but ironically remained under Free French 
authority)—to compensate for the deficiency in exchanges with Japan. 
Trade with these partners was based on a system of “balanced 
exchanges,” meaning imports were paid for with exports of similar 
value.21  Imports from countries other than Japan were 35,000 tons in 
1942, 23,000 tons in 1943, and 12,800 in 1944 (from only Thailand and 
Kwangchouwan).22 
The lack of available goods in the French colony led to inflationary 
pressures, which the government fought through economic intervention 
including price controls and repression of the black market. The price 
index in Saigon for wholesale goods, based on 100 for 1925, went from 
182 in 1943 to 329 in 1944. The overall cost of living for Europeans rose 
from 100 in 1925 to 199 in 1943 and 338 by the end of 1944. The same in 
Hanoi was 356 in 1943 and 740 in December 1944. The situation was 
even worse for the Indochinese working class. The Saigon index for 
Vietnamese passed from 236 in 1943 to 437 by the end of 1944 and in 
Hanoi from 541 to 1,040 over the same period.23 Price control involved a 
double strategy of acting on the price of imported goods on the local 
market (though regulation of the purchase price at the port of entry was 
impossible) and the maintenance of low prices on domestically produced 
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items. In addition, the authorities threatened severe punishment on any 
party engaged in surcharging for goods.24  On 1 November 1941, the 
government created an economic police, named the Commission on the 
Control and Monitoring of Prices, to ensure that when imported goods 
were more expensive than locally produced items, the prices for the latter 
were not increased to match with the imports as means of raising the 
seller’s profits , and the 14 March 1942 law gave the authorities the ability 
to address issues of  stock hoarding.25
Government price control policies had mixed results. Since it was 
impossible to control the prices of all items on the market, officials were 
charged with regulating specific goods. The administration decided on 
acceptable costs of sale, and a coefficient corresponding to authorized 
profit levels determined sale price, which was verified by the economic 
police. A special committee, presided by the Director of Economic 
Services, regulated prices of industrial goods and the Governor General’s 
office fixed prices of agricultural products.26 This system did little to solve 
the problem as coefficients on acceptable profits were based on cost of 
sale, encouraging merchants to acquire products at the highest price 
possible.27  Furthermore, the authorities frequently increased the money 
supply leading to the regular depreciation of the piastre and a rush on 
stores to stock goods through fear of further inflation.28  Money in 
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circulation went from 235 million piastres in January 1940 to 511 million 
by January 1943 and 1.4 billion in March 1945.29  Furthermore, the 
political weight of the Grands travaux meant that government spending 
outweighed the economic necessity of controlling prices. Scarcity of 
goods became an inevitability: the government had to spend to stimulate 
the economy to increase and diversify production and build the 
infrastructural networks necessary for commerce which caused inflation. 
Had it cut back on spending or tried to reduce the money supply to 
control inflation, it would have potentially faced an even worse shortage 
of  goods.
The lack of goods available in stores also intensified activity on the 
black market, which was sometimes supplied by the Japanese. To fight 
illegal sales, Decoux relied heavily on the economic police to impose 
sanctions.30  Merchants had to account for their stocks of basic goods, 
including butter, flour, paper, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and fuel.31 
Success was limited and one report blamed insufficient funds available to 
reward informers, claiming that the latter wanted a portion of the value of 
the seized merchandise, something the GGI was unwilling to accord.32 
Many of the goods found on the black market came from Japanese 
trading houses that dumped products in excess of quotas in Indochina.33 
In 1941, the Japanese army seized Chinese merchandise in Haiphong 
worth 100 million piastres, much of it sold on the black market with a 
249
29. Untitled box, “L’Effort économique de l’Indochine,” 22.
30. Directives politiques, 16 March 1943.
31. Le Nouveau Laos, 1 April 1943
32. RSTNF 6703, “Notice sur la situation politique au Tonkin (Mai 1943-Mai 1944).”
33. For example Untitled box, “L’Effort économique de l’Indochine,” 22.
considerable uptick.34 Given its tense relations with Japan, there was very 
little the authorities could do to curb this behavior and the Japanese 
benefited from the chaos that ensued since it eroded French legitimacy. 
Even with a dedicated police force, there was very little the government 
could do to end the black market; French intelligence reported locals 
claiming that one sale on the black market was worth more than an entire 
year’s wages.35 Even if this is more boastful than accurate, the upside was 
more often than not worth the risk for a population that had to keep up 
with soaring inflation.
Isolation from international markets was the primary cause of 
inflation, but the inability to transport goods between different pays 
exacerbated the problem, particularly in the latter years of the war when 
Allied bombardment destroyed infrastructure and disrupted trade routes. 
Until these bombardments made transportation nearly impossible, 
Cochinchinese rice fed Tonkin and Northern Annam and fueled their 
vehicles while Cambodian cotton supplied Vietnamese factories, leading 
Decoux to exalt the strengthening of federal ties between the five 
countries of the Union.36  By March 1944, however, French intelligence 
reported that railways were almost paralyzed and that the maritime fleet 
found it increasingly difficult to navigate.37  During the first half of that 
year, junks replaced railways as means of transport even though the 
former had higher freight and insurance costs—further contributing to 
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inflation—and trains took an average of 40 days to travel from 
Cochinchina to Tonkin and junks between 45 and 60 days. 
Bombardments and minings had rendered the port of Haiphong non-
operational by 1943, contributing significantly to the famine of 1944-1945 
(see below). No matter the mode of transport, delays led to the loss of 
20-25% of the merchandise from spoilage.38  Road circulation fared no 
better as lack of tires and spare parts threatened to reduce traffic in 
Tonkin by 60% in 1944.39  The French understood the political dangers 
accompanying the impossibility of providing for Tonkin’s growing 
population, warning of rising nationalist sentiments brought on by 
incessant bombardments and the scarcity of affordable food.40 Difficulties 
in transportation had significant human costs and the GGI had no choice 
but to push Tonkin and North Annam to exist in a closed circuit, that is 
to improve, to develop their own production as means of survival rather 
than importing rice from Cochinchina.41  This was hardly a 
demonstration of  France’s ability to provide for its protected peoples.
Developing a Substitution Economy
Indochina’s inability to import goods for production or consumption 
posed problems for the French authorities to legitimize their place as the 
keystone of the Indochinese federation and boast the benefits of their 
mission civilisatrice. The humanitarian catastrophe constituted one of the 
nails in the coffin of this mission. Decoux believed that the best way to 
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fight inflation was to develop domestic production.42  One might have 
expected him to launch an effective propaganda campaign to explain the 
inevitability of short and medium term inflation that government 
spending (for the Grands travaux for instance) would cause in its efforts to 
increase and especially diversify production. Whether this would have 
attenuated public discontent is uncertain, but it had the potential to 
clarify the administration’s policies. In the end it did not link the two 
while it reorganized production and reallocated resources to produce 
locally those goods it had imported before the war. This substitution 
economy was an integral part of the authorities’ politics of prestige and 
intended to demonstrate how French leadership could harness 
Indochinese creativity and make use of the natural riches of the region. 
For Decoux it was critical to find ways to produce essentials that were 
lacking, using propaganda to make the population understand the 
motives behind the measures taken, of certain restrictions, or certain 
delays.43  This may account for why he never publicly admitted that 
inflation was inevitable: his propaganda machine was focused on 
explaining that the administration would end the scarcity of goods, which 
meant government spending. That government spending could lead to 
inflation (and thus a scarcity of  food) had to be left out.
With an eye toward maintaining French sovereignty in Indochina in 
the postwar period, Decoux stressed that the future of Indochina 
depended on its inhabitants working together and in total submission to 
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the directives of the government.44  Furthermore, the Admiral presented 
the situation as an opportunity to tighten Franco-Indochinese bonds as 
both communities worked together to traverse the economic crisis and 
build a stronger Indochina. According to Decoux, the control economy 
that would enable the production of substitution goods required the 
creation of new economic sectors that would serve as a healthy and 
potent economic base once peace returned, through the creation of new 
industries and the redirection of internal trade currents.45 Of course these 
promises did little to fill hungry stomachs in the present. 
By 1942, ordinary consumers could find very little, if any, of the 
types of goods imported into Indochina before the war, such as milk, 
butter, flour, potatoes, medicine, leather, fuel, tires, wool, or bicycles. 
Through an increased control of the economy, the government pushed 
the production of substitution goods locally. The Labbe factories in 
Saigon produced tires for bicycles and the large distilleries made spirits 
and fruit wines. Flour from rice replaced flour from wheat for baking 
bread, which one French source qualified as “acceptable.” Cochinchina 
and Cambodia produced milk—which was sterilized for transport to 
Tonkin—in quantities sufficient for “pressing needs” and an office of 
fishery managed the increase in the supply of fish for consumption. The 
government imposed restrictions to ensure substitution products went 
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where they were most needed: alcohol for vehicles, milk for children, and 
medicine for the sick.46
Fuel and textiles are two product categories that illustrate well the 
Decoux regime’s efforts to build a substitution economy because of their 
importance for consumers and trade. Gautier described in his memoirs 
the administration’s will to fabricate substitution products as a means to 
preserve internal stability:
One had to supply Indochina with fuel, lubricants, tires, textiles, 
smelting materials, quinine, and a hundred other base products that a 
country with several million inhabitants cannot do without, and 
Indochina could dispense with these all the less as the maintenance of a 
certain standard of living for the indigenous peoples was a condition of 
internal peace. The fabrication of these replacement products mobilized 
all the available energies and we can affirm that the impulsion given by 
Admiral Decoux in this enterprise was such that no problem remained 
unsolvable. We must indicate in passing that the fabrication of these 
replacement products affected the economic life of Indochina 
understood as a whole, and not a particular category of the 
population.47
Gautier’s assertion that no problem remained unsolvable forgets the 
human costs of the substitution economy, namely the redirection of 
certain foodstuffs for the production of fuel. Yet without fuel, the 
foodstuff could not be transported, highlighting the impossible situation 
in which the GGI found itself.
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Before the war, Indochina imported 110,000 tons of fuel annually for 
lighting, vehicles, lubricants, and power stations.48  As early as 1941, gas 
consumption was reduced through increasingly severe restrictions on 
traffic. Drivers required permits to operate vehicles and were prohibited 
from traveling on itineraries serviced by public modes of transportation, 
unless under exceptional circumstances. This reduced the consumption of 
such fuel from 3,000 to 2,000 tons per month that year.49 The government 
used hydrated alcohol derived from rice to replace petrol-based gasoline 
and tried with limited success to obtain petrol from rubber. Only a few 
months after the conflict with Thailand, Decoux asked Vichy to lift the 
law prohibiting trade with the former enemy in order to acquire more 
rice, specifying the region’s need for fuel, not food.50  By 1943, 3,000 
vehicles were equipped with gasogenes (devices enabling them to run on 
wood or charcoal) and fueled with 15 to 20,000 hectoliters of alcohol 
from Cambodia, Cochinchina, and Tonkin.51 
Fuel oil was replaced by a mixture of fish, copra, and peanut oils and 
lubricants by products derived from local vegetable oils. The government 
imposed minimum quotas for oil production to be delivered at set prices 
and the monopoly of trade, transport, and treatment of oleaginous goods 
was given to the Union des coopératives agricoles in Tonkin and Annam and 
to the Comptoir des corps gras in the South.52  Tightly controlled by the 
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authorities, these monopolies, called comptoirs, were private organizations 
that had exclusive rights to ensure the supply of specific goods and were 
an essential piece of the economic strategy of the colonial government.53 
From 1940 to 1942, the area devoted to the production of peanut oil went 
from 25,000 to 43,000 hectares and for castor-oil from 6,000 to 10,000 
hectares. By the first quarter of 1942, the average monthly production of 
vegetable- and animal-derived fuel oil reached 640 tons, up from only 12 
tons in the second half of 1941, thanks to the completion of factories in 
Cambodia.54  Paddy rice was burned in Cochinchina’s electric plants 
when Tonkinese coal could no longer be transported south.55  The 
decision to reallocate land toward the production of crops used by the 
industrial sector contributed to the severity of the 1945 famine in Tonkin, 
though the difficulties in transportation of foodstuffs from Cochinchina 
and Cambodia to the North during the later years of the conflict (due to 
the destruction of the infrastructure) would have prevented any 
additional food from reaching Tonkin anyhow. Moreover, at the time 
these decisions were made—during the first two years of the war—
famine was not an immediate threat and transportation (including the 
production of  fuel) was a significant concern.
Prior to 1940, Indochina imported 20,000 tons of textiles—mostly 
cotton and silk—destined for Tonkin’s large factories and the region’s 
cottage industries. The problem of the sudden drop in imports (8,000 tons 
in 1942, 6,000 in 1943) was aggravated by the type of material imported, 
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in large part from Japan, which often consisted of expensive materials 
like rayon, poorly adaptable for indigenous clothing. One thousand tons 
of cotton were locally produced and jute was practically nonexistent. To 
grow substitution products in Indochina, the authorities launched 
propaganda campaigns and local administrators pressured farmers 
wherever cultivation could take place or increase, at the risk of diverting 
resources from the production of food crops. The government fixed prices 
and imposed quotas on regions where land was devoted to cultivation, a 
parallel policy to incentivize peasants to grow certain crops through 
remuneration and to coerce them in case they resisted.56  In the first 
example of a system of coerced cash crops in Indochina (whereas the 
Dutch in East India had practiced it since the nineteenth century), a 
textile comptoir regulated production, collection, and distribution, though 
it quickly became apparent that the farmers’ reluctance to hand over the 
entirety of their harvest would have political ramifications. To minimize 
discontent, the administration allowed farmers to keep a portion of their 
production and in 1944, only 2,500 of a total of 6,500 tons of cotton 
grown were handed over to the comptoir.57  While there was never any 
question of attempting to grow the same quantity of cotton locally to 
match prewar exports, the area devoted to cotton cultivation went from 
7,000 hectares in 1939 to 19,000 by 1942 and 52,000 by 1944, though 
insects, poor choices of seeds, and improper soil types kept yields lower 
than expected. Until relations were broken with India, Indochina 
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imported 20,000 tons of sacks made from jute, which were necessary for 
the transportation and export of rice. To compensate for the cessation of 
trade with the British colony, 12,700 hectares of jute were cultivated by 
1942 (up from 500 in 1939), which along with rush plants from 
Cochinchina, served to make sacks.58
Artisanat
One area where Hanoi followed Vichy policy closely was the 
promotion of artisan crafts, or artisanat, though where Vichy had been 
incompetent and even duplicitous, Hanoi encouraged artisanat as an 
integral part of tradition and saw it as a cornerstone of its efforts for 
economic survival. As discussed in Chapter 2, Vichy’s glorification of  the 
artisanat as a return to a more stable past fell short of the reality of its 
authoritarian and centralizing policies. Inspired by social philosophers 
such as Gustave Thibon and René Gillouin, Pétainist discourse blamed 
the fall of France on its departure from the traditional small-scale craft 
and peasant world that had been its strength only a few years before the 
war. Charles Maurras, one of the inspirations of the National 
Revolution’s ultraconservative wing, criticized the Third Republic’s 
atomization of society and argued that it was tradition that had allowed 
civilization to endure, as transmitted capital, and that it must always be 
greater and more important than the individual; there could be no society 
without tradition.59  Yet by the end of 1942, with the impetus of the 
National Revolution weakened significantly, the government had resettled 
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a mere 200 artisans in the French provinces.60  In contrast to France, the 
effects of machinery on the fabric of society never reached Indochina, 
with 95-97%  of its population living in rural areas and an almost 
nonexistent industrial base. Artisanat was ubiquitously a way of life for 
the peasantry who needed to supplement income while waiting for the 
next harvest. A discourse for the return to traditional ways of production 
would have been absurd given that production was almost never 
industrial and therefore, traditional by nature. Rather, Decoux’s 
government tried to direct and coordinate Indochinese artisanat to sustain 
and develop the substitution economy that was borne of the region’s 
isolation.
The colonial authorities under the Third Republic had mostly 
encouraged the development of Indochinese artistic artisanry (e.g. 
jewelry, silk, or ivory-work), distinguishable from utilitarian artisanry 
(e.g. weaving, woodwork, or pottery). This preference stemmed from the 
colonists’ desire to stop the perceived decline of traditional arts, and 
efforts focused mostly on high end goods targeted at the elite rather than 
every day consumption. Without officially discouraging production of 
utilitarian arts and crafts, the French arrival in the region had accelerated 
its decline by flooding the market with cheap mass-produced goods. 
Those who made their living from cottage industry could no longer 
compete. The French placed few restrictions on imports to protect this 
sector though they did try to preserve the artistic artisanry in efforts 
ranging from the opening of small museums to the founding of cultural 
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institutions to the restoration of Angkor.61  The fear that national art 
would disappear was particularly acute in Cambodia, where a 1917 study 
counted 130 artisans of art out of an estimated population of 1.5 million, 
most whom found farming more profitable. The republican GGI created 
the School of Cambodian Arts that year to organize, conserve, and 
popularize Khmer art in all its forms and in 1924 it established the Ecole 
des Beaux-Arts de l’Indochine, which trained artisans of art.62  A report 
published in 1937 insisted that it was France’s duty to revive the artistic 
crafts: “It seems that our role must consist in conserving in that domain 
of arts, to the people of whom we have taken on the education, the 
proper character and originality of their national art, and to help them to 
rediscover the elements they poorly know or have forgotten.”63  The 
emphasis remained on artistic rather than utilitarian artisanry.
The governments of the 1930s became aware of the need to nurture 
local utilitarian artisanry to fight peasant poverty and minimize the need 
to industrialize Indochina, two forces they feared could lead to the 
proletarianization of the population. Industrialization risked hurting 
factories in the metropole and favoring the “bolshevization” of the 
workers and the countryside with which many still had relations. 
Minister of Colonies Marius Moutet announced: “It would be a grave 
error to rush our colonies toward poorly planned industrialization. We 
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be dangerous for French sovereignty.”64  Justin Godart, Senator from 
Rhône, asked upon his return from Indochina in 1937:
Is it desirable to see the number of workers increase, that is to wish for 
the development of industry in Indochina? I don’t think so. Here is a 
stable and definitive base for Indochina: small property. We must defend 
it where it exists; we must create it where there is room. If, along with 
this agrarian policy we can build an artisan policy, we will bring a new 
and effective palliative to the current situation.65
The authorities sought to reverse rural poverty by accelerating the 
promotion of utilitarian artisanry, which they hoped would supplement 
income and increase goods for local consumption. Tonkin had the largest 
artisan population of the Union, yet less than 7% of the inhabitants drew 
the majority of its income from this type of production.66 Of course these 
numbers do not reflect the aggregate quantitative output of 
microcapitalism of a peasantry whose primary activity derived from the 
land but that often supplemented its income through artisanal production 
when not harvesting. This production may or may not have been 
considered “national art” by the colonial authorities, and thus may not 
have been counted in the statistics, but it remained a critical part of the 
local economy. Nevertheless, in the years preceding the war the 
government tried to stimulate utilitarian artisanry through credits 
permitting the craftsman to purchase tools and raw materials without 
having to go through usurers. These credits were provided through the 
intermediary of cooperative societies, which also created a discipline, a 
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standardization, and a regulation of the quality of production. The 
government opened workshops to revive lost artisan crafts (such as in Ha 
Dong) and artisan schools (such as in Bien Hoa) to teach skills and 
prepare for careers. During the late 1930s the French wanted to give a 
sense of national artisanry to the Indochinese peoples while at the same 
time molding tastes. By focusing on artisanry for mass consumption 
rather than for the elite, utilitarian and artistic artisanry became more 
closely associated. No longer were national arts reserved for the 
production of art on grand or intricate scales. Standardization and 
quality control were critical in developing the sector and commoditizing 
its production rather than seeing it as an art form. The authorities 
estimated that during this time, the export of artisan goods contributed 
three to five million piastres to the balance of trade and the further 
expansion of the sector could diversify the Indochinese economy, without 
having to engage in cost ly, and dangerous, programs of 
industrialization.67  Unfortunately the effects of these measures were 
negligible, as they were never fully implemented by the time war broke 
out.68
Since the republican authorities had focused on nurturing artisan art 
and achieved very little to stimulate the production of utilitarian 
artisanry, Decoux’s government inherited a weak sector that required 
further encouragement and direction to fulfill its potential, be an integral 
part in the substitution economy, and alleviate rural poverty.69  In 1941, 
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the GGI reported that artisanry in Indochina, still lacked financial 
concentration and principles of standardization, as it had developed 
haphazardly and under the sole impetus of individual need, keeping it, by 
the quality and quantity of its production, well below its vast potential. It 
still could not provide a normal means of subsistence to a considerable 
hunger-stricken mass.70  Adults could expect to earn between 0.06 and 
0.10 piastres and children 0.02 to 0.10 piastres a day through artisanry, 
and since they mostly sold to middlemen—who profited greatly from 
sales—and raw materials were often subject to drastic markups (up to 
300% according to government sources), they were squeezed financially. 
Moreover, selling to middlemen meant that artisans had no direct 
exposure to fluctuations in demand or tastes.71  Decoux’s regime 
understood that to increase the daily consumption and wealth of the 
colony, production ideally needed to increase quantitatively and 
qualitatively and flood local markets as well as drive exports, which in 
turn would allow the increased import of goods.72  It also counted on a 
healthy artisanat to curb rural-urban migration, which threatened to pull 
wages down as the number of available workers in cities increased.73 This 
would leave the administration with the problem of an overpopulated 
countryside, but the supplemental income from artisanry was supposed to 
alleviate pressures. Yet these policies were never able to overcome the 
devastation of the war on the economy, namely isolation and 
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bombardments, and the populations remained desperately poor and 
hungry. Decoux rightly recognized artisanry’s potential as a provider to 
the substitution economy that had to emerge to address autarky, but the 
economy itself could not develop in wartime. Decoux’s solutions, no 
matter how creative, were doomed from the start. 
With no alternatives and hoping to ride out the war, Decoux’s 
government tried to direct the Indochinese artisanat through the control of 
its production and its channels of distribution. Though these initiatives 
sought to address the immediate problems posed by the war, Decoux 
positioned the reorganization of the economy and the development of 
substitution products as a long term plan to raise standards of living in 
the colony. He proposed that the rupture in external communications that 
had forced Indochina to live in a closed circuit presented an opportunity 
to make up for important weaknesses in the regions’ economic 
organization. For the artisanat to continue to develop once the war was 
over the Admiral claimed it was indispensable to organize it so it could 
survive international competition.74 He never addressed how the French 
industrial conglomerates, that had purposefully kept the Indochinese 
economy dependent on its exports, would react once relations 
normalized, signaling either his own naiveté or a vulgar attempt to rally 
support for his ambitions by leaving these issues to his successor. Still, the 
government took it upon itself to assist, organize, and orient artisanal 
production.75  Decoux had an unprecedented opportunity to implement 
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corporatist structures to cure through shock therapy the ails caused by the 
war. Decoux’s administration envisioned an economy organized as a 
pyramidal structure where large modern industry was at the summit, 
transformation and extraction industry below, and at its base, “the 
thousands of small family workshops” that existed in the region, to 
which the French would give the means to modernize their fabrication 
and to produce new articles.76 Properly directed, the authorities believed, 
the artisanat could provide goods to small industry, which in turn could 
supply large industry.77  The French believed they needed to guide 
artisanal production away from art and ornamental trinkets to utilitarian 
products, such as those made of leather, rope, or metal.78 The relationship 
between a developed and directed artisanat and heavy industry (however 
nascent at the time) was symbiotic and it was believed could help the 
region as a whole after the war, provided workshops improved the quality 
of their goods.79  The policy made sense given wartime conditions but 
again, did not take into account the reactions of industry in the 
metropole once these conditions ended.
To build this pyramid and ensure the production of utilitarian goods, 
Decoux’s government sought to organize the artisanat at local and 
regional levels. In August 1941, it created (at the same time as the 
Council on Industrial Production) the Local Committees of Artisanat, 
which were directed in each pays by the ADLOC and attached to the 
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General Inspection of Mines and Industries. These committees were 
responsible for implementing measures to expand fabrication, while 
improving quality, perfecting work methods, and facilitating the sale of 
products.80  In each province the authorities established cooperatives for 
every major artisanal activity, such as weavers (broken down by the 
materials with which they worked), dyers, basket makers, and varnishers. 
The Union of Cooperatives (UNICOP) worked with these local 
cooperatives to ensure that the artisan corps of every pays work, 
according to its capacity and its means, on articles responding exactly to 
the demand and needs of the customers, minimizing competition 
between the different artisan groupings.81  The 27 July 1942 decree 
creating the Office of Popular Credit continued the formalization of 
groupings of artisans around cooperative societies. It divided the pays of 
the union into a certain number of zones in which only one cooperative 
would be allowed for every trade. These cooperatives oversaw the 
fabrication of specific goods and the equitable distribution of raw 
materials. By the end of 1943, Indochina counted 14 cooperatives, 13 of 
which were less than a year old and the government set aside 660,000 
piastres to fund cooperatives, up from 140,000 the year before.82 Unlike in 
the metropole, these cooperatives did not have a voice in the political 
defense of their interests, but their organization into natural groupings, 
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based on professional knowledge, was anchored in Maurrassism (see 
below), though Decoux preferred to allude publicly to Pétain.83
The government expanded schools to train artisans and set standards 
of production on a scale never before seen in previous administrations, 
since most had been more concerned with the production of artistic crafts 
than utilitarian products. These “centers of perfection” were set up in 
areas with high concentrations of artisanal activity and placed under the 
supervision of the Artisanal Technical Service, which was responsible for 
improving quality of goods and orient production toward customer 
demand.84  These centers intended to elevate artisans, and as was written 
in one newspaper, teach them that their professions “did not consist in 
producing, according to circumstances, to respond to the vogues of the 
moment, to sell as much as possible, but also to put out [sortir] finished, 
cared for work. . .The dignity of the profession of artisan demands from 
those who practice it, in addition to professional probity, the search to 
ameliorate, to perfect, quality.”85 This was nothing less than an attempted 
overhaul of local culture by the French: the French appropriated 
Indochinese artisanry to run the colony effectively and returned their 
version of local crafts to the population in a transformed, somehow more 
elevated form. Under the leadership of the Europeans, these schools 
sought to correct what was perceived to be the lack of professional 
consciousness in local craftsmen that characterized the French artisan, a 
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certain self esteem through which his work somehow reflected his soul.86 
The French went so far as to push the idea that Indochinese artisanry 
depended on them to flourish, evoking Charles Crévost, the “father of 
Tonkinese artisanat,” who, working in the Agricultural and Commercial 
Services of Tonkin under Governor General Paul Beau’s administration 
(1902-1907), “had for only ambition to guide workers, because the latter 
needed to be advised, the latter not being sufficiently aware of the tastes 
and needs of the principally French customers at the time.”87  In a 
paragon of absurdity and paternalism, the French presented the idea that 
the Indochinese peoples could not produce their own national treasures 
(that is the culmination of centuries of knowhow of how to fabricate 
certain goods) without the assistance of the French. Even as the shift 
occurred away from artistic artisanry toward utilitarian artisanry, the 
French saw themselves as the saviors of  local tradition.
The French authorities organized fairs in Hanoi and Saigon to show 
the public that Indochinese artisanat was thriving, and, with French 
guidance, played an important part in addressing some of the Union’s 
socioeconomic problems. While these fairs existed before the war—the 
last such event had been held in 1938—the region’s isolation led Decoux’s 
regime to emphasize, for propagandistic purposes, Indochina’s ability to 
survive through its own resources by adapting them and substituting them 
to replace goods that were lacking. This was a critical part in building the 
enthusiasm of the populations behind the government’s efforts to salvage 
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the economy through redirection. Visitors learned about how the 
government guided local artisans to find and produce solutions to energy 
problems using vegetable oils, efforts made in cultivating cotton and jute, 
or how gazogenes were placed in vehicles.88  Decoux used the fairs to 
promote how French tutelage was necessary to tap the ingeniousness of 
the locals. He also used the opportunity to emphasize the federal spirit of 
solidarity calling on visitors to reflect on the importance of  common 
work and the strength of collective ties.89   Again, once internal 
transportation logistics broke down two years later, there was nothing 
upon which to base these collective ties, culminating in Decoux’s call for 
Tonkin to fend for itself. In 1941, no one appreciated the dangers posed 
by a change in the Allies’ fortunes and one editorialist wrote:
Essentially this Hanoi Fair is symbolic: it attests that the French of 
Indochina and the Indochinese aren’t giving up the fight, that on the 
contrary it is fascinating to them precisely because it is difficult. They 
trust, they know that their effort, their inventive spirit, their consistency 
assures the future, and that Indochina will surmount all the crises, 
simply because they want it.90
The fairs were supposed to feature not only artisanal goods, but the 
spirit of the Indochinese Union. The government wanted the fairs to 
display nothing less than Indochina’s effort in the struggle for its 
existence thanks to the solidarity that bound its people to one another and 
France. The fairs were part of the effort to elevate the artisanat, presenting 
it as a linchpin in the economic transformation that was occurring.91 
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Brought together, artisans from all parts of the colony could learn from 
one another, ending what one newspaper called the “lack of cohesion of 
the different family workshops. . .[which impeded] equally professional 
development and perfectibility.”92 This process of solidarity was part of a 
moral and commercial education from which technical improvements 
would surely follow, an undisguised effort to push the idea that France, as 
the cement that held the Union together, brought peoples together and 
allowed them to perfect their own national treasures.93  One editorial 
summarized the intents of  the government vis-à-vis the fairs:
The Foire-Exposition brings to Indochina proof that its natural resources 
and the working spirit of its sons allow it to suffice for itself; it 
establishes a balance sheet of riches until now fairly unknown, and we 
are talking not only of material riches, but also moral riches. Face to 
face with a grave situation, Indochina, federation of countries 
considered until now, rightly or wrongly, weak and minor, acts as one 
nation, a courageous and coherent nation, distant member and, for now, 
isolated from a vast and powerful whole that is the French empire.94
The fairs attracted large crowds—two million visitors attended the 
1943 Foire-Exposition of Saigon—and inspired the authorities to open 
permanent artisanat exhibits in Saigon, Ha Dong, and Hanoi.95  The 
government hoped these centers would encourage trading houses to 
familiarize themselves with the production of family workshops and 
establish relations between buyers and producers, while informing the 
latter on customers’ latest tastes and desires and advising them on how to 
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improve their work methods.96 They represented the colonial authorities’ 
continued efforts to promote Indochinese artisanat, recognizing it as an 
essential element in the Indochinese economy but also signaling their 
complete disconnection with the reality of how the postwar empire 
would accept these changes, should Indochina remain a part of it. 
Whatever success the efforts to elevate the artisanat would have had was 
destroyed by the infrastructural collapse of the colony. Locally-produced 
goods remained locally-consumed and Decoux’s vision of an artisanal 
base whose goods were distributed across Indochina, with glimpses of 
specialization by region toward an economy based on competitive 
advantage, never came about, nor could it after 1945, during years of 
conflict toward independence.
Les Grands travaux
The Grands travaux, or “Great works,” was the name given to the 
major infrastructural improvements conducted by the colonial authorities 
in Indochina. Building roads, railways, or hydraulic structures would 
ameliorate the region’s communication, production, and transportation 
systems, which in turn brought economic benefits, but also served 
political purposes by contributing to the narrative of France’s oeuvre. 
While the governments of the Third Republic had invested in 
infrastructural improvements early on partly as means of ensuring the 
effective movement of troops throughout the colony, the nineteenth 
century construction of routes were at the heart of France’s reasons for 
establishing itself in Southeast Asia; trade with Asian nations. France’s 
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economic stagnation during 1873-1897 led Paris to seek new outlets for 
its goods, since exports had plateaued in part due to the protectionist 
policies of most the country’s economic partners. In 1886, future 
Governor General Jean-Marie de Lanessan wrote 
Industry at first worked for the domestic market, toward trade between 
city and countryside; but soon this market became too small; industry 
began to produce for export. . .But the same events occurred [in other 
countries], the same evolution took place in all civilized nations. . .For 
half a century all the nations of Europe compete with zeal for the 
creation of the most diverse industries, all try to make do without their 
neighbors. . .The number of civilized countries lacking industry 
diminishing every day, it is more and more outside these that 
manufacturers are forced to go find consumers. We find in these needs 
of European industry a first explanation for the movement of expansion 
that since long has pushed Europe toward the regions inhabited by 
peoples still ignorant of  the benefits of  civilization.97 
For French political leaders, the creation of captive consumer markets 
was the solution to the country’s economic difficulties, and infrastructural 
improvements in Indochina were vital in assuring access to these markets, 
in particular Yunnan, gateway to China.98 France had originally sought to 
reach China along the Mekong River through Laos, but when that proved 
unnavigable, it sought to control the Red River to access Yunnan. When 
in turn this waterway’s limitations for efficient navigability were exposed 
after the completion of colonization in the 1880s, the French turned to 
railways, the Resident of Tonkin declaring “The route that will offer 
immediately all the elements necessary for international commerce and 
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to European industry, as well as giving France a powerful means of 
action, civilization, and authority in all of Asia, could consist in the 
construction of a railway that [would start] in Ha Long Bay. . .make its 
way north through Yunnan. . .toward the northwest, into Tibet.”99 
While transport by river continued to represent an important part of 
commercial traffic, the French authorities accelerated the construction of 
railways and roads after the turn of the century. Indochina’s railway 
expansion began with a vast project elaborated between 1891 and 1898 
(which came to be called the Doumer program), designed to penetrate 
China as well as to connect rural areas to regional markets, new poles of 
industrialization, and external outlets. Most of the railway construction 
was financed by the publicly owned Compagnie des chemins de fer de 
L’Indochine, though the privately held Compagnie des chemins de fer du 
Yunnan, received 68.5 million francs in subsidies from the French 
government from 1901 to 1909, demonstrating how the Republic was 
eager to fund the networks to attract private interests.100  In 1911 the 
government launched a program to establish a coherent road network, 
which intended to unlock Laos and the Vietnamese highlands.101  These 
new roads also facilitated the migration of Vietnamese laborers from 
overpopulated Tonkin and Annam (and to a lesser extent Cochinchina) to 
other parts of the colony, such as Cambodia, where the number of 
Vietnamese grew from 79,000 in 1911 to over 140,000 by 1921. New 
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roads provided the means with which the authorities were able to expand 
their administrative structures, allowing them to send Vietnamese public 
servants having passed the French language civil service examination to 
all parts of the colony. It was hoped this would strengthen the nascent 
federalist program, though as discussed above, it created the basis of 
nationalist tensions in the region given the overwhelming preponderance 
of Vietnamese administrators charged with helping the French run 
Cambodia and Laos.102  The French also saw the construction of road 
networks as a means to counter the Siamese proximity and facility of 
access to Laos and integrate the country into the Union. The Route 
Coloniale 13 (R.C.13) linked Saigon and Luang Prabang through the 
Mekong Valley and was hailed as bringing Laos definitively within the 
Indochinese community. Unfortunately, rhetoric did not match reality 
and large parts of the road were impracticable outside of the dry season 
and transport between Laos and Siam remained cheaper and quicker than 
that between Laos and other parts of Indochina.103 By 1938, Indochina’s 
transportation network counted 2,908 kilometers of rail (excluding the 
Yunnan route, up from 1,549 kilometers in 1913) and 27,500 kilometers 
of roads (19,000 of which were paved, up from 18,600 kilometers and 
10,600 kilometers respectively in 1913).104
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Northern Vietnam’s overpopulation problems pushed the 
administration in the early 1930s to improve the hydraulic irrigation 
system of the Red River delta to increase the quantity of rice produced. 
The 1931 hydraulic program, revised and completed in 1936 and 1937, 
was financed with 1,370 francs in loans and intended to develop 
irrigation in the Thai Binh region, the middle delta (Ha Dong-Phu Ly, 
Nam Dinh, Ké Sat, Hung Yen, Bac Ninh, Day dam), those of Annam 
(Vinh, Thanh Hoa, Ha Tinh, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai), of 
Cambodia, and of Laos. Between 1931 and 1940, 41 million piastres 
were invested in the hydraulic Grands travaux and irrigation networks gave 
water to 200,000 hectares in Tonkin, 124,000 in Annam, and 30,000 in 
Cambodia. In Cochinchina, they were instrumental in allowing the area 
devoted to rice culture to expand from 528,000 hectares in 1880 to 
2,443,000 in 1930. However, this did little to alleviate rural poverty since 
most of the land ended up in the hands of big landlords who squeezed 
the peasants, and though famines were largely avoided, the Indochinese 
peasantry was unable to rise above its precarious standards of living, 
marked by continued malnourishment and general underdevelopment.105
Under Decoux’s government, the French continued and expanded 
the Republic’s projects to extend the transportation and hydraulic 
networks throughout the region. Indochina’s isolation, juxtaposed with 
the stationing of Japanese troops, accentuated the economic and 
propagandistic need to engage in public works. Cut off from the 
metropole, Decoux’s administration had unprecedented freedom to plan 
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and carry out infrastructural endeavors as the Ministry of Colonies could 
not scrutinize every minute expense.106 The Grands travaux were necessary 
to facilitate the development of local production, forced by Indochina’s 
autarky, but Decoux saw them as means of promoting the French oeuvre 
and reinforcing the perception of French sovereignty. He saw them as 
tangible means of creating emotional linkages with France, 
demonstrating the colonists’ will and power to build: an immediate 
satisfaction veiling the difficulties in providing long term improvements to 
standards of living.107  In his memoirs, Decoux wrote: “It is through the 
Grands travaux of public interest that the politics of prestige that I 
intended to pursue at the head of Indochina manifested themselves in the 
most tangible way to the autochthon populations.”108 The Grands travaux 
were as much part of the show as they were solutions to the colony’s 
economic problems. 
Decoux’s administration unlocked and connected many parts of 
Indochina thanks to its improvements of the road network. In Laos, the 
final 440 kilometers of the R.C.13 were completed by 1943, linking 
Saigon to Luang Prabang and creating liaisons with the three transversal 
roads that join Laos and Vietnam (R.C.7, 8, and 9). R.C.19 linked Stung 
Treng to Pleiku over 260 kilometers while R.C.14 joined Cochinchina 
with the Central Highlands of Annam over 405 kilometers of new roads 
and R.C.4 took travelers to the border with China from Hanoi and Lao 
Cai. Other projects aimed to link Upper Tonkin with Upper Laos or cities 
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to Tonkinese mines as well as provide access to the new developing city of 
Da Lat. This work must have come at considerable cost of labor and 
resources as many of the roads were finished in parts of the region where 
the terrain was most treacherous, the proverbial last mile that the 
Republic had left until the easier pieces were in place.109  This was a 
valuable piece of propaganda for Decoux in his quest to glorify the 
French oeuvre and resolve.
Decoux’s regime improved hydraulic infrastructures to increase rice 
production, particularly important in Tonkin given its overpopulation and 
the difficulties in transporting foodstuffs from the South. The Ha Dong-
Phuly and Thai-Binh lock (affecting areas of 100,000 and 75,000 hectares 
respectively) were completed in 1943. In Annam, the largest dam in 
Indochina (26 meters high) was constructed in Nghê An and work was 
engaged on a larger dam in Liet Son (28 meters high, 170 long, allowing 
20 million cubic meters of reserve water), while the Vinh-West and Vinh-
South water networks were built. The authorities also built a dam in Ban 
Cung, Cochinchina to protect 110,000 hectares from foul waters and the 
Rach Gia-Ha Tien-Chau Doc-Long Xuyen canals (3,750 hectares) were 
dug where 750 resided newly installed families in the region. Meanwhile, 
irrigation works permitted the further cultivation of lands in Cambodia in 
Siem Reap (15,000 hectares) and near Kompong-Cham and Preyveng.110
In his memoirs, Gautier underscored the importance of the Grands 
travaux during this time in maintaining “trust and domestic peace” and 
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claimed that never “had one moved so many rocks and earth as during 
this time when one would have to have a good excuse to let the work sites 
sleep.”111 There is validity in this as no previous administration had built 
so many roads, bridges, hydraulic systems, or made so many urban 
improvements.112 Infrastructural works were the physical proof of French 
dynamism and promise of development linked with colonial tutelage and 
the colonists had to be ambitious to enhance what they saw as their 
legitimacy. The government asserted that the public works contributed to 
the activity of local industry and that the wages paid would raise the 
purchasing power of those involved who could then afford the foodstuff 
that were no longer be exported.113 The reality was that the wages paid, if 
any were paid at all, were most likely too low to affect consumption, 
certainly not enough to keep up with inflation. Still, the government 
needed the Grands travaux to be a centerpiece of its propaganda to 
promote the French oeuvre in the region, and often warned, explicitly or 
not, of the difficulties that would follow were colonial help to disappear. 
In a form of emotional blackmail, it claimed that the region’s prosperity 
was dependent on the completion of the infrastructural systems, which 
ostensibly was impossible without French knowhow and financial 
backing.114 The Indochinese must have known that even if another power 
stepped in, it would have meant a simple replacement of masters, a 
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recognition that may in turn have been a point of entry for the attraction 
to the internationalist nature of  communism.
For now, the Grands travaux were to be the source of federal and local 
pride, guided by the wisdom of the colonial powers, and Decoux’s 
propaganda machine took every opportunity to praise the material and 
moral prosperity that they would bring. One article exalted the 
determination of the Indochinese peoples that successfully overcame 
economic hardships when led by the knowledge of  French engineers:
Everything is lacking, but we have learned that will, relentlessness, 
ingeniousness, can provide instead. There is no more cement, but never 
have the yards been so numerous. There are no transportation problems 
that do not seem unsolvable, no more iron or wood to be found, no 
more workers  from afar that don’t need to be fed, clothed, cares for with 
expensive means, but everywhere the works are completed on time, the 
plans followed, the programs executed—and what programs!. . .[these 
works] affirm that these difficulties don’t matter, that we only need the 
will to overcome them.115
In another article, which exemplified the French conviction that they 
were giving locals back their authenticity, the new hydraulic system put in 
place in Cambodia by the administration was said to be built on the 
cultural and physical legacy of the Angkor kingdom, bringing not only 
irrigation for the local population, but reconnecting Cambodia with its 
Khmer past. The author wrote:
Not much is left if the enormous works of the great Khmer empire; 
enough, nevertheless, so that one can more or less reconstitute the map, 
take it with new methods and formulas, and return water and life to a 
country that was so alive [animé], and that today would be covered by 
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the forest and completely deserted if France did not accomplish its 
oeuvre there.116
The Grands travaux were the physical manifestation of what colonizer and 
local peoples could achieve through collaboration. Writing about 
Kompong-Cham, a provincial capital in central Cambodia, one author 
described how the “provincial administration and the inhabitants [were] 
equally proud of their little capital, which [was] an example of the results 
a tight collaboration between public powers and the population can 
achieve.”117  Of course this was a collaboration of tutelage, not equality, 
and as with every other facet of Decoux’s administration, the French 
wanted to project the image of benevolent paternalism, an impossible 
task with the crushing of uprisings (Yen Bay or Nghe Tinh, for instance) 
still fresh in many minds.
Corporatism
While Indochina’s isolation forced Decoux to reorganize the 
economy for reasons of pragmatism and prestige, the advent of the 
National Revolution in France provided the legal framework with which 
to apply corporatist structures. Decoux used this framework to implement 
his own version of corporatism, based on the Indochinese context. This 
sometimes put him at odds with Vichy over how this implementation 
should take place (see below). Though Decoux’s Maurrassian influences 
would have made him sensible to a corporatist reorganization of society
—one based on professional groupings where workers, owners, and 
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government decide in concert on production and economic objectives—
the predominantly agrarian nature of Indochinese society meant that 
class consciousness was almost nonexistent in the region. As such, the 
subjective conditions that lead to class warfare, to use Marxist 
terminology, were never mature enough to create the socioeconomic 
disorder that corporatism sought to redress. In other words, the 
corporatism that had been a reaction to the organization of labor in 
Europe had no reason to exist as an antidote to class warfare in 
Indochina because labor was never organized on a scale that warranted 
such a reorganization. Moreover, economic activity outside the primary 
sector was small, which rendered the emulation of Vichy reorganization 
difficult, leading to imbalances and inefficiencies. While the authorities 
had mixed successes in their efforts to implement corporatist structures in 
Indochina, Decoux’s promises that professional groupings would be 
beneficial were an important part of his campaign to gain hearts and 
minds of the French and Indochinese peoples, and provided him with the 
structures through which to better direct economic production.
Corporatism as a theoretical construct was found in Maurrassian 
ideology that sought to eradicate individualism and democracy. Charles 
Maurras wrote:
What makes socialism anarchical and revolutionary is not what makes it 
socialist, it is the democratic poison that always interferes: take out this 
poison and the organization of work becomes once again an important 
actual problem that all healthy societies will resolve satisfactorily and 
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even spontaneously, so long as the political power, being continuous and 
powerful, is willing to maintain order.118
Founded on a hierarchical notion of society in which natural superiorities 
should be respected and nurtured, Action française believed in the 
restoration of corporatist cadres, and its program drew inspiration from 
the traditionalist, aristocratic, and paternalistic branch of social 
Catholicism.119 Corporatism, according to AF, was a solution to end class 
conflict and the despotism of capital, “progenitor and father of all 
democratic power, of all elected power, of all power dependent on 
opinion.”120  Through social and professional bodies led by the state, 
corporatist structures, Maurrassism affirmed, would end class conflict 
and protect both the proletariat and the petite bourgeoisie from the 
concentration of power of large industry.121  Maurras believed that the 
“state, perfectly free . . .in some cases intervenes in the conflicts of capital 
and labor, either in its capacity as judge, or as chief of the national police. 
To prevent certain ills, to repress them all [are] the two functions of the 
state.”122 Furthermore in a corporatist society, according to Maurras, “the 
national state invites friendship and unity instead of exciting hate and 
division as does and must do the democratically elected state.”123 
 Corporatism rejected syndicalism and capitalist liberalism through 
the economic organization of the active population (owners, managers, 
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and workers) into natural groupings, by branch of industry or profession. 
The state would play a central role in harmonizing production with 
society’s needs and mediate between capital and labor, thus ending the 
chaos of the free market and the picket lines. Portuguese President 
Salazar, whose policies inspired the ultraconservative architects of the 
National Revolution, wrote:
The greatest political problem of our time will be the need to organize 
the nation, as much as possible according to its natural plan, that is 
respecting the spontaneous groupings of men around their interests or 
their activities in order to frame them within the state, in such a way that 
[the state] will only be the representation of the nation with the proper 
organs to achieve collective ends. This is the problem that bestows an 
utmost political importance to the corporatist organization.124
Shortly after the armistice, Pétain’s speeches were modeled on both 
Maurras and Salazar’s visions of the corporatist state: “Competition is 
the law of life and if the interests of the bosses and the workers can 
sometimes be opposed, the general interest of the profession, that is 
common to them, must dominate the opposition of their particular 
interests, and is itself a part of the more general interest of national 
production.” Professional organizations, in the Marshal’s view, would
deal with everything that concerns the trade, but [would] limit 
themselves only to the professional domain. They [would] assure, under 
the authority of the state, the crafting and the execution of work 
conventions. They [would] guarantee the dignity of the worker by 
ameliorating his life conditions, until old age. They [would] also avoid 
conflicts by the absolute prohibition of ‘lock outs’ and strikes, by the 
obligatory judgement of  the labor tribunals.125
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Vichy’s record on corporatist organization, like many of the disparities 
between its rhetoric and action, did not reflect these views, and already by 
February 1941 representatives of heavy industry ran the Ministry of 
Industrial Production—which was responsible for appointing the 
members of the Organization Committee that was designed to be the 
building block of the corporatist structures—effectively preserving the 
dominance of big business in the economy.126 Promulgated in France on 
4 October 1941, the Charte du travail [Work Charter], prescribed 
obligatory syndicates for different professional categories, outlawed 
strikes, and established social committees in every factory. As historian 
John Sweets describes, it failed to gain the support of the workers and 
owners did little to encourage state officials to reach its employees 
directly.127
Decoux’s willingness to restructure Indochina’s economy along 
corporatist lines derived from a need to direct the economy rather than 
end class conflict as corporatism promised to do in Europe. Decoux 
refused to implement the Charte du travail, hesitant to evoke its promises 
in a region where workers had no place sitting at a table with owners and 
government. Class consciousness in Indochina was simply not as mature 
as in Europe given its lack of an industrial base, though the strikes held 
between 1929 and 1931 did show potential in the three pays that would 
constitute Vietnam. The proletarian base remained too small. Decoux 
rightly treated the ICP as a nationalist threat that appealed to locals’ 
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desire for independence rather than their proletarianism. The colony’s 
lack of proletarian or democratic traditions—which according to French 
ultraconservatives fueled social anarchy and threatened to atomize 
society—provided a different context for the justification of professional 
groupings. Much like with artisanat, Decoux saw the reorganization of 
the entire economy based on activity as a means to assure the control, 
distribution, and sale of certain key products.128 Decoux affirmed that the 
new doctrine must condemn liberalism and socialism and even though 
the situation in Indochina was different from that of the metropole, the 
ends were the same. Decoux wanted to create a third path, an economy 
based on the willingness to serve the community, to make it strong, 
united, and durable through planning and control. Unlike socialist 
societies, this one would be based on hierarchy and natural order.129 
The desire to control the professional groupings was a significant and 
pragmatic departure from Maurras, who wrote “the direct interventions 
[of the state] must be as rare as possible”130 The realities of Indochina’s 
situation—its isolation, its agrarian economy, and its colonial 
administration—meant that the government sought greater control, not 
industrial self-management. Decoux counted on industry leaders to 
provide him with information to make the necessary decisions on how to 
intervene in the economy.131 The hierarchy he envisioned placed him at 
the top so that this distorted vision of corporatism no longer treated the 
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business community (much less workers) as a partner, but rather a court 
to the king. Professional groupings simply streamlined the voices from 
industry.132  He saw a double role for professional groupings, one that 
resembled little the official doctrine of the National Revolution: to 
provide the government information on the potential of the different 
professions in order to allow it to orient, direct, and harmonize their 
activities; and, through hierarchy and discipline, to allow for the 
directives of  the government to be executed.133
Pétain’s denunciation of economic liberalism provided the theoretical 
framework for the rhetoric surrounding professional grouping as means 
of building a more just society, even if the government’s ultimate 
intentions were to make Decoux’s proconsulship stronger. The authorities 
understood that they had to spin the measures to the people so that the 
latter believed they were in the interest of the common good.134 This must 
have been a daunting task in areas such as food and goods requisitions to 
be transported to more distant parts of the colony and there is little 
evidence that the authorities were successful in convincing the people of 
the need for such solidarity. On the contrary, it often bred ill-will and 
misunderstandings. Irreverent or naive, Decoux, asked the peoples of 
Indochina to associate themselves, without reserve, to the new economic 
principles, which he presented as one of justice and understanding with 
new rules that would be based on the submission to the common good.135 
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In other words, the strengthening of colonial structures was positioned as 
a step toward a better society. This was more than a promotion of French 
tutelage, this was a step toward a command economy. Yet Decoux had no 
other choice if he wanted to take the steps necessary to maintain a semi-
functioning economy.
The 6 December 1940 law that created professional organizations in 
France extended to Indochina one year later, in December 1941.136  The 
heavy centralization that ensued was a loose application of the 
metropolitan model. Ruptures in communications provided the GGI with 
only the broad brushes of the new structures of the French economy and 
conversely Hanoi could not give a full account of the new conditions in 
the colony.137  For over a year, telegraphic exchanges between Indochina 
and Vichy tried to resolve the question of exporting the corporatist model 
of an industrialized state to a predominately agrarian and ethnically 
heterogenous colony. In 1942, Minister of Colonies Jules Brévié warned 
Decoux against centralized structures, reminding him that the metropole 
was going in the opposite direction (at least in theory) to minimize 
decision-making hurdles.138
Decoux repeatedly asked Vichy for more power to localize 
professional groupings based on Indochinese specificities, as determined 
by the multiethnic and predominately small land holding and agrarian 
economy. While the Central Committee in Vichy—which coordinated 
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professional groupings for the government—instructed him to nominate 
only Frenchmen to leadership positions in the groupings, Decoux 
believed it was indispensable to associate the locals to these enterprises 
and to assure them representation by granting them vice-presidential 
positions. This was critical to associating, or giving the illusion of 
association, locals to the efforts and strengthening Franco-Indochinese 
ties, though the French would never relinquish real power. Decoux 
ignored orders from the metropole and assigned locals to these posts. He 
also asked for permission to create an Indochinese Economic Council, 
where he would have powers of arbitration, fearing that the 
representatives of large industry in Indochina would act in opposition to 
what he believed to be the greater interests of the whole, or at least the 
colonial structures.139  This Council was another means of lessening the 
clout that the industrialists may have had in the past, conversely 
strengthening the government’s ability to control the economy. Vichy 
denied this request, afraid that the Council Decoux proposed would 
erode the Central Committee’s power (from Vichy) over the colony.140 
Frustrated by the delays in implementation of his program that 
authorizations from the Central Committee required as well as the latter’s 
lack of knowledge of the Indochinese context, Decoux continued to 
appoint leaders of the professional groupings and organize them in such 
a way as he saw fit. In a show of his increasing brazenness, he informed 
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Vichy directly that he would continue to disobey orders to ensure the 
defense of  the interests that were entrusted to him.141
While by the end of 1941, groupings in Indochina still did not exist 
because of the “grave difficulties due in particular to political 
circumstances” and only the import sector was organized into some form 
of corporatist structure, by the middle of 1942 Decoux announced plans 
to reorganize the Indochinese economy based on the metropolitan model. 
The decision to divide the Indochinese economy into in six groupings 
came from Vichy, in spite of the region’s industrial underdevelopment 
and the inefficiencies that threatened to ensue. These groupings came 
under: Agriculture and Forestry, Industry, Mining, Commerce, Transport, 
and Credit (Vichy excluded family businesses from corporatist structures 
and therefore artisanat since they were in general family-run operations). 
Decoux followed directives and met with leaders of each sector, no 
matter how small, but he quietly altered the plans as he saw fit.142 
Critically, after much protest, Decoux officially obeyed Vichy’s 
instructions to keep family businesses (which included peasants who 
produced goods in addition to crops, therefore making artisanry their 
secondary activity and therefore not included in the French artisan 
classification) outside the groupings, in spite of its importance relative to 
the economy as a whole.143  He managed to circumvent the order not to 
integrate the artisanat by creating the Local Committees of Artisanat, 
which in Decoux’s vision, served as the pyramidal base for the 
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Indochinese economy by organizing its members to source materials, 
determine production, and find markets, policies that were vital to the 
health of the substitution economy. He believed the inclusion of the 
artisanat within the corporatist structures was indispensable for political 
reasons vis-à-vis the indigenous masses and because artisanat could not be 
dissociated from industry given its potential to supply it with finished and 
semifinished goods and he tried to get around Vichy’s opposition by 
redefining what constitutes a family business.144
In order to gain public approval, the press ran a campaign to describe 
the benefits and characteristics of an economically organized society. La 
Tribune Indochinoise explained that, as part of a group, the profession was 
“entirely geared toward socially useful ends, by ends desired by the 
Marshal,” ones that would subordinate individual interests to the 
common good. They would allow the state, better informed, to make the 
appropriate decisions to ensure the well-being of all peoples of 
Indochina.145  It was suggested that corporatism was part of a long 
European tradition stretching back almost a thousand years and as such 
was an integral part of the gift of the French civilization that would help 
develop Indochina.146 The weekly Indochine was particularly aggressive in 
its promotion of corporatism through a series of articles describing the 
symbiotic relationship between society’s individual parts when organized 
along corporatist structures. The magazine did not hesitate to appeal to 
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what the French believed to be Indochinese traditionalism, making 
connections between corporatist structures and the fabric of local society: 
“No more than the family group, the professional group is not compatible 
with the proletarian condition. So that a trade is no longer a means to 
acquire money or a place where man is forced to serve an anonymous 
state, the ‘relations’ that constitute his reason for being must also be 
preserved, saved.”147 Corporatism promised to restitute property, against 
the dehumanization of capitalist accumulation. It was written that under 
the new system, “property [was] a guarantee of the person. It remain[ed] 
human and salvageable. It [was] not founded on money but on creative 
work.”148 The state would be the “supreme arbiter of generalized social 
conflicts,” supported by “a deep spiritual, intellectual, and moral reform 
of the Nation.”149  The colonial authorities presented corporatism as 
another means through which French leadership would guide 
Indochinese peoples into economic development while preserving the 
traditional bases upon which their societies were built, protecting them 
from the ravages of  international capitalism.
Conclusion
On 9 March 1945, the day the Japanese seized power from the 
French authorities, Indochina’s economic situation was catastrophic, with 
the famine of the winter of 1944-1945 as the paroxysm of indigence. 
Difficulties for the colonists had begun as early as the summer of 1940 
when Vichy and London severed relations. While Britain and Decoux’s 
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government continued to trade to a limited extent until the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, nothing could compensate for the end of regular maritime 
communication with France, which had accounted for half of 
Indochina’s commerce before the war. Indochina’s negligible industrial 
base could not furnish the region with the products necessary to maintain 
local standards of living. The French authorities had no alternative but to 
turn to Japan for the supply of goods it could not manufacture, in 
exchange for agricultural and mineral commodities.
The 6 May 1941 trade agreement signed between Vichy and Tokyo 
gave most favored nation status to Japan and aimed to supply Indochina 
with the goods it needed while providing the Land of the Rising Sun with 
the materials (including food) necessary for its war effort. Indochina was 
to receive machinery, paper, chemicals, and textiles in exchange for rice 
and rubber. Unfortunately, over the course of almost four years, Japan 
never met the quotas set by the agreement and by the end of 1943, Hanoi 
could no longer count on receiving products in any quantity from its 
partner. It is difficult to determine the degree to which the Japanese were 
committed to reaching these objectives—even at the outset—but the 
advance of the American forces in the Pacific led to progressive 
dominance of the US on the seas, disrupting maritime traffic between 
Indochina and Japan and thus further complicating matters for the 
French. Allied supremacy in the region also impeded Indochinese 
internal trade through the continuous bombardment of the region’s 
railways which prevented goods from circulating internally. Perhaps if the 
GGI had faced autarky alone it could have reengineered the economy in 
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such a way as to maintain standards of living to acceptable levels, but the 
devastation of the war on its infrastructure doomed any attempt. No 
administration could have succeeded no matter its political persuasion.
Decoux saw in artisanat not national moral salvation—though he 
used Pétainist rhetoric to fetishize small scale production against the 
dehumanization of large industry—but rather the means to build the 
substitution economy that would save Indochina from its autarkic penury. 
He encouraged the formation of local cooperatives to ease cost burdens 
of small and family businesses while directing the types of goods they 
should produce for the benefit of the macroeconomy. The artisanat, in 
Decoux’s vision, could feed medium industry, which in turn could supply 
large manufacturing enterprises. The National Revolution provided the 
context and legitimizing force with which to promote artisanat but 
Indochina, with its primarily agrarian economy, never experienced the 
industrialization process that swept away the cottage industry. Organizing 
the artisanat was a way of controlling the economy by creating more or 
less formal bodies that worked with the government, carrying out the 
latter’s directives. Again, whatever successes the GGI achieved were 
wiped out by the destruction of  the economy due to war.
Similarly the reorganization of economic sectors into professional 
groupings was a means for the government to understand and direct the 
region’s production more effectively. Since the 1920s, the colonial 
authorities were reluctant to develop a strong industrial base in Indochina 
precisely because of the negative effects of proletarianization and the risk 
it could pose to French sovereignty. Even under the Popular Front labor 
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unions remained illegal. The class conflict that corporatism meant to end 
was rarely mature in Indochina and it was absurd to imagine the 
government sitting at a table with both owners and workers. Professional 
groupings organized the economy, facilitated planning (which was a 
corporatist objective), and redistributed resources, but it was not meant to 
reign in the power of capital or labor. The corporatist discourse that 
Decoux employed in Indochina borrowed phrases from Pétainist 
speeches, but unlike in the metropole, where corporatism was supposed 
to lead to decentralization, Decoux tightened government control on the 
economy. As with artisanat cooperatives (that could not officially be 
grouped professionally based on Vichy directives), the reorganization of 
the economy based on groupings was a means to facilitate the regime’s 
direction of  production plans.
Like the authorities’ administrative reforms, the economic 
reorganization that ensued from the circumstances of isolation was used 
as a means of promoting the French oeuvre in the region. Following a 
major theme of French colonial rule, whether calling on Franco-
Indochinese solidarity, praising the moral purification of artisanal 
creativity, or building roads that connected remote regions, Decoux’s 
regime wanted to show that France was the only guide that could deliver 
socioeconomic development for the region through tutelage and through 
the “gift” of its civilizational achievements. In spite of all the rhetoric of 
the National Revolution, its theoretical opposition to the Republic, 
Decoux’s regime adhered to the same discourse of his predecessors. The 
new economic structures were designed for more than minimizing the 
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hardships of autarky—although this remains a critical point. They aimed 
to keep Indochina French by salvaging the colonial economic structures 
and creating the sentiment of Franco-Indochinese symbiosis, one that 
could overcome any hardship through French creativity and Indochinese 
sweat. It was part of the colonial discourse that described Indochina as “a 
veritable harbor of  calm and peace in a world singularly troubled.”150 
In spite of its many measures, the government was unable to provide 
for the entire Indochinese population—though Allied disruptive actions 
deserve much of the blame—culminating in the famine of 1944-1945 
when over a million Tonkinese succumbed to hunger.151  With the 
Tonkinese population having increased from 8.7 million in 1936 to 10 
million by 1944, while paddy output had dropped 20 percent during the 
previous two decades, the authorities simply could not provide Tonkin 
and Northern Annam  with the quantities of food they needed for 
sustenance without Cochinchinese rice imports.  No one could have 
thought the GGI’s call for these regions to sustain themselves was a 
viable solution and the administration was forced to propose a plan that 
was doomed to fail, exposing its inabilities to provide for the population, 
thereby eroding its credibility. In 1943, Decoux spoke of the need for 
Tonkin and North Annam to become self-reliant in terms of rice 
production, understanding the precarious nature of the colony’s 
infrastructure. He pointed to the lack of reliability of transportation, but 
ultimately, in spite of early warnings, he did not—could not—take the 
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measures necessary to avert famine, a failure which mattered more than 
these warnings. Natural disasters also did their part toward this tragedy. 
Drought and insects affected the crops in the spring of 1944 while 
typhoons in June and floods in November reduced yearly overall output 
further, magnifying the problems posed by lack of transportation. 
According to David Marr, Tonkin’s 1944 official output of 1.68 million 
tons of paddy would have provided barely enough for everyone to survive 
(171 kilograms per capita) until the next harvest in June 1945, even had it 
been divided equally. Instead both the French and Japanese stockpiled 
rice for their future use, though local rumors certainly exaggerated the 
actual quantity located in warehouses. By December 1944, many villagers 
were reduced to eating ground-up rice husks, tree roots, and bark and the 
winter’s exceptionally cold temperatures put people further at risk.152 
Many survivors were psychologically devastated by the quotidian scenes 
of emaciated corpses lying in the streets, wailing starving compatriots, 
and the humiliation many endured to find food. Their ire quickly turned 
on the French who were seen as letting the famine continue, either 
through their inability to bring rice to Tonkin or their supposed 
stockpiling of foodstuffs, or at the very least their inability as the 
“protecting power” to prevent the Japanese from continuing to enforce 
starvation-inducing collection quotas. The French oeuvre failed them, and 
the ICP recognized how the famine could lead to the maturation of 
political consciousness of the people—provided their plight was 
alleviated just enough—and encouraged peasants to storm granaries with 
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the slogan “Destroy the granaries, solve the danger of famine!”153  The 
momentum was building toward the August Revolution.
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Chapter VII: Conclusion
French political historian René Rémond wrote, “[i]t is always worth 
going back to the origins of movements, the source being purer, it still 
offers an image that is intact.”1  The key to understanding the 
implementation of the National Revolution in Indochina is precisely to 
go back to its ideological sources, recognizing that the influences which 
shaped played a greater part in the story than the specific measures put in 
place in Vichy and exported to the colonies. The National Revolution was 
intended to be the culmination of pent up anti-Republican sentiments, the 
intellectual legacies of Barrès and Maurras that already were powerful 
forces during the 1930s. France’s desperate socioeconomic situation 
under occupation juxtaposed with the politics of those in key positions 
led a Vichy government incapable—and unwilling—to stand behind the 
rhetoric of its Head of State, often acting against the very doctrine it 
officially embraced. The National Revolution lost its momentum only 
seven months after the 10 July vote that dissolved the Third Republic 
when François Darlan replaced Flandin as Pétain’s deputy and opened 
the door to collaboration with Germany, a project that took priority over 
the programs of the National Revolution. While Darlan’s government 
maintained and even broadened exclusionary laws, there was little 
sympathy for the more ultraconservative elements of Pétainist discourse 
that, influenced by Maurras, aimed to destroy the gains of the Revolution 
in favor of a return to a more traditional society, based on hierarchy, 
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localisms, and natural groupings. Laval’s return to power marked the 
definitive turn toward pragmatism, and the invigoration of 
collaborationism. The paradox of Vichy’s inability to implement 
Pétainism is found in this pragmatism, which was fueled by the need to 
manage the occupying forces and the hope that Germany would allow 
France to sit alongside it in the New European Order, its position as a 
world power reestablished thanks to its willingness to fit within the new 
German-led model.
There thus existed no comprehensive National Revolution in France 
for Vichy to export—no impetus to transform society in the metropole, 
much less in colonies where societies in no manner resembled those of 
Europe—and thus the ultraconservative policies of the Decoux regime in 
Indochina need to be examined not in terms of Vichy’s alleged cloning 
overseas, as Jennings argues, but rather in the more localized fusion of 
Decoux’s worldview and the geopolitical realities of the colony. More 
than any political or sociological program of transformation, the GGI’s 
foremost imperative was the maintenance of French sovereignty in 
Indochina, which was threatened not only by the presence of Japanese 
troops but also, as became increasingly evident over the course of the war, 
the tepid commitment from the Allies to return the colonies to France 
after the war. Like most other naval officers at the time, Decoux was 
heavily influenced by the discourse of Action française and the National 
Revolution provided the vehicle with which to achieve the safeguard of 
French sovereignty in the region. To examine the policy-making of the 
Decoux regime, it is critical to understand the worldview that guided the 
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Admiral’s decisions, the intellectual foundation from which he assessed 
the situation in Indochina and elaborated a roadmap from which to 
ensure French sovereignty after the war, which was always the primary 
objective, far ahead of  any aspiration to create a “new man.”2
The Pétainist discourse resonated with Decoux’s own worldviews 
because like the latter it also originated in the writings of Maurras and, 
looking through his ideological lenses, Decoux saw Indochinese cultures 
anchored in traditionalism, hierarchy, and community, thereby presenting 
fertile grounds for the implementation of his ultraconservative agenda. 
France and Indochinese societies were vastly different socioeconomically, 
but for Decoux there existed commonalities that could bring the 
civilizations closer, France assuming the role of mentor to harness the 
underlying characteristics of Indochinese cultures. Decoux was driven by 
the same European notion of the linearity of the development of societies 
that inspired the republican mission civilisatrice. Decoux brought his own 
brand of authoritarianism to the colony by adapting his 
ultraconservatism to an Indochina he believed open to such ideas, and he 
intended to win the hearts and minds of its inhabitants through the 
implementation of policies that in his mind tapped the region’s 
particularities while elevating France as a benevolent tutor.
Decoux’s administration was not an “unfettered form of Vichy rule”3 
because there was no “one Vichy,” but more important, it sought to 
secure French sovereignty by elevating the continuity and resolve of the 
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French oeuvre in the region. The National Revolution, or rather its 
Maurrassian sources, would provide, Decoux believed, the vehicle 
through which to promote the benefits of French tutelage through a new 
kind of administration, with a new culture that promoted natural 
groupings from which the elite would rise for the benefit of all society, 
from local villages to the capital of an Indochinese Federation held 
together by France. This new form of power was all that was left for the 
French to defend their legitimacy or better yet, convince the Indochinese 
peoples that the glory of French civilization would accompany them on 
their path to development—a linearity of social progression proper to 
European thinking.
In many ways Decoux’s regime was more a reflection of Republican 
colonialism than it was of Vichy politics. The Admiral’s policies, it turns 
out, were most often an extension of the politics of the previous four 
decades. Yet the National Revolution—and Indochina’s isolation—gave 
Decoux the possibility to take the policies further than his predecessors 
(who remained constrained by republican ideals and metropolitan 
bureaucracy), solidifying them in an ultraconservative discourse that 
would not have been entirely permissible under the Republic. Indochinese 
federalism had already been pushed by Sarraut and Pasquier, albeit in less 
sophisticated forms. The elevation of local sovereigns had also been a 
goal during the 1930s as means of better controlling the population and 
reversing the perceived weakening of Indochinese rulers. Even the 
omnipresent and powerful IPP was at best a more complex and effective 
form of censorship that had already existed under every republican 
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administration, even though the Popular Front had allowed more 
dissenting voices. 
Decoux was able to go further specifically because the National 
Revolution provided him with the ideological justifications behind these 
policies, justifications that were anchored in a certain view of society. 
Maurrassian discourse legitimized French tutelage over the region as part 
of a natural order, and the re-hierarchization of society created a basis on 
which to raise the prestige of the elite to render them more effective and 
obliging in maintaining French rule. Arguably, the colony’s economic 
reorganization along corporatist lines was primarily attributable to 
autarkical imperatives and any administration would have had to reorient 
production in similar ways, including an artisan sector whose resources 
needed to be diverted to the production of utilitarian rather than artistic 
goods. In any case, Pétainism and its Maurrassian roots provided the 
framework for these measures.
Republican and the Decoux regimes were willing to repress local 
anti-French movements violently to maintain control,4  but unlike his 
predecessors, Decoux punished those within the European community 
who openly expressed views against his government. This marked a 
significant break with previous administrations, but none of his 
predecessors faced the presence of foreign troops on Indochinese soil, 
undermining French legitimacy and threatening to overturn the 
administration should it challenge that presence. Still, while these unique 
wartime conditions played an important part in imposing censorship 
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(both in the press and as a matter of individual expression), they do not 
account for the unprecedented severity of the regime’s demands for 
discipline. Some drew similarities between Decoux the Governor General 
and Decoux the Admiral. One witness said “Decoux certainly thought of 
himself as master of Indochina after God, like he was on his ship.”5 
Decoux’s very character and naval background abhorred dissent. Just as 
important, his ultraconservative worldview, based on the virtues of 
hierarchy, reinforced his intolerance for opposing voices. 
Decoux stressed the need for silence specifically because the 
government could not afford to enforce discipline through punitive 
means. It needed the French community to cooperate so that the GGI 
was not forced to enact its own policies, sending large numbers of 
Frenchmen to prison, which, in Decoux’s mind, would have sent the 
Indochinese peoples a disturbing message about the lack of unity and 
support among the French for the government. This would have eroded 
what the French believed to be their legitimacy by damaging the image 
Decoux wanted to project of a France determined and capable of 
assuming its role as the colony’s natural tutor. Decoux would express 
later his certainty that had the French community maintained its 
discipline through the last months of the war, and not been so open about 
the organization of a local resistance movement, thus provoking the 
Japanese into seizing power, the GGI would have achieved in its mission 
to maintain French sovereignty over Indochina.6  The Japanese coup de 
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force destroyed the last vestiges of French authority (both administrative 
and physical) and set in motion the events leading to the Vietnamese 
August Revolution, and to heightening nationalist sentiments among the 
Cambodian and the Lao.
As such, the legacy of the Decoux regime cannot best be understood 
in terms of to the impetus given to independentist forces by the National 
Revolution’s promotion of “national rebirth and authenticity.”7 The GGI 
was aware of the risks posed by the promotion of local patriotisms 
(which it quite rightly feared could turn into anti-French nationalism) 
important to building the Indochinese federation, but it was not able to 
contain them, which eventually contributed to its demise. The Federalist 
spirit that Decoux was so convinced was the key to maintaining French 
sovereignty in Indochina developed into a distorted creature. Decoux’s 
faith in an Indochinese Union capable of creating bonds of solidarity 
between the locals and the French (as well as among local pays) was 
either delusional or desperate. 
In either case, the “revival of cultural authenticity” is an insufficient 
reason to explain the momentum of local nationalisms because there 
already existed a strong sense of national identity in Vietnam, formed 
through self-definitions in opposition to other societies—perceptions of 
what was Vietnamese and what was not—and concepts of juridical 
delineations of states, inherited from its experiences with China. Even if 
the French did revive authenticity in Cambodia and Laos, as argued by 
Edwards and Jennings, the Khmer and Lao postwar governments did not 
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immediately repudiate French rule, for reasons which will be discussed 
below. The supposed revival may have aided in the development of a 
national awareness but it was not its main catalyst. It should also be 
pointed out that the leadership of the ICP spent much of the war 
preparing for the eventual revolution with little reference to, or influence 
from, the propaganda and policies of the Decoux regime. Had the French 
remained in power until the end of the war, troops would have violently 
repressed demonstrations, altering the timeline of the independentist 
movements, but ultimately delaying, not preventing, them.  In this sense, 
we can talk about the futility of Decoux’s efforts, the fatal destiny of a 
French colonialism beyond the Admiral’s control.
When Admiral d’Argenlieu assumed the role of High Commissioner 
(the Fourth Republic’s new title for the Head of the French 
administration in Indochina) in October 1945, he inherited an untenable 
situation. The Vietnamese were invigorated by the ousting of the French, 
who, after ruling for 80 years, lost power in 48 hours, and the momentum 
behind the August declaration of statehood was unstoppable. The Viet 
Minh’s 1941 change in strategy away from class-based struggle in favor of 
a broad coalition of nationalists had opened up possibilities to rally all 
Vietnamese antagonized by French and Japanese imperialism. This 
coalition also extended across ethnicities as the ICP and the Viet Minh 
started giving attention to the idea of a united Indochina.8  This was, 
however, nothing new and not a consequence of French initiatives to 
create a spirit of federalism. Goscha explains that the ICP had its own 
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vision of an Indochinese Federation, one designed to be a counter-state, 
against French rule.9  While many Lao and Khmer independentists 
understood that they would need to collaborate with the better armed and 
organized Viet Minh to be successful, there existed a parallel and 
oppositional current of anti-Vietnamese sentiments within their societies, 
ones that, albeit intensified by the migration of Vietnamese into Laos and 
Cambodia under French rule, pre-dated the arrival of the Europeans, 
when Siam and Vietnam competed for suzerain domination over these 
lands.10  The Cambodian and Lao elites who most strongly held these 
anti-Vietnamese sentiments were encouraged and even stimulated by the 
events following 9 March, and they eventually chose to pursue a gradual 
path to independence which did not involve collaboration with the ICP.
When the French returned to Indochina in late 1945, they were 
surprised that they were not greeted enthusiastically by the populations. 
The Fourth Republic’s fundamental misunderstanding of Indochinese 
mentalities and motivations is the continuity of the same 
misunderstandings of the Decoux regime. Decoux designed policies 
based on his beliefs of what was necessary to safeguard the sovereignty of 
France by winning over the Indochinese peoples, but his administration’s 
miscalculations doomed its endeavors.
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to reexamine the 
revolutionary movements in Indochina that followed the Second World 
War, but this study hopefully provides insights into the mechanisms 
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10. Ironically, the French justified establishing protectorates over Laos and Cambodia as 
means of  shielding them from the Vietnamese.
behind the colonial administration’s futile policy-making that was one 
part of the dialectic behind independence (with the local peoples as the 
antithesis, of course). During his four and a half years as Governor 
General, Decoux used the National Revolution as a vehicle to promote 
his agenda, crafted based on his Maurrassian worldview and designed to 
maintain French sovereignty in Indochina after the war, but no matter 
what course the admiral had taken, it was doomed because of exogenous 
forces (the inevitability of the Japanese coup as its fortunes turned) and 
the endogenous rejection of French colonialism that the fall of France in 
Europe and Asia accelerated.
In evaluating the record of the Decoux administration, and with 
hindsight, one must appreciate the eventual futility of his efforts. The 
colonial authorities were bound to be ousted by the Japanese eventually. 
Franco-Japanese rapprochement could do nothing to stop the advance of 
the Allied forces in the Pacific and the subsequent suspicion that the US 
planned to land on the Southeast Asian continent. Had Decoux acted 
upon his initial impulses to continue the fight from the colonies (as 
discussed in Chapter 1), the Japanese would have ended French rule 
much earlier. Instead, he took a course that prolonged French rule in 
Indochina for four and a half years, in all its agony. By 9 March 1945, 
French colonialism had already lost the Mandate of Heaven and 
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